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ABSTRACT  
   
"Wide adaptation" is an agricultural concept often employed and seldom closely 
examined. Norman E. Borlaug, while working for the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) on an 
agricultural project in Mexico in the 1950s, discovered that some tropical wheat varieties 
could be grown over broad geographic regions, not just in Central and South America but 
also in the Middle East and South Asia. He called this wide, or broad, adaptation, which 
scientists generally define as a plant type that has high yields throughout diverse 
environments. Borlaug soon made wide adaptation as a core pillar of his international 
wheat program. Borlaug's wheat program rapidly expanded in the 1960s, and he and his 
colleagues from the RF heavily promoted wide adaptation and the increased use of 
fertilizers in the Middle East and India. These events led to the green revolution, when 
several countries rapidly increased their wheat production. Indian wheat cultivation 
changed radically in the 1960s due to new technologies and policy reforms introduced 
during the green revolution, and farmers' adoption of 'technology packages' of modern 
seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation.  
Just prior to the green revolution, Indian wheat scientists adopted Borlaug’s new 
plant breeding philosophy—that varieties should have as wide an adaptation as possible. 
But Borlaug and Indian wheat scientists also argued that wide adaptation could be 
achieved by selecting only plants that did well in high fertility and irrigated 
environments. Scientists claimed, in many cases erroneously, that widely adapted 
varieties still produced high yields in marginal, or resource poor, areas. Many people 
have criticized the green revolution for its unequal spread of benefits, but none of these 
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critiques address wide adaptation—the core tenant held by Indian wheat scientists to 
justify their focus on highly productive land while ignoring marginal and rainfed 
agriculture. My dissertation describes Borlaug and the RF's research program in wide 
adaptation, Borlaug's involvement in the Indian wheat program, and internal debates 
about wide adaptation and selection under favorable environments among Indian 
scientists. It argues that scientists leveraged the concept of wide adaptation to justify a 
particular regime of research focused on high production agriculture, and that the 
footprints of this regime are still present in Indian agriculture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
Norman Borlaug is perhaps the most famous agricultural scientist in the modern 
world. He is remembered for saving millions of people from starvation in the 1960s and 
1970s by introducing high yielding varieties of wheat. Starting in the 1940s, he worked 
for the Rockefeller Foundation’s (RF) agricultural program in Mexico. In 1955, he 
developed a fertilizer-responsive variety of semi-dwarf wheat that would soon spread 
around the world. Five years later, he discovered wheat varieties with what he called 
“surprisingly broad adaptation” (known also as wide adaptation) (Borlaug, 1968, p. 8). 
These varieties could be grown not just across agro-climatic zones, but across continents. 
Borlaug soon realized that this wide adaptation was due to the genetic trait of photoperiod 
insensitivity.1 Yet discussions of wide adaptation seldom centered on photoperiod 
insensitivity; they focused on vague claims of improvements in the inherent yield of 
wheat (high yield independent of environmental context) and harkened to the greater 
quest of feeding the world.  
Becoming head of the RF’s international wheat program soon after he discovered 
wide adaptation, Borlaug made wide adaptation a key part of his program. To Borlaug, 
wide adaptation became emblematic of his program’s global reach and ability to affect 
radical agricultural change. Against the prevailing sentiment that “plant breeders must 
work in the place where their crop will be grown,” (Hesser, 2006, p. 52), Borlaug argued 
                                                
1 Photoperiod insensitivity is a simple dominant genetic trait (Ppd) that allowed wheat 
varieties to grow at different latitudes and in different seasons, something that North 
American wheats could not do. 
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that wide adaptation was not only a tenable, but also a desirable plant-breeding goal. 
Through his publications, correspondence, and lectures, he influenced agricultural 
scientists around the world. Beyond this paradigm-shifting endeavor, however, Borlaug 
had a very mission-oriented reason for promoting wide adaptation: he wanted to 
transform agricultural production in developing countries from pre-modern to modern, 
and thought that widely adapted varieties were the most likely way to accomplish this. 
In the 1960s, Borlaug quickly moved beyond the theoretical aspects of wide 
adaptation to its implementation. Borlaug and his colleagues saw wide adaptation as a 
way to speed up the process of adapting wheat varieties to countries with limited 
scientific resources to accomplish the task themselves (Rockefeller Foundation, 1964). 
He wrote to RF agricultural sciences director Albert Moseman in 1963:  
Wheat varieties are much more flexible and plastic in their adaptation than has 
ever been recognized in the past. I feel that the materials that come from one 
broadly based wheat breeding program in which the objectives are a wide 
adaptation and resistance to the most important diseases of wheat, will be of value 
as varieties or lines that can be reselected for direct use in countries far distant 
from the location of the breeding programs. (Borlaug, January 18, 1963)  
Borlaug proposed in 1965 that, “varieties and breeding lines with broad adaptation can be 
introduced rapidly and grown successfully in many areas of the world where expansion 
of food production is urgently needed. This is not possible with narrowly adapted 
varieties” (Rockefeller Foundation, 1965, p. 214). Borlaug realized that he could not only 
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transmit scientific knowledge to other wheat breeding programs around the world, he 
could directly transfer wheat germplasm.  
In a plant-breeding context, adaptation means the relative performance (roughly, 
yield and disease resistance) of a plant variety under different conditions. Agricultural 
scientists define wide, or broad, adaptation as a crop that has high yields under many 
different environments and locations, also known as phenotypic stability. Scientists can 
measure variation of plant characteristics (such as plant height) to study the phenotypic 
responses, or adaptation, of plants to different conditions, but adaptation is typically 
measured in yield, or biomass per area. RF scientists wrote that yield “is the most 
meaningful measure of adaptation in terms of world food needs” (Krull et al., 1968, p. 1). 
Despite the many possible advantages of widely adapted wheat varieties, there is 
significant evidence that Borlaug’s intended goal of wide adaptation—that is, wide 
adaptation across agronomic conditions—could be better described as adaptation across 
locations with similar agronomic conditions. Further, I present evidence that Borlaug so 
fervently promoted his intended goal that he overlooked evidence to the contrary. 
Borlaug and other proponents of wide adaptation argued that widely adapted wheat 
varieties were superior to local varieties (see Chapter 2) in both favorable and 
unfavorable environments, due to some “inherent yielding ability” (Stakman, Bradfield, 
& Mangelsdorf, 1967, p. 80). Further, they argued that locally adapted varieties were 
inferior under favorable environments because they could not utilize higher levels of 
fertilizer. 
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Critics against wide adaptation have argued that widely adapted crops were only 
widely adapted to favorable environments, and thus did not benefit farmers who face 
variable and non-optimal environments.2 My dissertation research, both quantitative and 
qualitative, tends to support this position. In the 1950s, Borlaug specifically adapted 
wheat varieties to high fertility and irrigated environments, by selecting varieties under 
those conditions. After he discovered broad geographic range of his wheat varieties that 
was possible due to their photoperiod insensitivity, he then began to make arguments that 
his varieties could also be adopted in rainfed and low fertility environments. Despite the 
evidence against Borlaug’s claims, Borlaug’s ideas have had lasting consequences in the 
Indian and international wheat research programs (the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center [CIMMYT] and the Indian Agricultural Research Institute [IARI]), 
leading to a system that is biased towards breeding and testing varieties under favorable 
conditions. 
By the 1970s, Borlaug canonized wide adaptation in his narrative of the green 
revolution. In his Nobel Lecture, Borlaug spoke of the Mexican semi-dwarf varieties he 
developed:  
It is the unusual breadth of adaption combined with high genetic yield potential, 
short straw, a strong responsiveness and high efficiency in the use of heavy doses 
of fertilizers, and a broad spectrum of disease resistance that has made the 
                                                
2 Or, in the words of James C. Scott, that “every effort is made to transform and 
homogenize field conditions so that the field meets the genotype’s specific requirements” 
(Scott, 1999, p. 302). 
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Mexican dwarf varieties the powerful catalyst that they have become in launching 
the green revolution. (Borlaug, 1970) 
While many scholars have studied the green revolution, this dissertation will examine the 
critical yet overlooked history of Borlaug’s wide adaptation and its impact on 
international wheat research. 
A Brief History of Adaptation Studies in Agriculture 
The science of plant adaptation is historically and conceptually tied to plant 
collection and introduction. In the twentieth century and earlier, the science of plant 
introduction and adaptation was based on trial and error as well as using climate 
analogues to predict areas of good adaptation (Wilsie, 1962). When farmers or scientists 
introduce a plant to a new location, they test its adaptation to the new environment, or the 
“transposition of a genetic entity from an environment to which it is attuned to one in 
which it is untried” (Frankel, 1958, p. 338). While ad hoc collection schemes occurred 
earlier, in “1827 President John Adams instructed the foreign consuls to collect seeds and 
rare plants and send them to Washington, DC” (Baranski, 2013, no page number). Mark 
Alfred Carleton at the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) started procuring wheat 
varieties from around the world to test them in the US around 1894 (Loegering & 
Borlaug, 1963). The USDA created the Office of Foreign Seed and Plant Introduction in 
1898 (Baranski, 2013). 
Adaptation has been, and continues to be, a rather fluid term. In the ecological 
and evolutionary sense, it means a plant variety’s reproduction and production of biomass 
based on its physiological tolerance and requirements of temperature, soil composition, 
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moisture, disease, sunlight, wind, species competition, etc., which vary between regions. 
Through evolution and natural selection, as well as artificial selection (by farmers and 
plant breeders), plants are assumed to be specifically adapted to their region of origin (the 
place that they evolved in—though recent studies have shown that plants are not 
necessarily optimally adapted to their local conditions). Scientists use specific, or narrow, 
adaptation to refer to a variety that only thrives under a specific set of environmental 
conditions (Annicchiarico, 2002). 
Early studies of plant adaptation drew from the theories of Charles Darwin. 
Cittadino (1981) has shown that German botanists became interested in adaptation in the 
last two decades of the 19th century. Around 1895-96, Danish botanist Eugenius 
Warming coalesced the study of plant adaptation into a field he called “ecological plant 
geography” (Coleman, 1986). In his study of plant geography, Russian plant scientist and 
explorer Nikolai Vavilov created his well-known theory of the centers of origin of 
cultivated plants, based on his travels around the world as a plant collector in the early 
20th century (Baranski, 2014). Vavilov wrote on the adaptation of wheat: “Although 
wheat in general appears to be a plant with varieties which are comparatively specialized, 
nevertheless, in many ecological types there is observed a high degree of ecological 
plasticity” (Vavilov, 1951, p. 193). After Vavilov, scientists used a variety of theories 
such as plant tolerance, ecotypes, plasticity, and genotype by environment interactions to 
explain plant distribution and adaptation (Wilsie, 1962). 
In the mid-twentieth century, organizations like the Food and Agricultural 
Organization and the Rockefeller Foundation facilitated an enormous global movement 
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of plant germplasm. Research and development programs such as the RF’s Mexican 
Agricultural Program focused on both the collection of wheat and maize germplasm, and 
the testing and breeding of those varieties. The growth of international plant germplasm 
exchange and introduction was tightly linked to increasing interest in the adaptation of 
crops to diverse geographies. 
Wide adaptation existed in the lexicon of agricultural scientists in the 1960s, but 
only in the margins of agricultural science (Finlay, 1968). Since at least the mid-1800s, 
agriculturalists have used the term wide adaptation to describe the climatic and edaphic 
range of horticultural varieties in America, but wide adaptation was not viewed as a 
particularly desirable goal, rather as one of many possible plant characteristics (New 
York State Agricultural Society, 1856; Prentiss, 1866). The conventional wisdom of plant 
breeding in the early 20th century was that crop selection should occur in the target 
environment, creating varieties with specific adaptation to the local conditions. Even a 
1954 annual report from the RF’s Columbian Agricultural Program stated that, “it is 
axiomatic in agricultural research that an improved crop variety, to be commercially 
successful in a given region, must be developed and tested in that region” (Oficina de 
Estudios Especiales, 1954, p. 10). In other words, agriculture was a “site-specific 
science” (Perkins, 1997, p. 12), and most cereal breeders viewed wide adaptation with 
little more than skepticism (Finlay, 1968). 
Until the mid-1960s, plant breeders believed that crops should be specifically 
adapted to local conditions. But as Borlaug’s research program rapidly expanded from 
Mexico to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, the international conversation shifted. Paulo 
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Annicchiarico (2002) wrote that in the first half of the 20th century, plant breeders in 
England and Italy focused on “understanding and exploiting specific adaptation effects in 
order to raise crop yields in their respective countries” (p. 9), and then in the second half 
of the century, breeding goals shifted to improving yield potential through selection in 
favorable environments. To date, existing regional and national plant breeding programs 
have diverse goals that range between specific adaptation and wide adaptation. But some 
countries, like India, are solely focused on wide adaptation of specific crops. This is a 
legacy of Borlaug’s involvement in Indian wheat breeding starting in the mid-1960s.  
Wide Adaptation in India 
This dissertation traces Borlaug’s ideas around adaptation and climate from the 
1950s and through several decades and countries. I start with Borlaug’s discovery in 
Mexico, and move through India, Turkey, and the Middle East. My primary narrative 
focuses on the introduction of wide adaptation to India and the subsequent embedding of 
wide adaptation in the structure and practices of Indian wheat research. This focus on 
India is due not only to the availability of archival information in India, but also the 
landscape of post-Independence India and the involvement of RF scientists, particularly 
Borlaug’s interest and participation in reshaping Indian wheat research.  
Many scholars have examined how Borlaug and the RF promoted a specific 
package of seeds and agricultural inputs that led to the green revolution. Most of these 
accounts, however, overlook wide adaptation as a critical part of this package. In 
retrospect, many critics point to the uneven distribution of green revolution technologies 
in India as evidence of a capitalist agenda. But Indian scientists utilized Borlaug’s 
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rhetoric around wide adaptation to promote food production and support equity 
throughout India’s agro-climatic regions. While wide adaptation is not inherently 
problematic to any agricultural research program, in India in the 1960s, wide adaptation 
was used to justify a research regime focused on irrigated and fertilized conditions. 
Modern efforts to support regional and localized research are largely ineffective due to 
the continued reliance on old narratives and institutional structures set up during the 
green revolution. My primary research questions are as follows: 
1) How did wide adaptation become central to Indian wheat research? 
2) Why did some scientists so fervently promote widely adapted varieties in light 
of scant or contradictory evidence? 
I also explore to a smaller extent, that in light of the historical connections between wide 
adaptation and plant breeding under favorable agricultural conditions, what does this 
mean for present-day discussions of poverty alleviation through agricultural 
development? 
My dissertation relies heavily on the historical and theoretical groundwork laid by 
historians Nick Cullather (2010) and John H. Perkins (1997) in their respective books, 
The Hungry World and Geopolitics and the Green Revolution, as well as the recent 
contribution of Madhumita Saha with her 2012 dissertation, State policy, agricultural 
research and transformation of Indian agriculture with reference to basic food-crops, 
1947-75. Perkins and Cullather map the connections between the Cold War, agricultural 
development, and the Green Revolution in Mexico and India (examined briefly in 
Chapter 1). These works also situate agricultural scientists in the context of state identity 
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and authority, such as the RF’s connections with US foreign policy officials and advisors. 
In Saha’s dissertation, she breaks down the dualism between “indigenous” and “modern” 
technology, showing the multifaceted reasons why scientists and political planners 
advanced certain scientific agendas post-Independence. 
India became a major site of international intervention in agricultural 
development in the 1950s. This was due to the Bengal Famine of 1943 (which followed a 
string of famines in the late 1890s), India’s Independence in 1947, and growing 
international fears of overpopulation and starvation in India in the 1950s. In the 1950s, 
the US Government began food and technical assistance programs in India, and various 
foundations also became involved in India’s agricultural development. The RF, because 
of their program in Mexico, was invited to advise on Indian maize and small grain 
programs in the 1950s. In 1963, the Government of India invited Borlaug to advise on 
India’s wheat research program, and Borlaug’s semi-dwarfs introduced to India that same 
year. 
 Then in 1964 to ‘66, the Indian wheat research rapidly changed. The All-India 
Coordinated Wheat Improvement Program was formed and headquartered in New Delhi 
in 1965. That same year Benjamin Peary Pal, a wheat scientist, became head of India’s 
agricultural policy organization, the scientist to hold this role. Finally, in late 1964 the RF 
hired R. Glenn Anderson to join the RF staff in New Delhi and to co-coordinate the All-
India wheat program. Anderson and Borlaug worked with Indian scientists such as Pal 
and the famous wheat scientist M. S. Swaminathan to introduce not only new wheat 
varieties, but also the new plant breeding philosophy of wide adaptation. In addition to 
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these administrative changes, India was in the midst of an ecological and political crisis: 
a war with Pakistan, a failed monsoon season and looming famine, President Johnson’s 
“short tether” approach to food aid as a negotiation strategy, and the untimely deaths of 
successive Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Lal Bahadur Shastri (Perkins, 1997). 
Concurrent with the changes in the research landscape, the Indian government approved 
several agricultural policy changes including seed and fertilizer imports, a minimum 
support price for wheat as well as ongoing land policy reforms such as abolishing 
absentee landlords.  
While Anderson coordinated the RF’s Indian wheat program from Delhi, Borlaug 
organized and proselytized an emphasis on increased fertilizers concentrated in irrigated, 
productive areas, which at the time formed only twenty percent of cultivated land. High-
level Indian agricultural scientists such as Pal, Swaminathan, and others supported 
Borlaug in this. These scientists used the concept of wide adaptation to justify that the 
concentration of research efforts on irrigated and highly fertilized land would spillover 
into rainfed and less fertilized areas, due to the claimed superiority of widely adapted 
wheats. But wide adaptation became controversial among scientists in India. A wide 
adaptation-based agenda meant that testing for adaptation was only done post-hoc, 
meaning wheat varieties would not be developed in situ or for location-specific 
conditions. Critics of wide adaptation questioned whether the system of plant breeding 
and testing for high production areas would benefit rainfed and marginal farmers in India.  
To understand the connection between fertilizers and wide adaptation, one must 
put Borlaug in the context of his work in Mexico with the RF. When Borlaug started 
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working in Mexico in the 1940s, his task was to develop a wheat variety with higher 
yields and more disease resistant than the present varieties. He realized that more 
fertilizers were required to improve yields, but conventional varieties, when grown under 
higher fertility, would fall over due to the weight of their grain. Borlaug, working with 
Orville Vogel in Washington, thus developed a semi-dwarf wheat adapted to Mexican 
conditions in 1955. At that same time, Borlaug started testing varieties under exclusively 
high fertility conditions. Borlaug was convinced that fertilizers would soon become more 
available and affordable, and that fertilizer-responsive varieties were needed to increase 
global grain production. He also believed that testing under favorable conditions was the 
best and most efficient way to assess the genetic yield potential of varieties. Borlaug 
believed that an ideal genotype would be more powerful than environmental variation, 
and that this was the key to raising yields in developing countries. Borlaug’s wheat 
program was considered successful in Mexico, as farmers quickly adopted his wheat 
varieties, though these were mostly commercial farmers in the Sonora who had access to 
irrigation and fertilizers. When Borlaug discovered wide adaptation around 1960, his 
wheat research program was solely focused on selection and testing under favorable 
conditions. 
By the time Borlaug became involved in Indian wheat research, he was already 
highly invested in his model of widely adapted, fertilizer responsive wheat coupled with 
higher levels of fertilizer. Although the RF realized this did not reach marginal farmers, 
they were more concerned about overall global food production than equity. In India, 
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Borlaug’s model appealed to scientists, especially those who worked in the mostly 
irrigated area of northwest India. 
But some scientists, and especially India’s social planners, were against this 
model (Saha, 2012). While Borlaug wanted to concentrate fertilizers on irrigated land, 
social planners favored evenly distributing fertilizers throughout the country. Borlaug 
lobbied to increase fertilizer production and imports, with marginal success. Against 
these pressures, Borlaug had to prove that concentrating on fertilized and irrigated areas 
was for the greater good. He did this through wide adaptation. 
Around 1965, Borlaug began promoting wide adaptation on the basis of not just 
adaptation to location, but adaptation across agronomic conditions. While Borlaug was in 
the midst of planning an Indian green revolution, he argued that widely adapted varieties 
could equally benefit farmers under varying conditions. He claimed that widely adapted 
varieties would still produce high yields in less productive areas, which despite being 
ecologically dubious, became a central part of his argument. Borlaug’s influence 
coincided with a greater shift in Indian agricultural policy starting in 1965 (see Chapter 
3). In 1969, India’s fourth five year plan radically updated the previous focus on equity to 
“betting on the strong” by concentrating resources on irrigated areas (Cullather, 2010, p. 
199; Saha, 2012). 
In light of the evidence I have collected throughout my research, I believe that 
Borlaug promoted a fundamental misinterpretation of wide adaptation that either he 
himself believed, or that he promoted in spite of evidence because of his ideological 
motivations. That is, I argue Borlaug’s widely adapted wheats were so because of their 
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photoperiod insensitivity and fertilizer responsiveness, and not any genetic or inherent 
wide adaptation or yield, as Borlaug argued. But, in part due to his connection with India 
at the time, Borlaug fallaciously promoted wide adaptation as adaptation across 
agronomic conditions. It is clear that Borlaug, however noble his intentions were, was 
focused on a specific set of farmers who had access to irrigation and fertilizers, and used 
wide adaptation to deflect criticisms of bias. Regardless of how the story is framed, there 
are no easy explanations for why Borlaug held onto the idea of the widely adapted 
genotype while simultaneously attempting to make farmers’ fields look more like 
experiment station fields. 
While Borlaug’s argument that selection in favorable environments leads to wide 
adaptation across conditions has been challenged over the years (Annicchiarico, 2002; 
Ceccarelli, 1989; Simmonds, 1991), one cannot simply dismiss Borlaug as wrong—one 
needs to understand history to see just how deeply his ideas have been engrained in 
modern research. Unfortunately, many of Borlaug’s mid-century ideas became solidified 
in Indian wheat research. 
In the late 1960s, India’s wheat production rapidly increased in what was heralded 
as the green revolution. But by the early 1970s, it was clear that the green revolution was 
not the miracle everyone had hoped. Questions about the impacts of the green revolution 
were rampant. Although wheat production did increase, there were storage and 
distribution problems, and further, a string of good agricultural years was succeeded by 
bad weather in the early 1970s. In retrospect, some scholars have suggested that the rapid 
gains in wheat production from 1966 to 1971 were more likely a result of good weather 
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and extensification in response to price supports rather than the genetic benefits of 
Borlaug’s widely adapted, semi-dwarf wheat (Cullather, 2010; Sen, 1974). India was 
once again importing grains in the mid-1970s, and the spread of green revolution 
varieties was slowed down as rising energy prices limited the availability of external 
inputs such as fertilizer and irrigation (Cullather, 2010). In 1973 to ‘74, wheat scientists 
noted, “farmers were inclined to revert to local wheats because of input shortages and 
better prices for the local wheat and straw” (Rao, 1974, p. viii). 
Considering the criticisms against the green revolution, several organizations 
(including the RF) hired external reviewers to assess the food situation in India. The US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) commissioned Francine Frankel, and the 
World Bank sent Wolf Ladejinsky to India in the late 1960s (Cullather 2010). Both 
scholars released reports in 1969 that strongly critiqued the unequal impacts of the green 
revolution on different socio-economic classes of farmers (Frankel, 1969; Ladejinsky, 
1969). Frankel, Ladejinsky, and other contemporary scholars (Abel, 1970; Cleaver, 1972; 
Sen, 1974; Wade, 1974) all pointed out the shortcomings of the green revolution, 
including that adoption of new varieties was limited mostly to irrigated areas, and that 
farmers with more capital benefitted more from new technologies, despite that many 
scientists claimed that the seeds and technologies were “scale neutral.”  
Then in the early 1970s, scientists became concerned about the “genetic erosion” 
of agricultural crops that were vulnerable to biotic and abiotic stresses (National Research 
Council, 1972). These claims, which still exist today, tend to ignore that northwest India 
was already a high production area and ruled by only a few varieties before the green 
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revolution (Smale et al., 2008; Wood & Lenné, 1997). Yet the spatial diversity of wheat 
varieties remained the lowest in this area of 2001, due to the dominance of a few varieties 
and a slow replacement rate of these varieties (Mohan et al., 2001). It is less clear how 
the green revolution has affected agrobiodiversity in northeastern India, where wheat was 
not a primary crop. 
A 1973 USAID report found that the green revolution had not impacted the 
availability of cereal grains compared to population in India. Even the RF staff in India 
wrote, “India has made no real progress in improving her people-food equation in the 
decade of 'the green revolution' and there's no new agricultural technology on the 
drawing board as glamorous and promising as was the HYV's [high yielding varieties] at 
the beginning of the decade” (Rockefeller Foundation Indian Agricultural Program, 
1973). This was despite the clearly rising production of wheat (Figure 1), which was 
considered more successful than the introduction of green revolution rice.3  
Past a slight nadir in the 1970s due to the slowed adopted of new varieties and rise 
in energy prices, wheat production in India has continued to rise at a roughly linear rate 
(Figure 1). This corresponds with fertilizer production and consumption that have also 
increased to several times over the levels in the 1960s (Figure 2), and also the expansion 
of irrigation throughout India. Yet net foodgrain availability per capita per year has not 
increased since the green revolution, and availability of protein-rich pulses has declined 
and while wheat has increased (Figure 3). While the adoption of green revolution 
                                                
3 Rice varieties developed in the Philippines were not locally adapted, and were 
susceptible to pests (Kalirajan & Shand, 1982; Sen, 1974) 
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varieties, technologies, and policy changes has led to an increase in food production that 
has kept pace with population growth, hunger and malnutrition remain pervasive 
problems in India due to regional disparities in production, poor distribution systems, and 
wasted grain due to improper storage. 
 
 
Figure 1. India’s wheat production in tonnes, from 1961 to 2013. Data retrieved from 
FAOSTAT. 
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Figure 2. India’s fertilizer consumption, production, and imports in tonnes from 1961 to 
2002. Data retrieved from FAOSTAT. 
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Figure 3. Net availability of foodgrains in India for rice, wheat, pulses and total. Data 
retrieved from Directorate of Economics and Statistics (2006) and (2013). 
Theory: Initial Conditions of Research Trajectories 
Borlaug discovered wide adaptation over 55 years ago, and despite a rich 
literature challenging the philosophy of wide adaptation in plant breeding, several 
research organizations dogmatically hold wide adaptation theories and practice. These 
include the IARI as well as CIMMYT, which emerged from the RF’s Mexican 
Agricultural Program. To explain the dominance of wide adaptation in these 
organizations, I invoke the work of several scholars who highlight the importance of the 
initial conditions of an organization’s development in determining its evolution. As a 
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result of being set up to address the specific problem of overall food production in the 
1960s, these organizations have struggled to address new paradigms of agricultural 
development, particularly ecological problems, social equity, and participatory research. 
In short, these organizations suffer from a type of institutional path dependency, relying 
on outdated narratives, models, and institutional norms established during their 
formation, and which makes outdated concepts like wide adaptation invincible to 
critique.  
 This theoretical orientation turns wide adaptation into a science policy question 
that should concern administrators in India, the World Bank, and USAID. Forty years 
ago, the economist Keith Griffin stated: 
There is no reason why plant research cannot be directed toward developing 
improved varieties which reflect the factor endowments and ecological conditions 
which most Asian farmers confront. The desired physical properties of plants can 
be predetermined by science policy advisors, and the research biologists can then 
be asked to design such a plant... In other words, science policy could be used to 
push technical change in a 'peasant-biased' direction. (Griffin, 1974, pp. 78–79) 
Indeed, science policy could be utilized to seriously address the dominance of wide 
adaptation. But because wide adaptation is so embedded in research trajectories, it 
seldom comes up for discussion. This is very much relevant to current policies and 
research investments towards agricultural adaptation to climate change. 
Both CIMMYT and the Indian wheat research program emerged in the 1960s, and 
were strongly shaped by the social influence of Borlaug and Cold War rhetoric around 
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population growth and hunger. In both wheat programs, Borlaug canonized wide 
adaptation. The specific conditions under which the research systems were formed still 
influence the trajectory of current programs. The relative success of the green revolution 
in increasing aggregate wheat production has allowed both research programs to continue 
along these same pathways: focusing on improving wheat germplasm through a 
centralized breeding system, and then post-hoc testing for adaptation. As discussed, both 
the breeding and testing systems are biased towards favorable environments, but wide 
adaptation is held up as an ideal to deflect criticism. Indeed, many of the wheat varieties 
developed by CIMMYT and its predecessor organizations did have an impressive global 
spread. But as stated, this was due to the convergence of photoperiod insensitivity and 
fertilizer responsiveness in new varieties. RF-sponsored breeding programs for maize and 
rice have not been as successful at developing a so-called universal variety. 
Recent literature has discussed the green revolution narrative as a useful 
explanatory framework to examine modern agricultural research (Cullather, 2010; Patel, 
2013; Thompson & Scoones, 2009). Cold War historian Cullather wrote, “Development 
should be analyzed not as a process or an outcome but as a narrative strategy” (Cullather 
2010, p. 183). In his 2010 book, Cullather examined the power of narratives and models 
of agricultural development as a tool of modernization, writing that, “A characteristic 
feature of modernization studies is modeling, the dissection of case studies with the aim 
of revealing generalizable principles that can be applied in other circumstances” 
(Cullather 2010, p. 645). As Patel (2013) and Thompson and Scoones (2009), among 
others, have shown, narratives around the green revolution are still incredibly pervasive 
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and influential in the international agricultural research system. Emerging during the 
Cold War, green revolution technologies became an important symbol of international 
development and geopolitical intervention (Westad, 2005). Thus, Chapter 1 will focus on 
the Cold War context of the green revolution, the emergence of green revolution 
narratives, and Borlaug’s wheat program as a model for other international agricultural 
programs. Chapter 2 focuses on some of the individual actors who played important roles 
in creating the green revolution narratives around widely adapted wheat. 
Other scholars have analyzed narratives not just for their pervasiveness in modern 
agricultural development, but also for their ability to limit alternative innovation 
pathways. Leach, Scoones, and Stirling wrote about the “pervasive tendency… for 
powerful actors and institutions to ‘close down’ around particular framing, committing to 
particular pathways that emphasize maintaining stability and control (Leach, Scoones, & 
Stirling, 2010, p. 5). Their aim, in examining the mid-century framings of international 
development, “is to open up debate about the array of socio-technical trajectories” 
(Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 2010, p. 161). My dissertation holds a similar goal of re-
opening debate around wide adaptation in order to examine plausible alternatives. 
 Hall et al. more explicitly examine the limits of present-day agricultural 
innovation systems (2000). They wrote: 
At the risk of over-simplification, the green revolution was concerned with 
increasing the productivity of agriculture in order to increase the aggregate food 
supply. This was seen as a way of reducing hunger and the poverty associated 
with it. The institutional arrangements to achieve this goal were consistent with 
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prevailing ideas concerning the organization of science and its relationship with 
innovation and economic production; namely that centralized scientific research 
institutes could solve the generic problem of increasing the biological potential of 
important food crops and that this would lead to increased food production. The 
task to be achieved was conceptually quite simple and all the actors in the system 
charged with achieving it held a similar clarity of purpose. However, as the policy 
agenda has moved away from articulation in broadly scientific terms to one 
articulated in more developmental terms, existing research structures have had 
increasing difficulty making satisfactory contributions... Often these new agendas 
actually conflict with traditional internally driven policies and beliefs of the 
research sector, particularly where these remain focused on production and 
productivity and continue to reflect the food security concerns of an earlier period 
(Hall et al 2000, p. 72 & p. 81) 
My research results are consistent with this conclusion, and would add to this the 
pervasiveness of “black boxed” historical concepts like wide adaptation that limit 
innovation pathways.  
 Obviously, the narrative of the green revolution is important to current 
agricultural research. But how do narratives, models, and technological trajectories 
become embedded into an organization over time? Several factors are important, 
including: physical infrastructure, norms and values, and bureaucratic regimes and rules. 
One theory that unifies these factors is the idea of technological momentum as described 
by Thomas P. Hughes (1994). Hughes developed the concept of technological 
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momentum to explain the evolution of large-scale technological systems (1994). Large-
scale technological systems contain both social and technological—and human and non-
human—actors (Hughes, 1994). These systems initially develop to reflect political and 
social influences, but eventually acquire momentum of their own due to the passage of 
time and added physical infrastructure. According to Hughes, older systems are more 
immune to outside forces because of the momentum they have acquired. Technological 
momentum helps explain why older large-scale socio-technical systems appear to act in 
technological determinist ways. 
If we can view the Indian wheat research system as a large-scale socio-technical 
system (I believe we can), technological momentum helps explain why, despite so many 
calls for reform, the Indian coordinated wheat system has remained a top-down, 
centralized, and monolithic system of varietal research and testing that favors wide 
adaptation and excludes potentially complementary location-specific research.  
Physical infrastructure. CIMMYT’s and other international agricultural research 
centers’ strong historical reliance on plant breeding, for example, presents a force of 
technological momentum as well as institutional path dependency (McGuire, 2008).4 The 
historical pathway of agricultural innovation through plant breeding gained momentum 
by creating a system of seed banks and research labs that profoundly influences future 
conceptions of technologies for climate change adaptation. Future technologies are 
limited due not only to the scientific training, funding mechanisms, and research 
infrastructure of agricultural systems, but also the continued reliance on narratives about 
                                                
4 For another example, see Sally Brooks, et al. 2009 book: Environmental change and 
maize innovation in Kenya: Exploring pathways in and out of maize. 
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the green revolution. These factors ultimately limit conceptions of what adaptation to 
climate change. 
Norms and values. In Hughes’ theory of technological momentum, systems are 
most influenced by social and political forces in their infancy. This is consistent with my 
analysis earlier in this section that the initial conditions of a system’s development are 
critical to its later development. We know that in the agricultural research community, 
narratives of the green revolution and Borlaug are prevalent. An important question here 
is why did Borlaug’s ideas become so dominant? I believe this is due to the particular 
qualities of Borlaug’s background and personality as well as the socio-political context he 
operated in. For example, Borlaug possessed a “missionary zeal” that inspired his “wheat 
apostles,” and he worked in the post-WWII era of American interest in modernization 
and development of poorer countries through science and technology (Shiva, 1991). 
Bureaucracy. Hughes wrote that “as a system matures, a bureaucracy of 
managers and white-collar employees usually plays an increasingly prominent role in 
maintaining and expanding the system, so that it then becomes more social and less 
technical” (Hughes, 1994, p. 106). This is supported by the various failures of attempts to 
diversify the Indian wheat research system over time. For example, the Ford 
Foundation’s Package Programme in India started in 1961 (see Chapter 3 for more 
information). According to its second report, it aimed to “be a tailor made programme to 
suit the needs of a particular area which can be adjusted by the local authorities promptly 
and effectively, as and when the situation changes” (quoted in Sen, 1969, p. 66). But the 
Package Programme was limited in part because, “the main concern of the Indian 
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administrative system has been to lay down general patterns of conformity to which the 
areas must adjust rather than otherwise and leave the least possible discretion to the 
authorities lower in the hierarchical structure” (quoted in Sen, 1969, pp. 66–67). Indian 
economist Samar R. Sen found the Indian bureaucracy to be the main barrier to 
implementing research “directed to local situation at the field level and in the various 
agro-climatic regions” (1969, p. 123).  
In light of the preceding theoretical discussion, this dissertation largely focuses on 
the initial conditions of green revolution agriculture because of the importance not only 
historically, but also to present-day science policy debates. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 will 
examine international and Indian wheat programs up to 1970. Then, Chapter 4 examines 
CIMMYT’s international wheat program in light of shifting development concerns, 
including a focus on equity and rainfed areas that began at the end of the 1960s. Finally, 
Chapter 5 addresses present-day Indian agricultural science policy. 
Methods 
Historical research. The majority of my dissertation relies on historical 
documents that I collected at various sites in 2013 and 2014. Documents were selected 
based on their relevance to research on the agro-climatic adaptation of wheat, the 
institutional history of relevant organizations, and correspondence between relevant 
actors. Initial research was restricted to the time period of 1950–1970, but at the 
Rockefeller Archive Center I collected documents from the 1970s.  
Indian archives. In India I drew materials from several agricultural research 
libraries at the IARI in New Delhi, the Directorate of Wheat Research (DWR) in Karnal, 
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Haryana, and Punjab Agricultural University in Ludhiana, Punjab. While these libraries 
did not host any archives, they contained both primary and secondary sources. In 
particular, the IARI library hosts a wealth of annual reports and conference proceedings 
from mid-century (and earlier) to present. Sources included published and unpublished 
material including annual reports, national and international wheat conference 
proceedings, journal articles, and published books. The annual wheat research workers’ 
workshop proceedings were collected from both the IARI library and the DWR library.  
Historical wheat multi-location trial yield data. Due to the unavailability of 
historical yield data segregated by variety or area covered by different varieties, I relied 
on reports of the All India Coordinated Wheat Improvement Program to approximate this 
information. I collected data for every year available from 1965 to present. This data was 
limited to the Advanced Varietal Trials (formerly Uniform Regional Trials) and for what 
is currently considered the North West Plain Zone and North East Plain Zone. 
Rockefeller Archive Center. I spent three weeks at the Rockefeller Archive 
Center in April and May 2014. While there, I focused on three topics: the RF’s 
international wheat programs in the 1960s (focused on the office in Mexico), the RF’s 
Indian agricultural program in the 1950s and 60s, and RF’s international wheat programs 
in the 1970s (focused on the Middle East). For the RF’s international wheat programs in 
the 1960s, I was interested in the progression from the Mexican Agricultural Program to 
the Inter-American Food Crop Improvement Program, then to the International Center for 
Corn and Wheat Improvement, to eventually the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT). To these ends, I examined records from the project 
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files (RF, Record Group 1.2, Series 300D and 323, and Record Group 1.3, Series 105), 
administration, program and policy files (RF, Record group 3, Series 915 and 923), 
Mexico field office (RF, Record Group 6.13, Series 1), officer diaries (RF, Record Group 
12), oral histories (RF, Record Group 13), and the RF Agricultural Science Program 
Annual Reports. 
I also focused on the RF’s involvement in Indian maize and wheat improvement. 
Towards this end, I used project files (RF, Record Group 1.2, Series 464D, and Record 
Group 1.6, Series 464D) and the New Delhi field office records (RF, Record Group 6.7). 
Finally, I explored the RF’s expansion into wheat research in the Middle East in the 
1970s, utilizing again the project files (RF, Record Group 1.3, Series 105) and some 
recently added archival material from the Ankara, Turkey, field office (RF, Record 
Group 6, Series 19). 
Iowa State University Library Special Collections and University of 
Minnesota Library. Due to the particular importance of Norman E. Borlaug to my 
dissertation research, I drew from two collections dedicated to Borlaug’s papers. The 
Minnesota archive was only accessed online, thus my browsing was less thorough and 
restricted to Borlaug’s correspondence in the 1960s and his 1967 oral history. At the ISU 
Library Special Collections, I focused on Borlaug’s correspondence with Charles F. Krull 
and Keith W. Finlay, as well as Borlaug’s and other RF scientists’ involvement in various 
FAO programs. 
Fieldwork in northern India. Much of my dissertation research was conducted 
in northern India from January to July 2013. I was financially supported by an NSEP 
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Boren Fellowship and I was officially appointed as a Research Fellow with Bioversity 
International’s sub-regional office in New Delhi under the guidance of Dr. P. N. Mathur. 
In accordance with the Boren Fellowship, I completed approximately 200 hours of Hindi 
language study from the HindiGuru language institute as well as a private tutor. 
While in India I traveled to several different agricultural research institutions 
involved in wheat research. These include: IARI Regional Research Station in Pusa, 
Bihar (established in 1905, it is the birthplace of wheat research in India, and the former 
center of IARI until 1934), the Directorate of Wheat Research in Karnal, Haryana 
(established at Karnal in 1990), Punjab Agricultural University (PAU, established in 
1962), and the IARI headquarters in New Delhi (established in 1936). I stayed at each 
institution for about one week each, (except for the IARI, New Delhi), and spent 2-3 days 
at each place conducting interviews. The majority of my time in India was spent in New 
Delhi. 
Scientist interviews. From February to May 2013 I interviewed 47 agricultural 
scientists at four major agricultural research institutions in India. Thirty-two of these 
interviews were with practicing scientists involved in wheat improvement and extension 
programs. Main fields of the scientists interviewed included: plant breeding, 
biotechnology, genetics, plant protection (pathology), quality, agronomy, and extension 
science (see Error! Reference source not found.). Participants were chosen through 
snowball sampling. At each field site I had a local scientist host who would introduce me 
to the other scientists based on the criteria I had laid out of scientists involved in the 
Wheat Improvement Programme and extension scientists. The scientists I interviewed 
   30 
ranged from junior level plant breeders to senior level project directors. On a whole, my 
data may be skewed towards more senior scientists since that was often who I was 
directed to talk to. 
Scientist interviews generally lasted between 15 and 60 minutes, and followed a 
structured questionnaire (see Appendix A). Agricultural scientists were given a specific 
set of questions, while extension scientists were asked a separate set of questions. 
Interviews were conducted and recorded in English, and transcribed by the author. A few 
interviews were not recorded based on the informant’s preference. Transcriptions were 
not completely verbatim, but reflect the main themes of the conversation. Direct quotes 
were transcribed from key statements. IRB approval was obtained for all interview 
questions (including for farmers and administrators), and all interviews were confidential 
(no names were recorded, and no identifying information will be used in this 
dissertation).  
Table 1  
Number of Recorded Interviews with Wheat Scientists, by Field and Institution.  
 IARI Delhi IARI Pusa DWR PAU Total 
Plant breeding 2 1 4 3 10 
Biotechnology 1 1 4 0 6 
Plant protection 1 0 1 3 5 
Wheat quality 1 0 1 1 3 
Agronomy 0 1 2 0 3 
Seed Production 0 1 0 0 1 
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Extension 0 2 0 2 4 
Total 5 6 12 9 32 
 
When circumstances made the questionnaire format incompatible with the 
situation (such as time constraints, interviews which became off-topic, scientists whose 
research did not apply to the questionnaire), I would ask unstructured questions that were 
based on the main themes of the questionnaire. Despite this, the majority of the 
interviews were structured and most of the questions could be answered to a satisfactory 
degree.  
Based on completeness of the structured interview questions, twenty-five 
interviews were analyzed and coded. Answers to structured interview questions were put 
into a spreadsheet and analyzed for keywords and themes. Themes included wheat 
breeding for location, breeding for agro-climatic conditions, research on stress tolerance, 
microclimatic factors, and the structure of Indian research. Key quotes were pulled to 
reflect these themes, including themes to represent opposing viewpoints. 
Research administrator and retired scientist interviews. Eight current and 
retired agricultural research administrators were interviewed. Due to varying time 
allotments for interviews with administrators, these varied greatly in both questions and 
content. Administrator interviews were semi-structured and centered around Indian 
agricultural science policy in general and specifically related to wheat improvement in 
north India. Two retired wheat breeders at IARI in New Delhi were also interviewed. 
These interviews followed a similar format as the administrator interviews. Transcripts 
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from the interviews with research administrators and retired scientists were analyzed 
qualitatively. Administrators and retired scientists were identified through my local 
research networks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATIONS INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION OF 
STAPLE FOOD CROP IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS, 1940–1970 
 
“World peace must be based on world plenty.” 
–J. B. Orr, Nobel Peace Prize lecture, 1949 
 
Table 2 
Timeline of Chapter 1 Events.  
Year Event(s) 
 * Starred points all share institutional origins with the Mexican Agricultural 
Program (MAP). 
1941 Rockefeller Foundation (RF) sends scientists to survey Mexican agriculture 
1943 RF and Government of Mexico begin the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) 
under the Office of Special Studies* 
1944 Norman Borlaug hired to work with MAP 
1948 Fairfield Osborn’s Our Plundered Planet and William Vogt’s Road to Survival 
1949 Truman’s Point Four Speech 
1950 RF’s Columbia Agricultural Program started 
1952 Dean Rusk comes from State Department to become president of RF 
 RF sends scientists to survey Asian agriculture 
1954 Public Law 480 enacted 
 Hugh Everett Moore’s Population Bomb pamphlet 
 Central American Corn Improvement Program begins* 
1955 MAP starts a research station at Ciudad Obregón, research is focused on ideal 
conditions 
 RF’s Chilean Agricultural Program started 
1956 RF and Government of India sign a memorandum of understanding 
 RF starts a worldwide maize testing program, expanding to South America, India, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines 
1959 Inter-American Food Crop Improvement Program started* 
 RF and Ford Foundation (FF) sign memorandum of understanding with 
Government of Philippines 
1960 Dean Rusk becomes Secretary of State, George Harrar becomes RF president in 
1961 
1961 PL-480 becomes “Food for Peace”  
 MAP transferred to Mexican government and National Institute for Agricultural 
Investigations is formed* 
1962 International Rice Research Institute officially formed 
1963 RF and FF form the International Center for Corn and Wheat Improvement* 
1965 An El Niño event causes monsoon to fail in India; new varieties of dwarf rice and 
wheat are released there and rapidly adopted in irrigated areas 
1966 Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo (CIMMYT) / International 
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Maize and Wheat Improvement Center formed, RF and FF provide funding but 
CIMMYT is more autonomous from RF* 
1968 “Green revolution” is coined 
 
 
This chapter examines the origins of the Rockefeller Foundation’s (RF) 
agricultural programs in the 1940s up to the 1970s. I examine the geopolitical 
motivations for US-based foreign agricultural assistance in the post-WWII era, including 
fear of communism and the population problem. Then I discuss the formation of the RF’s 
Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP), which served as a model for other RF programs. I 
trace the evolution of MAP into cooperative and international programs for wheat and 
maize. The next section examines RF-supported rice research in Asia, focusing on the 
international research center and also the impact of new rice varieties in South Asia. 
Table 2 shows a timeline of the major political and institutional events that are mentioned 
in this chapter. 
The RF was a major force behind global agricultural development in the mid-
twentieth century, and helped establish international research centers and networks. RF-
affiliated programs, especially for wheat and rice, not only transformed agricultural 
landscapes in the developing world, but also set a new standard for international 
agricultural development based around a program of crop genetic improvement. In 
agricultural programs aimed to aid tropical and semi-tropical developing countries, RF 
scientists challenged many of the existing dogmas in plant science. Throughout my 
dissertation I focus on the RF’s philosophy of wide adaptation, meaning a variety that 
produced high yields over wide geographic locations and/or agro-climatic conditions 
(though I will debate the latter claim). This philosophy emerged in tandem with the RF’s 
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focus on breeding varieties for ideal conditions (high fertility and controlled irrigation), 
leading to a research regime and technologies that problematically benefitted larger, 
wealthier farmers. But RF scientists assumed that through wide adaptation, they could 
overlook socioeconomic or agro-climatic factors and develop varieties embedded with 
inherently high yields. This perspective is closely tied with high modernist beliefs that 
prevailed at the time in the RF and in countries like Mexico and India (Scott, 1999).  
To understand how RF scientists adopted wide adaptation as a main goal of their 
international plant breeding program, this chapter will discuss the history of the RF-
sponsored programs in Mexico, the Philippines, and India for the crops of maize, rice, 
and wheat. These countries and crops were major foci of the RF’s agricultural research 
program in the 1940s through 1960s. I will use primary historical sources to demonstrate 
the motivations of RF administrators and officers, specifically on concepts related to 
agro-climatic adaptation.  
Green Revolution Theory and Terminology in Agriculture 
 In 1968, US Agency for International Development (USAID) administrator 
William Gaud declared the “green revolution” as an alternative to a socialist Red 
Revolution. In retrospect, the green revolution is typically defined as the rapid 
transformation of agricultural technologies and practices in the 1960s and 1970s (and 
even up to the 1990s) in Latin America and Asia. Political ecologist Keith Griffin, 
however, pointed out that those recalling the green revolution usually refer to either the 
"broad transformation" in agriculture or "specific plant improvements" without 
differentiating between the two (Griffin, 1974, p. 2). Historian Deborah Fitzgerald argued 
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that economists and policymakers tend to refer to the former, but that this perspective 
ignores the RF’s agricultural program in Mexico that began in 1943 (Fitzgerald, 1986). 
Because my dissertation primarily focuses on the research, rather than the impact, of the 
green revolution, I adopt Fitzgerald’s perspective that the green revolution research-era 
spanned the 1940s to the 1970s, starting with the RF’s involvement in Mexican 
agriculture. I examine the “specific plant improvements” as not necessarily endogenous 
technological drivers of change, but as part of a system where personal and political 
motivations as well as socio-economic and biophysical contexts also play a role. While 
the green revolution has had impacts beyond the 1970s (Evenson & Gollin, 2003), the 
1940s through 1970s were characterized by a rapid expansion of agricultural 
modernization programs and the diffusion of new packages of agricultural technologies.  
There are many fields of scholarship that address the green revolution. Among 
these are agricultural economics, agricultural science, political economics, critical 
political ecology, sociology, anthropology, geography, history, development studies, and 
science and technology studies. This chapter will draw primarily from critical political 
ecology and the history of science. These literatures help contextualize the expansion of 
the RF’s international agricultural program in the 1960s. 
Setting the Political Backdrop to International Agricultural Assistance  
Agricultural research profoundly transformed during the 20th century. The 
rediscovery of Mendelian genetics, the invention of hybrid maize, and the advent of 
synthetic fertilizers all restructured the very business of agricultural research. These 
technological achievements fueled the ideology of international development through 
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modernization of agriculture, held by many RF administrators as well as US politicians 
and policy advisors in the 1960s. The modernization ideology replaced previous modes 
of development such as New Deal-style progressive schemes and Tennessee Valley 
Authority-type technical projects (Cullather, 2010). 
The ideological backdrop of modernization and other mid-century sociopolitical 
contexts is important to understand how a small group of American plant breeders, 
affiliated with the RF, became de facto diplomats of statecraft and agricultural 
interventions in several developing countries. The esteem in which US policy makers and 
advisors held these scientists, and the many ties between the US foreign policy 
community and the RF, are also critical to explain this particular era of plant scientists as 
state-builders. Before getting into that part of the story, some more background is 
necessary. 
The emergence of agricultural modernism began after World War II, although the 
ideological roots of modernism can be traced much further back (Adas, 1989; Cowen & 
Shenton, 1996). In the immediate post-WWII era, the US entered into international 
development through policies such as the Marshall Plan to help rebuild post-war Europe. 
Counter to previous isolationist policies, the US now involved itself in international food 
politics as a form of development. Before WWII and in the 1940s, historian John Perkins 
wrote that, “no analytical framework existed to see how agricultural science and 
technology and modernization of agriculture fit into the overall scheme of international 
relations and power” (Perkins, 1997, p. 103). Food aid and technical assistance programs 
were ad hoc and not unified by any national policy. Yet, the programs did have obvious 
   38 
political implications, as Cullather stated, “the construction of postwar order began with 
food” (Cullather 2010, p. 34).  
Globally, agricultural development shifted from an imperial to a geopolitical 
regime. Countries like India and the Philippines gained mid-century independence from 
their colonial rulers. Simultaneously, the RF and other agencies, working with local 
governments, rapidly proposed agricultural modernization schemes for these countries— 
the so-called developing world. These agricultural development schemes rested on 
assumptions that other countries needed to “develop” along a “social evolutionist 
teleology” called modernization theory (Adas, 1989, p. 412). Modernization theorists 
held that history could be “sped up” and that societies could become modern given the 
right set of knowledge and inputs (Latham, 2011). This perspective heavily relied on 
technology as a tool of development (Westad, 2005). 
Scholars widely cite President Harry S. Truman’s inauguration address of 1949 as 
the beginning of formalized international scientific assistance. Referred to as Point Four, 
Truman stated, “Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits 
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman, January 20, 1949). This fourth point of his 
speech highlighted the use of scientific and technological assistance as a tool of 
democracy. Thus international food aid, primarily through grain exports, gained attention 
in national political discourse, and was implemented through policies such as the 
Eisenhower administration’s Public Law 480 in 1954 (the Agricultural Trade 
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Development and Assistance Act, or PL-480).5 President John F. Kennedy renamed PL-
480 as “Food for Peace” in 1961.  
Modernization theory was closely tied to the west’s anti-communist agenda. 
Economist Walt Whitman Rostow’s 1960 famous book on modernization theory, The 
stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto, made this explicit (Westad, 
2005, p. 33). In the Cold War battle of western values versus communism, the fate of 
developing countries became symbolic of their respective ideologies. Historian Odd Arne 
Westad wrote that, “Washington and Moscow both needed to change the world in order 
to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies, and the elites of the newly 
independent states proved fertile ground for their competition” (Westad, 2005, p. 4). 
Newly independent states, as well as other developing countries, became known as the 
“Third World” in the 1950s to represent their potential mobilization (based on the French 
prerevolutionary “third estate”) as well as their non-alignment status in the Cold War 
(Westad, 2005).  
 The convergence of technological optimism and foreign intervention through 
agriculture was a remarkably shared between the consecutive US presidents Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Johnson. The common political advisors of these presidents (mostly 
Kennedy and Johnson) explains some of this convergence. Historian David Ekbladh 
wrote that foreign policy advisors Rostow, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, Robert 
Komer, Dean Rusk, and Robert McNamara all “nurtured a belief in the transformative 
power of development led by the United States” (Ekbladh, 2002, p. 262). Rusk, Komer, 
                                                
5 The US faced a massive surplus of grain throughout the 1950s and into the mid-1960s. See 
Ahlberg (2007). 
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and Rostow were on Kennedy’s National Security Council and helped Kennedy establish 
the 1960s as the Decade of Development (Cullather, 2010; Latham, 2011). The US’s 
focus on international development through technology continued through the Johnson 
administration. 
As historian John Perkins explained in his 1997 book, Geopolitics and the green 
revolution, Cold War intellectuals made the link between population, hunger, and 
national security, theorizing that overpopulation and hunger would cause political 
instability in the developing world. Historian Alison Bashford wrote that “the 
problematization of population often raised questions about and plans for migration, 
colonial expansion of territory, and the properties of land and soil: in other words, 
geopolitics” (Bashford, 2008, p. 328). Perkins called this constellation of geopolitics the 
“population-national security theory” (PNST) (Figure 4), which was the dominant Cold 
War-discourse linking dense populations to areas ripe for communism, thus framing 
foreign population control, food security, and pacification as a national security strategy 
(1997, p. 118).  
Overpopulation èResource exhaustion èHuger èPolitical instability 
èCommunist insurrection èDanger to American interests èWar 
 
Figure 4. Representation of John Perkins’ “population-national security theory” model. 
My research on American foundations in the 1940s through ‘60s supports the PNST 
model. The key takeaway here is that modernization theory and the PNST model linked 
hunger and war, and policymakers saw fighting hunger as an attainable intervention. This 
brought plant breeders directly into Cold War politics. 
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Neo-Malthusianism  
Simultaneous to the US’s involvement in international technical assistance, fears 
of the population bomb, or population problem, escalated in the 1940s and into the 60s as 
a foreign policy concern. Neo-Malthusianism resurged in the U.S. starting in the 1920s 
due to the development of demography and population models (Bashford, 2008; 
Cullather, 2010; Ramsden, 2002). Thomas Malthus became famous for his theory of 
population growth in 1798, Essay on the Principle of Population (Cowen & Shenton, 
1996). He proposed that population expands at an exponential rate, while food production 
grows at a linear rate, meaning that population will eventually outpace the food supply 
and result in hunger and starvation (Perkins, 1997). Around the 1930s, US and British 
academics starting becoming concerned about overpopulation in what is now called neo-
Malthusian thought (Perkins, 1997). Neo-Malthusianism was further bifurcated into 
political neo-Malthusians, who were concerned about the effects of overpopulation on 
geopolitics, and ecological neo-Malthusians, who were concerned about the outstripping 
of natural resources and possible ecological collapse due to overpopulation (Perkins, 
1997). 
In 1948, two publications, Fairfield Osborn’s Our plundered planet and William 
Vogt’s Road to survival, raised fears of ecological crisis. Fears of the population bomb 
were further sparked by Hugh Everett Moore’s eponymous popular pamphlet in 1954 
(Schlosser, 2009). While campaigning in 1952, Eisenhower spoke that “Our nation is 
moving swiftly into an entirely new balance between our population and our food 
supply” (quoted in Cullather, 2010, p. 104). By 1964 US foreign policy focused on the 
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“gap, in certain areas, between the rate of increase in population and the rate of increase 
in local food production, yielding a slide into increased dependence on U.S. food 
surpluses” (Rostow, October 28, 1964). The population problem was high on the U.S. 
national agenda as it peaked in the 1960s and 1970s, when neo-Malthusian theories were 
appropriated by the modern environmental movement (Hughes, 2000). 
Malthus’ ideas captured collective imaginations of fear and disaster. But the 
1960s brought optimism that these problems could be solved through science and 
technology. Paul Mangelsdorf, a plant breeder from Harvard who consulted for the RF in 
Mexico in 1941 and India in 1951–1952 (Perkins 1997), wrote in an essay in 1961 on 
food and population that stated, “I think that as biologists we can all agree that the first of 
Malthus' principles is absolutely valid” (Mangelsdorf, 1961, p. 280). Rusk, past president 
of the RF and now Secretary of State, testified to Congress in 1966: 
The root of the problem is clear enough. In many parts of the world, food 
production is beginning to lag behind population growth.… With limited land 
availability, our best hope is to obtain more food from lands already under 
cultivation… better seeds, fertilizers… and other miracles of technology can 
multiply food production many times. (Food for freedom program and commodity 
reserves, 1966, pp. 191–194) 
Thus, neo-Malthusian fears were infused with a modern sense of technological optimism. 
One of the most notably optimistic promoters of science to fight population was Nobel 
Prize-winner John Boyd Orr (Bashford, 2008), who wrote with David Lubbock in 1953, 
“Modern science has the answer to Malthus” (Orr & Lubbock, 1953, p. 80). 
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US Foundations embraced technological optimism over neo-Malthusian 
pessimism. Cullather wrote that the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations were among the 
first to promote “food-first” strategies as a means of development and in response to the 
population problem (2010). Warren Weaver, director of the RF’s Natural Sciences 
division, was particularly convinced that modern technology could increase agricultural 
production. He stated in 1951 that, “Agriculture is nothing more than the application of 
the principles of biology and other natural sciences to the art of growing food.” (Advisory 
Committee for Agricultural Activities, 1953, p.7). Weaver was also responsible for the 
RF’s conception of growing more food per area, which soon became central to the 
international discourse on population growth that the RF relied on for 30 years (Cullather, 
2010). The conception of increased yield per area as a solution to population growth fit 
among existing concerns of rapidly growing, urbanized populations leading to soil 
erosion of surrounding agricultural lands (Bashford, 2008). Coupled with the scarcity of 
new agricultural land, this almost naturally pointed to fertilizer and higher yielding crops 
as a solution to this mismatch of space and production. The perceived limit of available 
land, along with demographic changes like urbanization, led to the conceptualization of 
space where increasing yields per area were the most desirable solution (World 
Population and Food Crisis, 1965). Further, the RF envisioned higher yields as a radical 
force of modernization that would lead to other progressive social changes (Cullather, 
2010).  
In the later 1960s, however, the post-war technological optimism faded and 
declensionist narratives resurged. In a Congressional hearing on the green revolution in 
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1969, RF’s William Myers warned that if developed countries fail to provide continued 
support to developing ones, “We will sink once more into a sea of despair to wait for 
famine and chaos to overwhelm us” (The Green Revolution, 1969, p. 13). By the early 
1970s, the fears of overpopulation were far from over. Secretary of State William Rogers 
spoke to Congress in 1971:  
The need remains as great as it was when Point Four was proclaimed to apply 
technology to the problems of development. Indeed, population pressure in some 
nations is so acute that even the greatest agricultural breakthrough in decades—
the development of the grain which created the green revolution—has only… 
“bought time.” (Panel on science and technology, 1971, p. 3) 
Works such as Paul Ehrlich’s The population bomb (1968), Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of 
the commons” (1968), and the Club of Rome’s Limits to growth (Meadows et al., 1972) 
further contributed to an aura of pessimism (Hughes, 2000). A 1974 CIA report stated, 
“there are some factors pointing to the danger—even the likelihood—of a Malthusian 
crisis in India in the years ahead” (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, June 1974). 
The Rockefeller Foundation and Agricultural Development 
The Rockefeller Foundation began supporting agricultural research in the early 
1900s (Fitzgerald, 1986). Many of the RF’s programs at this time aimed to apply 
scientific research to social problems such as public health and population. The RF’s first 
agricultural program operated in the southern United States starting in 1906 under the 
General Education Board (Jennings, 1988). Then in 1924 RF started a technical 
assistance program in China that included an agricultural program, in order to raise rural 
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standards of living (Perkins, 1997). In the 1940s, the RF became involved in agricultural 
research in Mexico.  
Several factors prefaced the RF’s Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP), often 
referenced as the start of the green revolution (Fitzgerald, 1986). First, during World War 
II President Roosevelt focused on strengthening economic ties in the Americas in order to 
resist communist and fascist powers (Lewontin, 1983). Also during WWII, the RF had to 
end their programs in Europe, and it saw moving to Latin America as a natural adaptation 
of these programs. As historian Nick Cullather described, the RF saw Mexico as a 
“surrogate” for other developing countries (2010, p. 43). Scholars have debated what 
motivated the RF’s MAP, as Stephen Lewontin pointed out, “critics of the green 
revolution in Mexico have argued that political motivations and the associated 
ideological and cultural biases determined the program’s outcome” (1983, p. 73). He 
argued instead that the politics were more complex, and that painting the MAP as a 
picture of imperialistic motives of the RF ignores the various interests of both Mexican 
and RF scientists, other actors in Mexico, and the existing social structure of Mexican 
agriculture (1983). 
What we do know about the origins of the MAP is that it began as a rural 
development program. We also know that in the 1940s, the US government, particularly 
secretary of agriculture Henry A. Wallace, encouraged the RF to become involved in 
Mexican agriculture and framed it as a “yield per acre” problem (Cullather, 2010, p. 57). 
The US government also saw the RF as a way to support developing countries through a 
more autonomous and less politically charged organization than the US Department of 
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State (Cotter, 2003). There was also a direct connection with Dean Rusk, who came to 
the RF from the State Department in 1952 to become president of the RF until he became 
Secretary of State in 1960 (Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 1991).  
The US public and policymakers saw post-war Mexico as a success of foreign 
economic development (Cullather, 2010). But fears of an apocalyptic population 
explosion in Mexico started in 1948 and into the 1950s, and this shifted the meaning and 
focus of the MAP (Cotter, 2003; Cullather, 2010). While Mexico became a national 
security concern to the US, the RF did not explicitly play into these fears of peasant 
uprising in Mexico. But they did co-opt the population discourse, choosing to highlight 
the success of their agricultural modernization program in Mexico.  
Starting the Mexican Agricultural Program 
In 1941 the RF sent a group of scientific advisors to Mexico to survey the 
possibilities for an agricultural program in Mexico. Elvin Stakman, Richard Bradfield, 
and Paul Mangelsdorf, all professors of agricultural science (from University of 
Minnesota, Cornell, and Harvard, respectively), went to Mexico and developed a set of 
recommendations for a technical assistance program (Perkins, 1997). Their 
recommendations included: improving maize, wheat, and bean varieties; and better 
agronomic management practices, ostensibly under the leadership of American scientists 
(Jennings, 1988).  
The RF entered into an agreement with the Government of Mexico in 1943 that 
would be known as the RF’s Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) under the Office of 
Special Studies. MAP was hosted by the Chapingo Autonomous University, outside of 
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Mexico City (Cullather, 2010). The MAP started under the scientific leadership of J. 
George Harrar and initially focused on improving maize, beans, and wheat for Mexican 
conditions. The RF aimed to bring agricultural expertise to problems facing Mexican 
agriculture, such as breeding varieties of wheat that were resistant to stem rust, and 
developing improved varieties of maize (Fitzgerald, 1986; Perkins, 1997). Norman 
Borlaug was hired in 1944 to work with the wheat program. Borlaug and Harrar had both 
done their doctoral work with Stakman at Minnesota (Perkins, 1997). Many of the 
important details of the MAP are well documented in the secondary literature, therefore 
the next sections will focus on some of the scientific aspects of the MAP and how the 
MAP became a model for international agricultural development. 
Wheat and maize from the US and Canada were generally poorly adapted to 
Mexican conditions due to different lengths of daylight and seasons. Therefore MAP 
scientists realized that improved varieties for the semi-tropics needed to be derived from 
gene pools in the tropical, rather than temperate zones (Dahlberg, 1979). Under Borlaug’s 
supervision, MAP released new rust-resistant spring wheat varieties in 1949, and by 1957 
these new varieties constituted 90% of Mexican wheat acreage (Fitzgerald, 1986). 
Borlaug later discovered that wheat crosses between certain foreign strains produced 
varieties that could be grown over wide geographic areas. He stated at a 1960 meeting 
that “wheat is very different from corn in that it appears to be much more flexible in its 
adaptation to different soils and climatic conditions” (Notes on the Consultants' Meeting, 
1960). This would become the basis of Borlaug’s international wheat program, discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 2. This flexibility was due to their photoperiod insensitive 
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properties—a dominant genetic trait—that allowed them to grow under a variety of 
altitudes and latitudes, unlike Canadian and American wheat varieties (Borlaug, June 24, 
1960; Trethowan et al., 2007). While Borlaug’s discovery affected wheat only, the maize 
and rice programs also aimed at producing photoperiod insensitive varieties that could be 
grown over wide geographic regions.  
Borlaug’s discovery contradicted what many scientists, even Harrar, presumed at 
that time, which was that agricultural assistance programs necessarily had a limited 
geographic scope. In his 1961 oral history, Harrar, then-president of the RF, stated: 
Unfortunately, most scientific advances most directly benefit the particular 
geographic area in which they originated. This is especially true in the agricultural 
sciences. Of course, many basic principles are discovered which can be useful on 
an international front, on a broad front, but the application of those principles 
depends upon local climatic conditions and on many other factors. ([Oral history 
of J. George Harrar], 1961–62, p. 38) 
Harrar’s statement stands in contrast to statements from Borlaug at that time.  
Harrar also pointed out two other principles of the MAP: 1) collecting and testing 
plant germplasm and 2) testing finished varieties under controlled conditions. He noted, 
“one of the things we did was bring together the varieties of crop plants on which we 
were working from all of those parts of the world where climatic conditions had 
reasonable similarities... you don't know what to throw away until you get them together 
and test them” ([Oral history of J. George Harrar], 1961–62, p. 39). Secondly, Harrar 
stated that, “the plant itself tells you how many bushels you will get per acre, and the 
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only way you can find that out is by growing it under controlled conditions, theory to the 
contrary” ([Oral history of J. George Harrar], 1961–62, p. 39). Stakman, an advisor to the 
RF, echoed these principles in his own statement that, “wheat and corn and beans are 
grown under many different conditions and the varieties suitable in one area may not be 
suitable in another; these facts must be determined by experimentation” [Oral history of 
Elvin Charles Stakman], 1966–67, p. 9). These principles of germplasm collection and 
testing became standard for the RF’s later international agricultural programs. 
The other principle that Stakman advised the RF to follow came in 1953, when he 
wrote to RF’s president Rusk: 
It would be possible, and possibly desirable, to concentrate on incorporating into 
lines of the principal food crops the best possible combination of genes for 
yielding ability, disease resistance, or any other universally useful character, 
without considering adaptability to particular areas. These lines could then be 
given to breeders in all interested countries for use in developing varieties adapted 
to their conditions... others [problems], such as improvement of crop varieties, 
could be put on a regional or international basis where ecological zones extend 
over several countries. [emphasis added] (Stakman, December 22, 1953, p. 11) 
By the early 1960s, Stakman’s thoughts on developing broadly adapted varieties became 
a reality through Borlaug’s photoperiod insensitive wheat varieties. Throughout the 
1960s, the RF-sponsored programs focused on developing a few widely adapted varieties 
of wheat, rice, and maize that could be utilized in many countries (Smith, 2008). While 
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each program has continued up to the present, wheat was the most successful at proving 
itself as widely adapted. 
Wheat and Maize Research Programs in Mexico: Goals vs. Impacts 
By the 1950s it was clear that the MAP would primarily focus on maize and 
wheat improvement, and less on beans and other crops. And, as many scholars have 
pointed out, the programs would focus on one “isolable technical problem”: raising yields 
per acre, primarily through germplasm improvement (Harrar, Mangelsdorf, & Weaver, 
1951, quoted in Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 1991, p. 35). The MAP’s wheat program 
was incredibly successful in irrigated central and northern Mexico, with farmers 
clamoring for Borlaug’s newly-released, disease-resistant varieties. The maize program 
was less successful, however. While the RF’s new wheat varieties were rapidly adopted 
by farmers in Mexico’s Pacific Northwest, farmers in central Mexico adopted new maize 
varieties at a much lower rate. By the mid-1960s, farmers grew over 95% new wheat 
varieties, but only 13% new maize varieties (Griffin, 1974).  
A number of factors belied the different rates of adoption of RF varieties of wheat 
and maize in Mexico. First, the crop programs, led by their respective RF scientists, had 
different goals. Sterling Wortman, who worked for MAP and later directed RF’s 
Agricultural Sciences program recalled: 
In the corn program we primarily had a plant breeding effort under way, not a 
comprehensive production program… We were concerned very much with the 
problems of developing many varieties of hybrids needed for the great number of 
ecological situations in Mexico… The wheat program on the other hand was 
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concerned not only with development of rust resistant, high yielding varieties but 
with seed production, the use of higher amounts of fertilizer, and adoption by 
farmers. (Wortman quoted in Myren, 1969, p. 441) 
The biophysical properties of wheat and maize also varied: wheat was self-pollinated, 
which allowed farmers to multiply and save their seed, but hybrid maize required farmers 
to repurchase seed each year. Hybrid maize also appeared to be less widely adaptable 
than wheat. Maize varieties required specific adaptation to local conditions, prohibiting 
the wide spread of one or a few varieties. Myren wrote that, “In order to obtain hybrids 
that yield better than local native varieties, it has generally been necessary to develop 
them for specific climatic conditions” (1969, pp. 446–7).  
A final factor in the relative success of the RF’s maize and wheat programs was 
the different characteristics of farmers and the agricultural landscape for maize and wheat 
in Mexico. Most maize farmers were subsistence farmers on small tracts of land. They 
relied on rainfall for irrigation, and were mostly located in the climatically variable 
central Mexico, where the main demand for maize was for tortillas. Myren estimated that 
there were “40 times more corn farmers than wheat farmers, and consequently 40 times 
as many decisionmakers to be reached with information about new production practices” 
(1969, p. 444). Twenty years after MAP started, only 9.9% of Mexico’s maize-growing 
area was irrigated in 1962 (Myren, 1969). 
Edwin J. Wellhausen, a maize geneticist for the MAP from its beginning, and 
director starting in 1951 (later director of CIMMYT), apparently understood the many 
challenges faced by maize farmers (Jennings, 1988). In his oral history, he explained how 
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maize farmers in Mexico were different from maize farmers in the US. He stated, 
In the United States we think about producing varieties that yield the most in 
average years, and if we get caught with an abnormal season or an early frost... 
we'll hope to make up for it in succeeding years. But not here. They [farmers] 
selected very hard for those things that produced under very adverse conditions, 
regardless of how much they yield. They weren't interested in maximum yield, 
but they were interested in getting something every year.... They had selected for 
adaptation to the extremes of climate, rainfall. ([Oral history of Edwin J. 
Wellhausen], 1966, p. 47) 
In summary, maize farmers in Mexico faced a variety of site-specific challenges that 
required locally adapted varieties and technologies. 
Wheat farmers, in contrast, had socioeconomic and environmental characteristics 
that were compatible with the RF’s wheat program. In 1940, the central part of Mexico 
was the main wheat producing-area, harvesting 43% of the wheat while the northwestern 
region harvested only 17% (Myren, 1969). Then from 1940 to 1960, the RF’s research 
shifted from mainly the central Bajio area (where the Chapingo station was located—see 
Figure 5) to the Pacific Northwest, home to commercial wheat farmers but very few 
maize farmers (Lewontin, 1983). In 1955 the MAP started a research station at Ciudad 
Obregón (Jennings, 1988, p. 85) in the northwest. By 1964 the northwestern region of 
Mexico, the Sonora, contributed to 71.5% of production, due not to a replacement of 
wheat farming in central Mexico, but a drastic expansion of wheat-growing land. In the 
moderate desert climate of Sonora, wheat farmers held large tracts of land, had the socio-
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economic ability to invest in new seeds, inputs, and production technologies, and as a 
result of government-sponsored irrigation projects in the northwest, 89% of the wheat-
growing areas in Mexico were irrigated in 1963 (Myren, 1969).  
 
 
Figure 5. Map of Mexico highlighting Chapingo and Ciudad Obregón, two sites of wheat 
research in Mexico. 
For both maize and wheat, starting around 1945 and certainly by 1955, the RF 
scientists in Mexico focused on testing varieties under irrigated, heavily fertilized 
conditions (Oasa, 1981; Cullather, 2010). They used these same conditions to 
demonstrate the superiority of new crops to the indigenous varieties, and seldom 
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performed experiments at different levels of fertilizer6 (Lewontin, 1983). Historian 
Stephen Lewontin attributed the focus on irrigated, fertilized conditions to the RF 
scientists catering to the rural elite in Mexico. Given Wellhausen’s nuanced 
understanding of maize adaptation and his leadership in the MAP and later in CIMMYT, 
it is unclear why the “ideal conditions” adaptation strategy prevailed for maize, other than 
optimism that improved maize varieties would follow the same trajectory of adoption as 
Borlaug’s wheat varieties. 
The RF encountered early criticism of their Mexican program from Carl Sauer, a 
geographer at the University of California, Berkeley. Sauer was deeply concerned that the 
MAP would result in a loss in maize biodiversity in Mexico, and warned against 
modeling the MAP on US agriculture (Jennings, 1988). He found that Wellhausen was 
attuned to the local cultural specificities, and that “he is not a missionary for soybeans, 
and I suspect he sees the pitfalls in the wheat campaign” (Sauer quoted in Jennings, 1988, 
p. 52). 
Despite farmers’ lack of adoption of the MAP’s maize varieties, maize held 
political importance in Mexico and according to researcher Bruce Jennings, MAP 
scientists dismissed “claims of inadequate production as a myth” (1988, p. 71). RF 
scientists continued breeding maize for irrigated, highly fertilized conditions until the late 
1960s, when criticisms of MAP and the Green Revolution became more widespread. 
Even then, the RF launched the controversial Plan Puebla, an extension-heavy project to 
disseminate modern maize varieties to rainfed farmers, which was largely unsuccessful 
due to the lack of adaptation of maize to the rainfed conditions (Chapter 4 discusses Plan 
                                                
6 An exception being the agronomic experiments performed by Reggie Laird. 
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Puebla in more detail). The wheat research program, inspired by its success in northwest 
Mexico, continued to focus on breeding wheat with photoperiod insensitivity, fertilizer 
responsiveness, and dependence on irrigation until the 1970s. I will further discuss this in 
the rest of my dissertation. Ultimately, the MAP and its subsequent transnational and 
international programs would focus on both wheat and maize. 
Many scholars have retrospectively criticized MAP scientists for catering to 
wealthier farmers (Fitzgerald, 1986; Griffin, 1974; Lewontin, 1983). These scholars 
argued that by focusing on varieties suited to irrigated and fertilized conditions, RF 
scientists created a research program that was biased towards higher capital farmers. My 
own analysis is less critical and supports the work of Anderson, Levy, and Morrison 
(1991) who argue that scientists often operate under the assumptions that their own biases 
are neutral, and that technologies are also “neutral” in that they are not biased towards a 
certain socioeconomic population. MAP scientists believed that improved plant varieties 
and packages of practices were socioeconomically neutral technologies (that anyone 
could benefit from them). Of course in reality, farmers adopted technologies and 
packages of practices at different rates leading to socioeconomic changes that favored 
larger farmers with access to irrigation and fertilizers over small subsistence farmers. In 
retrospect, however, it is clear why green revolution-technologies favored larger farmers. 
First, one of the basic assumptions of innovation theory is that actors with more capital 
adopt innovations first (Rogers, 2010).  
Secondly, I argue that scientists working in Mexico focused on commercial 
farmers with access to irrigation and assured rainfall out of both convenience and an 
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imperative to focus on higher production areas.7 For example, Wellhausen, said in 1947 
that “areas in which a surplus can be produced should be attacked first’ the pure 
subsistence areas may be left to a long time in the future” (Cotter, 2002, p. 196). This 
philosophy, held by both Wellhausen and especially by Borlaug led to the disparity of 
outcomes between the MAP’s wheat and maize programs.  
Finally, as several scholars have noted, the evolution of MAP’s research 
trajectory was connected to the Mexican government’s political agenda at that time 
(Cotter, 2003; Lewontin, 1983; Matchett, 2002). As Karen Matchett (2002) described in 
her dissertation, the idea of genetic improvement of maize varieties was very attractive to 
the leftist Mexican government under Lázaro Cárdenas, president from 1934–40, who 
believed that scientific agriculture could improve the livelihoods of peasant farmers, and 
redistributed land according to the ejido system. Manuel Ávila Camacho, president from 
1940–46, shifted the discourse to overall production, rather than peasant livelihood. 
Under his successor, Miguel Alemán, most government funding went to irrigated rather 
than rainfed crops. 
Maize scientists at CIMMYT realized by the late 1960s that aiming for widely 
adapted maize varieties did not suit the needs of rainfed farmers, as shown by the failure 
of Project Puebla. Myren wrote of Project Puebla, “what we have learned up to now is 
that identifying improved germ plasm for rainfed production is much more complex than 
                                                
7 See Jennings (1988), Matchett (2002), and Harwood (2009) for further discussion of the 
motivations of the RF research staff in Mexico. These authors argue that the MAP’s maize 
research was initially peasant-focused. Matchett emphasized that the MAP’s maize breeding 
program first focused on inbred, open-pollinated (vs. hybrid) varieties that would benefit small 
farmers. While hybrids could attain higher potential yields, open-pollinated varieties were more 
likely to thrive under the field conditions in Mexico. 
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it is for irrigated conditions. It also appears that up to now most breeding programs have 
focused on selecting material for optimum moisture conditions” (Myren, 1972, p. 11). In 
turn, social scientist Kenneth Dahlberg wrote: “One wonders what the shape of 
agricultural research in those developing countries influenced primarily by the 
Rockefeller approach would be today if Project Puebla had been started in 1941 instead 
of the original project for increasing production on irrigated soils through specialized 
seed technologies” (1979, pp. 54–55). Dahlberg argued further that scientists should 
focus on adaptive agriculture, requiring “a shift from the emphasis on trying to control or 
change the environment to emphasis on better adapting production to the local 
environment” (1979, p. 183). Like other scholars, Dahlberg argued that the land grant 
model of US agricultural universities, applied to countries like Mexico and India, was a 
flawed and incomplete attempt at replication (Busch, 1988; Fitzgerald, 1986). He wrote 
that an important aspect of crop varietal development in the US was adaptation to local 
conditions, facilitated by local institutions and land-grant colleges. 
New Country-Specific and Cooperative Agricultural Programs 
Around 1950 RF administrators began considering the long-term future of the 
agricultural program in Mexico. Minutes from the 1950 meeting of the RF’s International 
Health Division stated that, "Five years ago we got into agricultural development in 
Mexico.... The success and interest in it would in itself raise the question whether The 
Rockefeller Foundation should, as a general undertaking, continue to do that kind of 
program" [emphasis original] (Excerpt from minutes of meeting of IHD Commission on 
Review, May 19, 1950). While some RF employees disagreed with the “universal 
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approach” of the MAP, by the end of the decade, it was clear that the RF would proceed 
with country-specific and transnational (cooperative) agricultural programs based on the 
MAP; that is, bringing in international scientists and working in-country to improve 
yields of staple crops (Cullather, 2010; Fahs, 1954).  
Harrar—who in 1950 transferred from director of the MAP to Deputy Director of 
Agriculture for the RF in New York—was particularly important in expanding the MAP 
model to other countries in Latin America and Asia (Harrar, 1951). RF administrators, 
including Harrar, reflected that the RF could make a niche supporting long-term 
programs in agriculture. Starting in 1950, the RF began a series of country-specific 
agricultural programs based on the MAP and focused on maize. These programs started 
as countrywide programs in Columbia (1950), India (1954), and Chile (1955). The 
programs in Columbia and Chile both focused on improvement of wheat and maize, but 
also included livestock and other programs (Dahlberg, 1979).  
In 1952 the RF sent Harrar, Manglesdorf, and Weaver8 to India to advise on the 
agricultural situation there. Then in 1954, the Indian government contracted two maize 
scientists, Wellhausen and U.J. Grant, from the RF to survey India’s research and 
development system and advise on collaboration between India and the RF. At that time, 
Wellhausen directed the MAP, and Grant led the RF’s Columbian Agricultural Program’s 
(CAP) maize improvement program. The RF and Government of India signed a 
memorandum of understanding in 1956 aimed at improving secondary education in 
agriculture and focusing on three cereal crops: hybrid maize, sorghum, and millet. On 
March 8, 1957 Ralph W. Cummings, a soil scientist from North Carolina State 
                                                
8 Weaver was at the time the RF’s Director of the Division of Science and Agriculture. 
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University, arrived in India as field director for the Rockefeller Foundation, and Grant as 
assistant field director and director of maize breeding (Rockefeller Foundation, 1957). 
Simultaneously, the RF expanded into what they called international cooperative 
programs that would typically be based in one country and would reach out to other 
countries. These programs aimed to 1) facilitate the international distribution of improved 
germplasm and 2) assist in building and training scientific researchers and staff in semi-
tropical countries, without stationing RF staff directly in those countries (Stakman, 
Bradfield, Mangelsdorf, 1967). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the RF’s international 
coordinated agricultural programs rapidly proliferated. The RF developed a network of 
cooperative crop testing programs through South America, the Middle East, and Asia. 
These cooperative programs were a means for the RF to institutionalize their research 
agenda beyond Mexico (Jennings, 1988). They functioned as an internationally diffused 
MAP, with the same basic cluster of administrators, crops, and goals. 
The RF’s first international cooperative program was the Central American Corn 
Improvement Program, which started in 1954 ([Oral history of Elvin Charles Stakman], 
1966–67). Several countries in Central America came together to request RF assistance 
with their maize production in the early 1950s (Stakman, Bradfield, & Mangelsdorf, 
1967). These countries included El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and 
Panama. In 1954, the RF sent Harrar, Stakman, and Sterling Wortman, a corn breeder for 
MAP, through Central America to survey the possibility of an international cooperative 
maize testing program (Oficina de Estudios Especiales, 1954). Based out of the RF 
offices in Mexico and Columbia, the RF began the Central American Corn Improvement 
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Program. Wortman led the program in 1954 and then Donald Smith, of the RF’s Mexico 
office, directed after that (Stakman, Bradfield, & Mangelsdorf, 1967). The goal of the 
Central American Corn Improvement Program was to test maize varieties that had 
already been exchanged between Columbia and Mexico to “see whether some of them 
may be used at once in the cooperating countries” (Oficina de Estudios Especiales, 1954). 
Then starting in 1956, MAP and CAP started a world-wide maize testing program that 
extended to several more countries in South America and also India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines (Columbian Agricultural Program, 1956). The world-wide program aimed to 
evaluate the “adaptability and genetic value of specific material throughout the world, 
help breeders learn what is available, and help the germ plasm banks to fill seed requests 
intelligently” (Columbian Agricultural Program, 1957, p. 35).  
In 1959 the RF created the Inter-American Food Crop Improvement Program, led 
by Wellhausen (Rockefeller Foundation, 1959). The program initially focused on maize 
but later included wheat and potatoes. This program aimed to apply the Columbian, 
Chilean, and Mexican agricultural programs more broadly throughout the western 
hemisphere. By 1960 the Inter-American Food Crop Improvement Program grew to 
include wheat, which would soon become its major focus. The RF established this 
program for two additional reasons, both internal and external. Internally, the MAP was 
moving towards a complete administrative transfer to Mexican scientists, which started in 
1960 with the appointment of Ignacio Narvaez Morales as director of the MAP’s wheat 
improvement program (Rockefeller Foundation, 1960). Because of this, the RF decided 
to establish Inter-American Food Crop Improvement Program so that they could continue 
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to operate internationally in Latin and South America. Secondly, the RF responded to 
demand from attendees at the Fourth Latin-American Conference of Agricultural 
Scientists in 1958. Wheat scientists at this meeting agreed to establish an inter-American 
cooperative yield test for wheat, similar to the Central American Corn Improvement 
Program. RF scientists, specifically Borlaug, would coordinate this program out of 
Mexico. 
In the late 1950s, RF administrators were eager to get Borlaug into a position of 
international leadership for wheat science. Harrar, then-director for agriculture at the RF, 
wrote to Borlaug in 1958, “it is now timely to begin to intensify international research on 
small grain improvement in the Americas and its logical leadership to this effort should 
come out of the cooperative agricultural program in Mexico” (Harrar, 1958). Harrar also 
wrote in 1959 to José Vallega of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) that “we 
now want Dr. Borlaug to operate on a very much more international scale. We would like 
to support him in an effort to strengthen cereals improvement research throughout the 
Americas and link these more closely together from the northern to the southern extremes 
of production areas” (Harrar, October 21, 1959). 
RF’s International Agricultural Programs 
 Starting in the 1960s, the RF’s agricultural programs expanded from country-wide 
and cooperative to what they called international. The international programs for maize 
and wheat were extensions of the previous cooperative programs, but their rice program 
in the Philippines (described later) was more or less de novo. Nonetheless, the conceptual 
shift to international programs was a deliberate move by RF administrators. Not 
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surprisingly, the international programs continued to address the controllable 
technological variables of agriculture, working on assumptions of uniform field 
conditions. These programs also assumed that wide adaptation gave varieties transitive 
yield properties under controlled conditions, which was truer for wheat than for maize or 
rice. 
In 1961, the administrative portion of the MAP was terminated and the National 
Institute for Agricultural Investigations (INIA) was formed to take over the MAP’s 
national operations in Mexico (Jennings, 1988). According to Jennings (1988), the Inter-
American programs floundered so the RF began looking for new institutional support for 
its international cooperative programs. Additionally, many of the RF scientists were not 
happy working at the INIA due to budget constraints and political tensions. So in 1963, 
the RF partnered with the Ford Foundation and Government of Mexico to form the 
International Center for Corn and Wheat Improvement, headquartered in Chapingo, 
Mexico, and directed by Wellhausen. The RF still provided funding to the INIA but built 
a new scientific complex to house the RF researchers (Press release, November 29, 
1963).  
 The International Center for Corn and Wheat Improvement (the Center), as its 
name suggests, focused on international research programs for maize and wheat. The 
maize and wheat programs expanded on the existing transnational infrastructure in the 
Americas, expanding over the next few years to include collaborators in Africa and Asia. 
The Center’s overall goal was “to aid, on an international scale, in the improvement of 
materials and methods for the production of maize and wheat by obtaining improved 
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varieties and by applying breeding techniques to achieve greater protection against insect 
pests and diseases as well as destructive climatic effects,” as described by the Secretary 
of Agriculture and Livestock of Mexico, Ing. Julian Rodriguez Adame (Speech by Ing. 
Julian Rodriguez Adame, October 25, 1963). The main goals of the wheat program 
included developing new varieties of wheat that were rust resistant and also “high-yield, 
widely-adapted” (The International Center for Corn and Wheat Improvement, 1963). For 
maize, the goals were to collect and distribute maize germplasm, to breed varieties 
resistant to disease, to develop varieties for high fertility conditions, and “to develop corn 
varieties insensitive to day length and temperature, thereby increasing adaptability” (The 
International Center for Corn and Wheat Improvement, 1963). 
As will be discussed later in this dissertation, this was exactly the time that 
Borlaug and others began to popularize wide adaptation as a breeding goal for cereal 
crops. Borlaug had already discovered, through the cooperative wheat program, that 
several of the varieties of wheat from Mexico and Columbia could be grown in the 
Middle East and South Asia, and produced relatively high yields. RF scientists were 
finding that maize, however, was not as successful abroad. It had a more narrow range of 
adaptation, likely due to its sensitivity to day length. By 1965, it was more and more clear 
that wheat would be the main international focus of the Center, due to its ability to grow 
under a variety of conditions and locations. Yet maize research was still, and remains 
today, an important component of the Center and its later evolutions. 
In the mid-1960s the RF had become involved in wheat improvement in India, 
and Ignacio Narvaez was contracted by the government of Pakistan and the Ford 
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Foundation to assist with Pakistan’s wheat program. Lewis M. Roberts, an Associate 
Director of Agricultural Sciences at the RF, wrote in a 1965 that an asset of the Center 
was their four wheat breeders: Borlaug, R. Glenn Anderson (recently hired by the RF to 
work in India), and John W. Gibler and Charles F. Krull, who were both recently 
transferred from Columbia to the Center’s headquarters in Mexico (Roberts, 1965). And 
interestingly, Roberts viewed the location of Mexico as an asset as well. He wrote, “The 
broad range of ecological conditions in that country provide a highly favorable natural 
setting for maize and wheat improvement work applicable to a broad belt of the globe, 
especially in the tropical latitudes” (Roberts, 1965). Roberts, among others, saw the 
potential to expand the RF’s international wheat program based on widely adapted 
germplasm developed and tested in Mexico. Though he hoped the same for maize, its 
more specific adaptation prevented wide international success. 
The International Center for Corn and Wheat Improvement became CIMMYT in 
1966 (Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo / International Maize and 
Wheat Improvement Center). CIMMYT was governed by an international board of RF 
and Ford Foundation affiliates as well as international scientists that participated in 
CIMMYT’s international programs (Jennings, 1988). Wellhausen became CIMMYT’s 
director general and Borlaug led the wheat program. This 1966 change also meant that 
CIMMYT was more autonomous from the RF, though clearly still financially dependent. 
The RF continued to sponsor the country-specific programs, such as in India. 
In summary: in the 1940s and 50s, the MAP aimed to collect foreign germplasm 
and test newly developed varieties under controlled conditions in Mexico. In the 1960s, 
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as the MAP ended and Inter-American Food Crop Improvement Program began, RF 
scientists added the element of international testing to the equation. Then the Center in 
1963 and CIMMYT in 1966 solidified the international component of Wellhausen’s 
maize program and Borlaug’s wheat program. All of the RF country-specific, 
coordinated, and international programs shared a common theme: reducing agro-
ecological complexity down to a uniform prescription of fertilizers, irrigation, and high 
yield potential varieties. This is reflected in the crop-specific nature of many of the 
programs, and the assumptions of their transferability to large agro-climatic zones. 
Rice Research in Asia 
Soon after starting the MAP, the RF became interested in agricultural 
development in Asia, and decided to use the MAP as a base to develop agricultural 
programs in other countries (Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 1991). RF administrators as 
well as US State Department officials believed that increasing food production in Asia 
would quell potential communist uprisings in rural Asia, in line with Perkins’ PNST. 
Thus, the success of the MAP was retrospectively imbued with political rhetoric about 
population growth, and the MAP was subsequently looked to by the State Department as 
the paragon of good international policy (Perkins, 1997). The MAP became model of 
preventing rural revolt and leading to happy, well-fed peasants (Cullather, 2010). The RF 
saw expanding their research into staple crops of Asia as a humanitarian mission to feed 
the hungry masses, especially in light of growing fears of a population explosion. To 
them and many others, the twin goals of increasing food production and stemming 
population growth were natural solutions. 
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The population problem was closely tied to post-war fears of communist 
expansion in Asia, as laid out by intellectuals such as John Boyd Orr and RF 
administrators such as Weaver (Orr, 1950; Perkins, 1997). Mangelsdorf wrote in 1961 
about the uncommitted, but politically valuable, recently independent nation-state of 
India. He wrote that, “the near-famine areas of India are usually strongly Communistic 
and all of India may well move toward Communism” (Mangelsdorf, 1961, p. 279). 
President Eisenhower in 1959 “hoped that India would some day become a great 
counterweight to Communist China” (Gleason, May 28, 1959). India became a symbol of 
both overpopulation and a test whether a newly democratic nation could survive and not 
turn to communism (Hess, 2005). 
The RF began planning and expanding their agricultural program into Asia in the 
1950s. The RF’s Advisory Committee became especially interested in agriculture in the 
Philippines, which faced threats of both hunger and communism (Anderson, Levy, & 
Morrison, 1991). As previously mentioned, the RF sent three scientists to primarily India, 
but also other countries in Asia, to survey the agricultural situation there in 1952. In 1953 
the RF appointed Elvin C. Stakman, an eminent and recently retired pathologist, as a 
special consultant to their international programs. Stakman wrote a detailed letter to RF 
president Dean Rusk outlining his thoughts on the expansion into Asia (as mentioned 
earlier, Harrar also discussed the expansion of the MAP to Asia). Stakman wrote to Rusk: 
To what extent could experience from the Latin-American programs be utilized 
elsewhere? There already is a demonstration of considerable transfer value for 
Latin America. But how much would be applicable to a politically, radically, and 
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linguistically heterogeneous region like the overpopulated areas of Asia?... If the 
objective is to do the greatest good to the largest number as quickly and 
inexpensively as possible, all available and applicable experience should be used 
as a basis for plans and procedures if it were decided to try an experiment in Asia. 
(Stakman, December 22, 1953, p. 8)  
This letter outlined some of the humanitarian motivations for the RF’s involvement in 
Asia.  
Simultaneously, in the early 1950s the RF considered becoming involved in rice 
research in India, Japan, and the Philippines, and in starting a regional rice research hub 
in one of these countries (Oasa, 1981). Over the next few years, the RF came to an 
agreement with the Ford Foundation to found an international rice research institute. 
While the Ford Foundation had previously been engaged in community development, or 
agricultural extension-based international programs, they had realized “that temperate 
zone agricultural technologies and western institutional arrangements did not transfer 
directly or easily into the tropical or semitropical environments of most developing 
countries. Fundamental and adaptive research was needed for the transfer to take place 
successfully” (Ford Foundation quoted in Oasa, 1981, p. 146). As previously mentioned, 
the RF’s Harrar was instrumental in proposing a rice research center in the Philippines, 
which he had hinted at back in 1951, and after he visited the Philippines in 1953 with 
Weaver (Oasa, 1981). In the midst of expanding technical and scientific assistance 
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programs and fears of overpopulation and communism, the RF chose rice as a tool of 
modernization and,9 some would argue, sociopolitical control (Smith, 2008).  
In 1959 the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations signed a memorandum of 
understanding with Juan de G. Rodriguez, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources of the Philippines (Oasa, 1981).10 The International Rice Research Institute 
(IRRI) was created at Los Baños, near the University of Philippines campus, and Robert 
Chandler became IRRI’s director. IRRI started official operations in 1962. IRRI was also 
funded by USAID starting in 1965 (Oasa, 1981).11 
 In many ways, IRRI was modeled on the MAP: a centralized research facility 
that produced widely adapted germplasm to distribute. This is evident from IRRI’s stated 
goals as well as from archival records that include correspondence between IRRI and 
CIMMYT scientists. IRRI drew inspiration from the success of the MAP model in 
Mexico, India, and Pakistan. At a 1966 Congressional hearing, Forrest Hill, and 
instrumental actor from the Ford Foundation in setting up IRRI, reported: 
The introduction by Pakistan and India of improved wheat varieties developed in 
the Mexican-Rockefeller Foundation crop improvement programs may well mark 
the beginning of a revolution in wheat production…. There is every reason to 
believe that rice varieties developed at the International Rice Research Institute in 
the Philippines can be used to help revolutionize rice production in the humid 
                                                
9 Many scholars of political ecology and science and technology studies have chosen rice 
technologies as a way to analyze sociotechnical systems in agriculture See: Anderson et al., 1991; 
Brooks, 2011a and 2011b; Moon, 2000; Oasa, 1981; Saha, 2012; Smith, 2008. 
10 Anderson et al., 1991, Cullather, 2010, and Oasa, 1981 provide more detailed descriptions of 
the scientific and political origins of IRRI. 
11 USAID started funding agricultural research in Mexico starting in 1969, see Jennings, 1988. 
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tropics. (World War on Hunger, 1966, pp. 96–97). 
IRRI initially operated with the goal of producing high yielding varieties of rice. IRRI’s 
first director, Chandler, retrospectively told an interviewer that, “IRRI had to show the 
world that higher yields were possible” (Chandler quoted in Oasa, 1981, p. 174). 
Cullather called this concerted scientific effort, led by US scientists, a “Manhattan Project 
for Food,” one that aimed to create a revolutionary new rice technology in an isolated, 
project-oriented setting (Cullather, 2004, p. 233).  
 Social scientist Edmund K. Oasa’s 1981 dissertation thoroughly documented the 
early research agenda of IRRI, which will not be discussed in detail here. Drawing on the 
work of Oasa and other scholars, I will analyze aspects of rice research in Asia that relate 
to the agro-climatic adaptation of rice varieties. As early as 1960 scientists in Asia 
promoted using “superior varieties with greater adaptability” (Dasananda cited in 
Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 1991). Sala Dasanada, a rice scientist from Thailand, in 
1963 presented a paper called “Breeding for adaptability to greater range of ecological 
conditions.” Dasananda went on to become a board of trustees member at IRRI in 1968 
and 1969 (Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 1991). 
Questions of adaptation were central to rice research, but were not explicitly 
studied. Instead, IRRI scientists focused on breeding rice varieties with an ideal plant 
type—photoperiod insensitive, fertilizer responsive, short-strawed, and disease resistant 
(Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 1991; Oasa, 1981). Further, in 1964, just before IR8’s 
release, IRRI scientists Peter Jennings and Henry Beachell repeatedly used the term 
“widely adapted” or “non-sensitive varieties” to justify the potential of IRRI varieties 
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across Asia (Jennings & Beachell cited in Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 1991, pp. 65–
66).  
In the summer of 1965 a drought in India and Pakistan crystallized fears of food 
shortages and famine. This provided an immediate motivation for a miracle crop from 
IRRI; luckily for IRRI, they had been working towards the release of their ideal variety of 
rice—though ironically, drought resistance was not part of the equation, drought simply 
provided motivation for more food production (Cullather 2004; Oasa, 1981). A specific 
strain of rice, called IR8, was released in the Philippines and tested throughout Asian 
rice-growing countries (Cullather, 2010; Oasa, 1981). IR8 was derived from a parent, 
developed by the Dutch in Indonesia, which was photoperiod insensitive (Barker & 
Herdt, 1982). IR8’s other main technological advancement was that it combined fertilizer 
responsiveness (typical of japonica varieties) with short duration suited to tropical 
conditions (of the indica varieties) (Farmer, 1979). IR8 was immediately dubbed the 
miracle rice.   
According to Anderson, Levy, and Morrison, the ideal of widely adapted varieties 
was ironic because IR8 was only adapted to irrigated conditions (1991). Like the wheat 
varieties developed by Borlaug in Mexico, IR8 was developed under irrigated, highly 
controlled conditions, and high levels of fertilizer. It was then tested in multiple locations 
in order to test its local adaptation. From a 1966 USAID report: 
The IRRI plant breeders have repeatedly stressed the importance of extensive 
local field trials, with proper attention to cultural practices and fertilizer use, 
before this, or any, new variety can be recommended for a specific region because 
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of the extreme variability in local soil and general environmental conditions and 
the uncertainty with respect to disease or insect hazards. (Moseman, 1966) 
But unlike Borlaug’s wheat varieties, IR8 did not prove itself as widely adapted across 
locations. Many authors have pointed to the extremely diverse rice-cultivation landscape 
as a reason for the limited success of IR8 in South Asia (Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 
1991; Farmer, 1979; Oasa, 1981). IRRI scientist Richard Bradfield justified the focus on 
irrigated conditions because he expected marginal rice cultivation to decrease and 
irrigated rice cultivation to increase, assuming a constant availability of water resources 
(Anderson, Levy, & Morrison, 1991).  
Oasa wrote that, “although IR8 was tested on private farms throughout parts of 
Asia in 1966, nowhere in his report did Chandler state the conditions under which it and 
other promising IR varieties were tested. In short, wide adaptability had a different 
meaning for IRRI. It actually meant wide adaptability under controlled conditions” 
[emphasis added] (1981, p. 251). Oasa cited the controlled experimental conditions of 
IRRI as a main contributor to its lack of adaptation to Asian landscapes, in particular the 
irregularity of water resources. While some IRRI scientists recognized that “it is entirely 
unrealistic… to develop a variety under one set of conditions and to expect it to perform 
equally well under another,” the IRRI mandate was to focus on conditions with 
demonstrable, big payoffs, which required testing and demonstrating results under 
controlled irrigation and fertilizer applications (Oasa, 1981, p. 200). 
Commenting on rice varieties released by IRRI in Asia, scholars have been more 
explicit in their criticisms of IRRI’s concept of wide adaptation. Farmer’s 1979 article 
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brought the issue of wide adaptation to light. In response to the failure of rice varieties in 
both flood- and drought-prone areas of India and Sri Lanka, he wrote:  
There are two kinds of adaptability. First, there is the adaptability… brought 
about by the selection of environment-specific varieties. Secondly, there is the 
adaptability of a single variety to a wide range of environments, including a 
variety of pests. Some of the claims made for IR.8, and some early 
pronouncements on strategy emanating from IRRI and elsewhere, clearly 
envisaged the second kind of adaptability… It is more the first kind of 
adaptability that is now essential in rice-breeding. It appears that the two kinds of 
adaptability have been confused, or at any rate not sufficiently distinguished. (pp. 
307–308) 
Subsequent studies of IRRI rice during the Green Revolution have had similar findings. 
Oasa also wrote about adaptation at length in his dissertation (1981). Anderson et al. 
made several claims that IRRI’s “assumptions” about the applications of their rice “were 
too narrow for the complexity of cultivation conditions in Asia” (1991, p. 66). They also 
noted that IRRI’s concept of wide adaptation appeared to mean in geography (i.e. latitude 
and longitude) only, not in reference to different environments (Anderson, Levy, & 
Morrison, 1991). Further, Robert Chambers (1977) suggested that IRRI’s strategy of 
selecting under irrigated and heavily fertilized conditions may have actually eliminated 
varieties with wide adaptation. 
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IRRI Rice in India and South Asia 
 Despite IRRI’s claim of developing widely adapted rice, natural and social 
scientists alike began realizing that IRRI’s rice was only adapted to irrigated conditions 
(Kalirajan & Shand, 1982; Maurya, Bottrall, & Farrrington, 1988). In other words, most 
farms in Asia did not have the necessary environmental conditions to grow IRRI’s new 
rice varieties. Although IRRI scientists aimed at a widely adapted variety, their methods 
and goals were mismatched. Several scholars have examined this issue in South Asia: in 
particular, Farmer (1979, 1986), Oasa (1981), Saha (2012), and Anderson et al. (1991). 
 New varieties of rice developed by IRRI were indeed adopted extensively 
throughout Asia, though limited to irrigated areas. Farmers in India’s western Indo-
Gangetic Plains, who had access to canal irrigation, adopted modern rice varieties and 
planted them during the kharif (summer monsoon) season, in rotation with modern wheat 
(Farmer, 1979). Pakistan (then West Pakistan) also rapidly adopted modern rice varieties. 
But Farmer pointed out that even countries that adopted modern rice did not see 
massively increased gains in production the way they did for wheat, due to lack of local 
adaptation and susceptibility to pest and disease (1979). Farmer pointed out that IRRI 
varieties—particularly IR8—failed in low-lying lands of India and Bangladesh because 
of their reduced stature, which became submerged during the monsoon, and also their 
photoperiod insensitivity, which meant they matured before the monsoon season finished 
(1979). Shortage of water, i.e. reliance on rainfall, in about half of South and Southeast 
Asia in the early 1970s, constrained adoption of irrigation-dependent rice varieties, or 
farmers risked lowering the water table through pump irrigation. 
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 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, agricultural scientists at this time, globally, 
wavered between the traditional view that crops must be developed in the location they 
would be grown, and the relatively new concept of wide adaptation that allowed quick 
adoption of foreign germplasm without extensive testing. Oasa recorded that IRRI 
scientists attempted to prove the wide adaptability of IR8 through well-managed 
experimental farms in 1965 and 1966 but that “some national scientists, India's in 
particular, questioned IR8's adaptability. Indian scientists felt that a variety should be 
tested widely before being released to areas outside of where it was bred and raised” 
(Robert F. Chandler cited in Oasa, 1981, p. 250). Indian scientists insisted on testing new 
materials under both irrigated and rainfed conditions. But Saha wrote that the “rainfed 
ecosystem, however, had its own set of problems that made cultivation of the newly bred 
varieties a challenging task for the scientists” (2012, p. 99).  
When an El Niño event in 1965 and 1966 resulted in a failed monsoon season, it 
caused drought and food shortages in India and Pakistan. According to some scholars, 
this catalyzed the rapid diffusion of modern wheat and rice varieties into India from RF-
funded research centers in Mexico and the Philippines (Ahlberg, 2007; Cullather, 2010). 
As green revolution-style research took hold in India, scientists shifted their focus to 
rapid gains in production that could be achieved in irrigated areas and under progressive 
farmers, rather than on equally distributing those gains (a similar “giving up” on the 
social aims of the project occurred in Mexico in the 1940s). This led to a bias in testing 
new varieties in well-fertilized, irrigated areas in the Punjab region. Saha argued that 
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Indian scientists, in focusing on developing rice varieties with high yields under ideal 
growing conditions, gave limited attention to the needs of marginal farmers (2012).12 
 Although some of the IRRI varieties released after IR8 were better adapted to 
tropical conditions (Farmer, 1986), from the late 1960s and on, IRRI scientists began 
grappling with the limited success of IR8 in rainfed and upland rice-growing areas. 
Several authors have documented this shift in goals, including Anderson et al. (1991) and 
Oasa. IRRI’s Bradfield, who earlier believed that irrigation would increase in Asian rice 
farms, returned to his earlier arguments for focusing on multiple cropping systems, and 
offered a training course on this topic in 1969 (Oasa, 1981). Bradfield also began 
experimenting with rainfed rice starting in 1967, and by 1969 there was a growing 
consensus among national rice scientists that a universal variety was an unrealistic goal. 
By 1975, IRRI stopped releasing named varieties at all, and instead shifted their focus to 
supporting national research programs (Oasa, 1981). 
Conclusion 
Existing scholarship has shown that the RF adopted a model of agricultural 
development aimed at producing varieties that gave high yields under controlled 
conditions of high fertilizer and irrigation. Some scholars argue that this in fact produced 
varieties narrowly adapted to ideal conditions, although RF scientist claimed that the new 
varieties of wheat and rice13 were well adapted to both ideal and marginal conditions. 
Most scholars who have critically assessed the green revolution have found that at least in 
                                                
12 The reader should note that the focus on production and food supply per capita preceded 
Amartya Sen’s insights on hunger and famine as a failure of food distribution rather than 
production. 
13 Limitations of maize’s adaptation were more well-known. 
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the cases of maize and rice, wide adaptation was either not attainable (maize) or 
improperly attributed (rice). Especially in the case of rice, scholars argued that IRRI 
scientists used wide adaptation in an aspirational and geographic sense, when in fact rice 
developed by IRRI was specifically adapted to high fertility and irrigated conditions.  
Few if any studies have specifically challenged the wide adaptation of green 
revolution wheat. For example, Perkins’ history of wheat research in the 20th century, one 
of the most thorough and cited accounts of such, hardly addressed adaptation (1997). I 
posit that this is because Borlaug’s wheat varieties did indeed have an impressive global 
spread and, coupled with higher amounts of fertilizer, drastically increased the national 
wheat yields of Mexico and India. These countries both had particular significance to US 
foreign policy. Also, the aggregate success of new wheat varieties shielded them from 
scrutiny on the claims of wide adaptation, specifically adaptation across conditions. 
Nonetheless, if anything, this chapter should show that the wide adaptation of wheat is an 
object worth studying in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER 2 
NARRATIVES AROUND WIDE ADAPTATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
WHEAT PROGRAMS, 1960–1970: NORMAN E. BORLAUG, CHARLES F. 
KRULL, AND KEITH W. FINLAY 
 
Chapter 2 examines three figures in international wheat research in the 1960s: 
Norman E. Borlaug, Charles F. Krull, and Keith W. Finlay. Borlaug and Krull were 
affiliated with the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico in the 1960s, while Finlay was an Australian 
academic who was hired by CIMMYT in the late 1960s. Borlaug undisputedly played the 
major role in elevating wide adaptation as a goal in the international agricultural sciences 
and establishing the narrative and meaning of wide adaptation. Krull and Finlay, 
however, have been overlooked in the history of agricultural science for their influential 
role in wheat research in the 1960s. Krull worked directly with Borlaug to promote wide 
adaptation and breeding for favorable environments in the Middle East, where the RF 
was strengthening its ties with plant breeders there through international wheat trials and 
by training plant breeders in collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO). Krull proposed that varieties developed in favorable environments could still 
have high yields in marginal environments, but not vice versa (Krull, [Diary Notes], 
April-May, 1966). Finlay, on the other hand, corresponded with Borlaug over the more 
theoretical aspects of wide adaptation. Finlay also promoted wide adaptation in several 
international forums, such as the Third International Wheat Genetics Symposium in 1968 
in Australia, and the FAO/International Biological Program’s plant gene pools project 
with his more famous collaborator, Otto H. Frankel. 
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In parts 1 and 2 of this chapter, I argue that Borlaug and Krull promoted wide 
adaptation in order to expand the RF’s wheat programs and to increase global wheat 
production, but they did so under questionable scientific premises. The team promoted 
breeding and testing under only high fertility and irrigated conditions, but extended the 
meaning of “wide adaptation” from location-based to adaptation across agronomic 
conditions. I conclude that their narrative of wide adaptation relied heavily on the 
assumption of uniform and ideal field conditions. In part 3, I argue that Finlay’s 
theoretical and administrative work on adaptation helped solidify adaptation as a 
measureable object of study in the plant sciences. Finlay, best known for his 
mathematical model of adaptation, helped start a revolution in quantitative plant 
breeding. 
Background 
Over the years, wide adaptation has been ‘black boxed:’ it has been packed with 
multiple, unfounded meanings and has been relatively unexamined by agricultural 
scientists, even today. This chapter unpacks the black box of wide adaptation and what is 
called yield performance. Borlaug and Krull developed a narrative that widely adapted 
crops have some inherent yield that expresses under any environment. But these scientists 
did not consider, nor care to, the mechanisms of wide adaptation beyond what they 
already knew: that it was a result of fertilizer responsiveness and photoperiod 
insensitivity. So why didn’t Borlaug rely on these more accurate descriptions of his wheat 
varieties? Why did Borlaug and Krull insist that adaptation conferred some special 
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properties that could be measured via international yield tests? These are questions worth 
investigating.  
In short, Borlaug and Krull made an argument about wide adaptation that I have 
summarized as: Fertilizer responsive + Photoperiod insensitive = Wide adaptation = 
Inherent yield.14 Borlaug and Krull assumed that wide adaptation imbued new wheat 
varieties with a transitive property of high yield. These scientists also assumed a 
relatively stable and favorable set of agro-climatic conditions, characterized by irrigation 
and high fertility. Thus, they promoted wide adaptation on the assumption of stable and 
favorable environments, but also extended the argument to marginal environments, using 
the argument of inherent yield. While Borlaug’s correspondent, Finlay, repeatedly tried to 
get Borlaug to study the mechanisms of wide adaptation, Borlaug was not interested at 
all. 
This chapter and the next two show the incredible expansion of RF and CIMMYT 
wheat programs led by Borlaug. Wide adaptation fit extraordinarily well into Borlaug’s 
vision of a centralized system of wheat research in Mexico and the extension of that 
model to other countries. Borlaug throughout this time was mostly involved in working in 
Mexico and India, training students from both places, but Krull worked as Borlaug’s 
proxy to establish connections in the Middle East, spreading the gospel of wide 
adaptation. 
                                                
14 Again, I define inherent yield as high yield independent of environmental context. 
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Part 1: Norman E. Borlaug’s International Wheat Program 
In 1960 the RF officially started its international wheat improvement program, led 
by Norman E. Borlaug.15 Borlaug’s international wheat program initially had two prongs: 
1) to train foreign agricultural scientists (mostly from the Middle East) in Mexico, and 2) 
to distribute new wheat varieties to semi-tropical and tropical countries, through what 
were called international wheat nurseries. Through the exchange of some plant 
germplasm with his RF colleagues in South America, Borlaug incidentally realized that 
wheat developed through RF programs in Mexico and Columbia could be grown under a 
wide range of locations and conditions, which he called wide, or broad, adaptation. 
International coordinated wheat yield trials. Up until 1960, wide adaptation 
was not viewed as a particularly desirable trait in wheat varieties. While plant breeders 
and explorers would collect plant varieties and store them for future use, there was no 
systematic testing of international wheat varieties throughout different agro-climatic 
areas of the world. Possibly the first systematic testing was the USDA’s International 
Wheat Rust Nursery Project, started in 1950. Due to an epidemic of wheat stem rust, a 
viral pathogen, in North America, the USDA decided to test their large collection of 
wheat germplasm in different environments around North and Central America in order 
to identify rust resistant varieties. By 1952 the nursery had expanded to Australia and 
various countries in Africa and Europe (Oficina de Estudios Especiales, 1954). 
Borlaug and the Mexican Agricultural Project were involved in the USDA’s 
International Wheat Rust Nursery Project from its start (Oficina de Estudios Especiales, 
                                                
15 See Chapter 1 for more context on the RF’s international agricultural programs up to 1970. 
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1954). Simultaneously, Borlaug engaged in collecting, breeding, and testing foreign 
wheat germplasm for his own program (separate from the USDA). In 1947 he had written 
to wheat scientists around the world, asking them to send him seeds of local wheat 
varieties, and around this time he also started sending out RF-varieties to any interested 
scientists.  
Around 1959 Borlaug proposed a new transnational wheat nursery that would 
focus on the adaptation of wheat to different locations. He wrote: 
In the past there has been a great deal of circumstantial evidence that certain types 
of wheat have great flexibility and adaptation; however, this has never been 
checked experimentally, and it seems that the time has now arrived for doing so… 
We in the R. F. program have profited greatly by moving seed, especially early 
generation, segregating material, from one country to another. (Borlaug, 1959a) 
He proposed a “uniform yield nursery” to collect “valuable information on varietal 
adaptation” in wheat (Borlaug, 1959b). In 1960, Borlaug started his first international 
nursery, called the Cooperative Inter-American Spring Wheat Test. Borlaug sent wheat 
seeds to twenty different locations in the Americas (Borlaug, June 24, 1960). 
Between 1960 and 1962 Borlaug became more involved in wheat science in the 
Middle (Near) East, working with wheat scientists from the FAO such as J. B. Harrington 
and José Vallega, who were stationed in or assigned to cover countries in the Near East. 
In 1959 he travelled to Libya, Egypt, India, and Pakistan to distribute packages of his 
dwarf wheats there (Cullather 2010). Borlaug worked with the FAO to train foreign 
agricultural scientists from the Near East in Mexico, starting in 1960. The FAO also 
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invited Borlaug to tour the Near East in 1960, where Borlaug examined some of the 
problems of wheat cultivation there (Borlaug, November 3, 1970). Borlaug apparently 
was surprised by the excellent yields of some of the wheat varieties developed through 
the RF programs in Columbia and Mexico. In 1960 he wrote to an RF scientist in Chile: 
The Mexican, Columbian and Australian wheats fit very broadly in the spring 
wheat areas of Pakistan, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Libya, 
and as we have known through Thorpe, in Kenya as well… On the basis of what I 
saw in the Near and Middle East, I am exploring the possibility of establishing 
another spring wheat yield nursery orienting east and west, which would include 
Australia, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Libya Kenya, 
Colombia, Chile and Mexico. (Borlaug, June 24, 1960) 
Borlaug was “amazed to see the wide adaptability of many of the wheat materials” and 
felt that many of the scientists did not recognize this, due to their lack of experience 
outside their own country (Notes on the Consultants' Meeting, 1960). In a draft of the 
RF’s 1960 to 1961 annual report, Borlaug noted that some of the wheat varieties 
developed in Mexico and Columbia “have wide patterns of adaptation” (Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1960, p. 254). 
In 1962 Borlaug collaborated with the FAO to start the Co-operative Near East-
American Spring Wheat Yield Nursery. In his 1967 oral history, Borlaug stated: 
The FAO was putting out what they called rust nurseries that were supposed to be 
uniform. This was badly handled, and the identity of the lines was only known by 
God Himself frequently…So we set up the second one, which was called the Near 
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East-American nursery, and this included essentially all of the varieties from the 
Near East—their main commercial ones—Mexican varieties and Columbian 
varieties. Because these fit. We knew from our programs in Colombia and Mexico 
that these had this flexibility and adaptability. ([Oral history of Norman Borlaug], 
1967, p. 282) 
From the 1961-62 and 1962-63 Near East-American trials, five Mexican varieties 
yielded, on average, the highest of all twenty-five varieties entered in the trials (Borlaug, 
Ortega, & Rodriguez, 1964). All varieties were grown under widely varied conditions, as 
Borlaug recommended planting seeds on uniform plots that represented average local 
conditions. While the Inter-American and Near East-American nurseries were first 
considered separate, in 1964 Borlaug combined the programs into the International 
Spring Wheat Yield Nursery. Based in Mexico, he sent twenty-five varieties to thirty-four 
locations in twenty-three wheat-growing countries (Table 3). Seeds were grown under 
both irrigated and rainfed and fertilized and non-fertilized conditions (Krull et al., 1968). 
Again, five Mexican varieties yielded the highest, on average. The initial reports of the 
international nurseries casually noted the wide adaptation of the Mexican varieties. But 
the results for the third Near East-American nursery and the first International nursery, 
both analyzed by Charles F. Krull in 1966 and 1968, respectively, included detailed 
arguments about the superiority of widely adapted wheats to local varieties under varied 
conditions (Krull, et al., 1966, 1968). This latter argument was incidental to the original 
purpose of the wheat varieties, which was to give high yields under fertilized conditions. 
But due mostly to Krull, it would become CIMMYT’s main justification for their wheat 
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research program: that a few varieties, if widely adapted, would raise yields and 
production in a great diversity of wheat-growing regions. 
Table 3  
Counties That Participated in the First International Spring Wheat Yield Nursery, 1964–
65 (Krull et al., 1968). 
Country Number of sites 
Argentina 4 
Chile 1 
Ecuador 1 
Columbia 1 
Guatemala 1 
Mexico 2 
United States 2 
South Africa 1 
Libya 1 
Cyprus 1 
Saudi Arabia 1 
Ethiopia 1 
Sudan 2 
Jordan 1 
Syria 1 
Lebanon 1 
Turkey 1 
Rumania 1 
Iraq 1 
Iran 1 
Pakistan 3 
India 3 
Australia 2 
 
Wide adaptation: Borlaug goes against the grain. In 1968, RF scientists noted, 
“not only is there surprisingly little information concerning the performance of varieties 
over a broad range of environments in even the major crop plants, but there is 
considerable confusion among plant breeders as to whether broad adaptation is desirable 
or not” (Krull et al., 1968, p. 1). Borlaug planned to use his international trials to evaluate 
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“the relative adaptability of a uniform set of varieties of different origins by growing and 
observing them systematically under widely different conditions of climate, soil, and 
latitude” as well as “possibility of developing wheat varieties with extremely wide 
patterns of adaptation” (Rockefeller Foundation, 1960, p. 254). 
By 1960 Borlaug had, in fact, already developed and identified several varieties 
that he considered widely adapted. According to him, he made this discovery during the 
USDA’s International Spring Wheat Rust Nursery (Loegering & Borlaug, 1963). 
Apparently, after seeing the wide adaptation of some of the varieties developed by RF 
programs in Mexico and Columbia, he developed an interest in collecting basic data on 
the adaptation, or geographic range, of wheat varieties (Loegering & Borlaug, 1963). 
 Borlaug first attributed the wide adaptation of certain varieties to his particular 
method of wheat breeding. Around 1945 Borlaug began alternately growing wheat 
generations between north and central Mexico, which was later called “shuttle breeding” 
(Cullather, 2010). Shuttle breeding is one of Borlaug’s best-known legacies, but it was 
not actually named that until the 1970s, when CIMMYT director Haldore Hanson 
“suggested that it be called ‘shuttle breeding,’ after US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East (CIMMYT, 1990, p. 14). In the winter, 
Borlaug planted wheat in the Sonora region of Mexico-- a coastal, irrigated region near 
sea level and at 28˚ N latitude. Then he would select the best offspring from that season 
and plant them in Toluca (near Mexico City), which was at 18˚ N latitude, had a high 
altitude, and had heavy rainfall and a higher prevalence of pathogens. In 1948, Borlaug 
almost resigned from his post in Mexico due to a conflict with his former professor, 
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Herbert Hayes. Hayes insisted that Borlaug’s shuttle breeding would never work (Hesser, 
2006). Borlaug stated in his 1967 oral history:  
We were constantly, and very early, we were doing it consciously—discarding 
those things that fit in only one environment. We were interested because of the 
ease of multiplication of varieties of having things that were broadly adapted and 
consequently probably less vulnerable to the vagaries of climate, but also that if 
we found a variety that was well adapted and yielded well—it could be grown 
widely in Mexico. ([Oral history of Norman Borlaug], 1967, p. 188) 
While Borlaug’s 1967 oral history suggested that wide adaptation was intentional, other 
sources suggest that discovering wide adaptation was accidental, and Borlaug initially 
used two contrasting locations in order to speed up the plant breeding process. 
Borlaug first proposed that wide adaptation was the result of certain “germ plasm 
complexes” that were genetically controlled (Rockefeller Foundation, 1960, p. 255). He 
surmised this because varieties he derived from the lines Mentana (Italy), Florence-
Aurore (Tunisia), and Gabo (Australia), tended to be more adaptable across locations. 
Within a few years, however, Borlaug realized that the main genetic contributor to wide 
adaptation was photoperiod insensitivity.16 As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
photoperiod insensitivity of wheat varieties he developed in Mexico contributed to their 
ability to grow in a diversity of geographic areas. Borlaug found that wheat varieties from 
the US and Canada were specifically adapted to certain daylight requirements and did not 
perform well in other locations, but photoperiod insensitive wheats could be grown in a 
                                                
16 Photoperiodism was discovered in 1918 (Kingsland, 2009) 
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variety of latitudes, elevations, and seasons (Borlaug, 1972a).17 He hypothesized that his 
shuttle breeding method had resulted in selection that favored photoperiod insensitive 
varieties that thrived in both the Sonora and Toluca regions, which have different seasons 
and photoperiods (Reynolds, Pask, & Mullan, 2012). Although Borlaug clearly 
recognized photoperiod insensitivity as a primary component of wide adaptation, his 
research program moved towards developing “even more widely adapted genetic types” 
of wheat and the question of “what is the maximum range of adaptation that can be 
incorporated into a variety” (Rockefeller Foundation, 1964, p. 228 & 229). 
As early as 1965, Borlaug began promoting the idea that widely adapted varieties 
were not only adapted to different geographies, but also across agro-climatic conditions 
such as irrigation and soil fertility. He wrote: “Some Mexican and Columbian varieties 
have been among the highest in yield in locations from 0° to 50° latitude and over a wide 
range of longitudes, under both irrigated and nonirrigated conditions” [emphasis added] 
(Borlaug, October 1965, pp. 1092–3). When asked about Lerma Rojo, a tall, photoperiod 
insensitive variety that Borlaug created, he replied that its best feature was “its wide 
adaptation—fertilized or unfertilized” ([Oral history of Norman Borlaug], 1967, p. 196). 
Borlaug’s shift in narrative around 1965 seems highly correlated with his working with 
Krull, as section 2 will explore. 
Other aspects of Borlaug’s program: dwarf wheats and breeding for high 
fertility. Photoperiod insensitivity is likely the most important trait that allowed 
Borlaug’s wheats, and derivations of them, to have the global spread that they did. But 
                                                
17 Present-day studies have shown that a semi-dominant genetic mutation conferred photoperiod 
insensitivity in Green Revolution-era wheats. See Beals et al., 2007. 
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Borlaug’s wheat program attempted several other innovations in wheat breeding, the 
most famous of those being his incorporation of dwarfing traits and rust resistance into 
varieties. Dwarf and semi-dwarf wheats have shorter and thicker straw than traditional 
wheat varieties. Semi-dwarf wheats can withstand higher levels of fertilizers without 
falling over and lodging, as traditional varieties are prone to do. Because they can utilize 
more fertilizer, semi-dwarfs have a higher yield potential than the traditional tall wheats. 
Borlaug learned of the dwarfing trait through Orville Vogel at Washington State 
University, who had obtained the wheat variety Norin 10 from Japan. Borlaug began 
crossing Norin 10 with Mexican wheat varieties in the 1950s, which resulted in a semi-
dwarf wheat variety adapted to Mexican conditions. By 1955 Borlaug had successfully 
crossed Norin 10 with Mexican varieties, though he did not release a semi-dwarf variety 
adapted to Mexican conditions until 1961 (Perkins, 1997).  
Borlaug began adapting wheat varieties to higher fertility conditions starting 
around 1945, under the assumption that fertilizers would soon become more easily 
available and affordable (Cullather, 2010). Borlaug also saw fertilizer inputs as key to 
reducing lost fertility from improper farming for centuries, leading to depletion of soil 
fertility. By 1955, Borlaug tested new wheat varieties under exclusively high fertility 
conditions (Oasa, 1981). He had several reasons for doing so, obviously the first being 
that the semi-dwarfs responded extremely well to increased levels of fertilizer. Second, 
Borlaug believed that with readily available fertilizer, varieties must be adapted to higher 
fertility conditions in order to increase overall food production. On his suggestion, 
Argentina’s varietal improvement program was “reoriented in 1962 in order to develop 
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varieties which would be better adapted to higher levels of soil fertility should the use of 
chemical fertilizers become widespread” (Borlaug & Gibler, January 12, 1965, p. 1). He 
reasoned that, “any breeding program which did not take into consideration a change in 
levels of soil fertility within the next five years, would be doomed to failure” (Borlaug, 
[Diary], 1962).  
Borlaug also believed that planting wheat under favorable environments (high 
fertility and optimum irrigation) allowed the scientist to observe a variety’s “true genetic 
potential,” because variation between varieties would be more obvious (Borlaug, January 
6, 1987). In a letter to a scientific advisor in West Pakistan in 1964, Borlaug argued:  
If these tests are conducted at high fertility levels with adequate irrigation one will 
begin to see many other problems in wheat production which are not evident 
when wheat is grown on ‘tired soil’, i.e. lodging, the magnitude of disease 
problems, new insect problems, lack of water penetration or percolation in some 
soil types, etc. This was my experience in India the past season when I finally 
succeeded in getting one of the yield trials established on 60 and 120 pounds of 
nitrogen levels at several locations. (Borlaug, June 18, 1964) 
Borlaug also emphasized that “under irrigation two years of yield testing is more 
meaningful and reliable than five years under rainfed conditions,” because the 
environment-caused phenotypic variation under rainfed conditions would eclipse the 
genotypic differences (Borlaug, June 18, 1964). 
 Finally, Borlaug believed that varieties adapted to higher levels of fertilizer would 
lead to social change among farmers and scientists and overall higher levels of wheat 
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production. He wrote in 1966 that the government of West Pakistan “should realize that 
solving the fertilizer problem for wheat will be the start, not the end, of increased 
fertilizer demand. For once a farmer learns how to use fertilizer in large dosage on wheat, 
the practice will quickly spread to other crops. That was our Mexican experience” 
(Narvaez & Borlaug, March 30, 1966, p. 17). In India, Borlaug promoted “the program 
should try to produce tremendous yield increases on the area where the dwarf varieties 
can be heavily fertilized and properly watered. By so doing a complete change in the 
psychology of wheat production—from one of survival to one of high yields—will shock 
both the farmer and the scientist” (Borlaug, April 12, 1966, p. 11). 
Borlaug also anticipated criticisms of the semi-dwarf wheats. As early as 1962, he 
responded to the “belief that these dwarfs in drought years will be short, that they will 
produce little or no grain, and that under such conditions what is produced will not be 
harvestable” (Borlaug, [Untitled report], n.d.), arguing that “the dwarfs now growing in 
Toluca show none of the weaknesses that had always been predicted for this kind of 
wheat under dry land conditions,” such as lack of straw (Borlaug, August 30, 1962). In 
response to those who might criticize the focus on breeding for favorable environments in 
India, Borlaug later wrote that, “even at low fertility and on dryland, they [Mexican semi-
dwarf wheats] do surprisingly well, displaying their efficiency even though they were 
developed under irrigation” (Borlaug, 1972a, p. 586).  
Criticisms of Borlaug’s wheat program became more widespread in the late 
1960s, especially focusing on the RF’s impact on Indian wheat production. One review of 
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the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center’s (CIMMYT) program, by S. H. 
Wittwer from Michigan State University, found: 
The lack of imput [sic] of plant physiology and variations in cultural practices in 
the wheat breeding program was apparent. One rate of fertilizer (160 pounds of 
nitrogen per acre) is used throughout the 140 acres of experimental plots devoted 
to wheat. The same irrigation practices and rates for all wheat selections is used 
and the same plant spacing. Tests in which fertilizer levels, particularly nitrogen 
and water as variables, are being conducted on a limited number of wheat 
varieties by Dr. Reggie J. Laird. (Wittwer, 1969, p. 8) 
Indeed, plant physiology as a field declined in popularity in the latter half of the 20th 
century partly due to the prominence of plant breeding as the central discipline. Today, 
agronomists typically carry out these types of fertilizer tests, and this happens almost 
exclusively in ‘downstream’ research, after varieties are already finished. 
Borlaug’s narrative of wide adaptation. Borlaug’s semi-dwarf, fertilizer 
responsive, and photoperiod insensitive wheat varieties were quickly adopted in certain 
regions, especially in the irrigated parts of India, Pakistan, and coastal Turkey. USAID 
administrator William Gaud declared the green revolution in 1968, and Borlaug was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970. Although Borlaug was modest about his award, 
he had by that time adopted a ‘missionary zeal’18 for increasing world food production 
and decreasing global population. The rapid increase in Borlaug’s international 
connections, through the international nurseries and the RF/FAO training program, 
resulted in a generation of international wheat scientists who were known as Borlaug’s 
                                                
18 This phrase is attributed to E. C. Stakman, but is widely used in retrospectives about Borlaug. 
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“wheat apostles” (Shiva, 1991, p. 86). As highlighted by Shiva (1991), Borlaug said, 
“‘What Mexico did, you country can also do, except that yours should do it in half the 
time.’ This is the doctrine that Borlaug preaches to his apostles” (Stakman, Bradfield, & 
Manglesdorf, 1967, p. 283). 
Borlaug’s program of breeding wheat for favorable conditions seemed at first to 
be a response to his assumption of rising levels of fertilizer. Simultaneous with his 
discovery of widely adapted varieties, however, he seemed to shift his focus to defending 
his choice of favorable environments. Without a doubt, favorable environments were 
easier for plant breeders to make selections in. But Borlaug went a step further by 
justifying his breeding environments with wide adaptation, arguing that wide adaptation 
allowed wheat varieties to yield higher than virtually any other variety (although this was 
only true on average). Unfortunately, Borlaug’s experiments relied on highly uniform and 
idealized field conditions. His major oversight was assuming that other locations around 
the world could also achieve these resource-intensive growing environments. 
Borlaug attributed much of the success of his global wheat program to the 
discovery of wide adaptation in wheat. In an undated outline of a report titled, “The 
Development of High Yielding, Broadly-Adapted Spring Wheat Varieties,” Borlaug 
handwrote the rest of the title to be “and its Significance for Increasing World Food 
Production” (Borlaug, n.d.). In the margins of the outline, he wrote “KF” and “CK” next 
to various sections.  These would be Keith Finlay and Charles Krull, Borlaug’s two 
colleagues who were most prominently involved in the promotion of wide adaptation as a 
plant breeding ideal. The next two parts of this chapter will focus on these scientists. 
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Part 2: Charles F. Krull and the RF’s Cooperative Program in the Near East, 1965–
68 
From 1965 to 1968, Charles F. Krull was a key scientist involved in 
RF/CIMMYT’s international wheat program, working in Mexico with Borlaug during 
this time. Luckily for historians of agriculture, there remains a wealth of primary sources 
from Krull’s work at the RF from 1965 to 1968, including his diary notes, 
correspondence, and a 1966 oral history. Yet while many historians have focused on 
Borlaug, Krull was equally, if not more important in promoting Borlaug’s concept of 
wide adaptation in the Near East—including in Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Turkey, and Syria. He also led the analysis of the International Spring Wheat 
Yield Nurseries, which were published starting in 1964 and in full starting in 1966. 
Throughout his time with the RF in Mexico, Krull portrayed a consistent argument that: 
1) scientists should consider the importance of widely adapted wheat varieties; 2) that 
countries should focus efforts on only one breeding and testing program for fertilized and 
irrigated environments; and 3) widely adapted varieties chosen under favorable 
environments could unequivocally outperform local varieties, regardless of environment.  
As Krull managed and reported data from the RF’s international wheat trials, 
Borlaug and others used his arguments to promote wide adaptation. Krull’s story is also 
extremely interesting because he took Borlaug’s arguments a step further. Krull argued 
that widely adapted varieties developed in irrigated and fertilized environments would 
yield equal or higher than local varieties in any environment. I call this premise 
“questionable” because it is so contrary to ecological theory, and also because Krull 
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apparently based this proposal on only a few years of the RF’s international wheat trial 
data. 
It is clear from Krull’s records that his views on wide adaptation and breeding for 
high fertility conditions were not mainstream among wheat breeders, especially those 
from the FAO who were working in the Near East. The three conventional wisdoms that 
Krull fought against were that: 1) crop varieties could not be widely adapted; 2) varieties 
exhibited large genotype-by-location effects, so they should be specifically adapted to the 
farmer’s conditions; and 3) varieties should be tested under local (often non-favorable) 
conditions. Using primary sources from 1965 to 1967, I will examine Krull’s arguments 
for wide adaptation and breeding for favorable environments, and some of the arguments 
against this from scientists with whom he corresponded.  
The RF hired Krull directly out of graduate school at Iowa State University, 
where he worked with Kenneth J. Frey, a well-known oat breeder. The RF needed an oat 
breeder to work in their Columbian Agricultural Sciences program, and Krull fit their 
requirements. Arriving in Bogota, Columbia, in June 1960, Krull worked with the RF 
wheat breeder John Gibler ([Oral history of Charles F. Krull], 1966). Although oats and 
barley were a component of the research program, based on the RF’s goals at this time, 
Krull and Gibler both became involved mainly in the wheat improvement program in 
Columbia ([Oral history of Charles F. Krull], 1966). After a period of a few years, 
however, both Krull and Gibler became dissatisfied working with each other and in the 
Columbia program. Gibler was transferred to Ecuador and Krull to Mexico in 1965. 
Around the same time, Borlaug had been considering utilizing Krull’s assistance 
   95 
in analyzing results of the international wheat yield trials. For several years, only 
preliminary results had been sent to the international collaborators (Krull, 1967). Borlaug 
needed someone with experience in both plant breeding and statistics to help him, and 
Krull was experienced in both from his dissertation work with Frey. Borlaug wrote to 
Moseman in 1964 that, “perhaps Dr. Charles Krull of our Columbian program is the man 
best prepared from all points of view to try to unscramble these difficulties with which 
we are confronted” (Borlaug, October 1, 1964). Borlaug wrote directly to Krull a few 
weeks later about “handling the data out at the Statistical Center in Chapingo, for both 
corn and wheat” (Borlaug, October 20, 1964). In August 1965 Krull transferred to 
Mexico to lead the coordination of the international wheat yield nurseries and their 
analysis, as well as to cover many of Borlaug’s duties in Mexico while Borlaug traveled 
internationally. Krull was named Resident Coordinator of International Wheat Program 
in May 1967. 
Having Krull in Mexico from 1965 to 1968 was a great boon to Borlaug’s 
program on wide adaptation. With the results of the international spring wheat yield trials 
analyzed, Borlaug now had empirical evidence to support wide adaptation: several of the 
Mexican varieties yielded, on average, the best of all varieties tested. He stated in his 
1967 oral history: 
We begin to understand some of the basic things that underlie this adaptation. 
This, to me, is a fundamental discovery that has long been overlooked. And it has 
been borne out now, and we have ample evidence, some of which has been 
reported in these recent bulletins that Dr. Krull has been getting out, that are 
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backed up by large quantities of experimental data that comes from what we call 
the International Yield Nursery. ([Oral history of Norman Borlaug], 1967, p. 191) 
Further, this understanding of wide adaptation bolstered Borlaug’s confidence in 
expanding the RF’s wheat program into the eastern hemisphere. He stated, “And it’s 
because of this mass of information that we feel pretty confident also in moving 
aggressively in Pakistan and India or in Turkey” ([Oral history of Norman Borlaug], 
1967, p. 192). 
Scientists should consider the importance of widely adapted wheat varieties. 
Krull argued that wide adaptation was an important and undervalued concept in wheat 
breeding. As examined earlier in this chapter, the philosophy of developing varieties with 
wide adaptation was uncommon outside of the RF’s programs in Central and South 
America, and a few other international scientists (including in India, as the next chapter 
will examine). Krull’s views on wide adaptation were extremely emphatic and clear in 
the “Results of the Third Near East American Spring Wheat Yield Nursery.” Krull is 
listed as first author, and from the subsequent reports, it is clear that his is the main voice 
in the report. Krull et al. wrote, “plant breeders frequently feel that varieties must be well 
adapted to only very small areas. They feel that since variety x location interactions are 
frequently encountered the ideal variety must be narrowly adapted. Indeed, such varieties 
can be produced. It is also possible, however, as is illustrated by these data, to produce 
varieties that are widely adapted” [emphasis original], even proclaiming the “possibility 
of producing spring wheat varieties with nearly universal adaptations” (Krull et al., 1966, 
p. 10). Discussing the prevailing idea that a country should have separate breeding 
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programs for different micro-climates, Krull et al. emphasized that, “Such a profusion of 
breeding programs unnecessarily depletes and weakens the effort being devoted to a crop 
as well as fostering an isolationist philosophy and narrow point of view on the part of the 
scientists” (Krull et al., 1966, p. 10). Based on the other writings of Krull, this is very 
much in line with his arguments at that time.  
Speaking about the “elusive concept of breeding for adaptation,” Krull addressed 
the Crop Quality Council19 in 1967 about the “deeply ingrained philosophy that is held 
and taught by most of the North American graduate schools that such adaptation is 
probably neither possible nor desirable” (Krull, 1967, p. 3). He wrote of the RF’s 
experimental results: 
The most striking thing concerning these results is, of course, the consistent, wide 
adaptation of certain varieties…. We know of no group of varieties in any crop 
plant that has shown a wider range of adaptation than is demonstrated by the 
highest yielding varieties in these nurseries. This is true in a crop that has 
generally been considered rather specific in its adaptation. (Krull, 1967, p. 3) 
It is not entirely clear why Krull became such an advocate for wide adaptation. One 
possibility is the strong influence of Borlaug. Krull did not have much direct contact with 
Borlaug until 1965, and it is only after that date that Krull presented his many arguments 
for wide adaptation and selection under favorable environments. Other evidence of 
Borlaug’s influence is that three major supporters of wide adaptation—Krull, R. Glenn 
Anderson, and Keith W. Finlay—were all hired and promoted within CIMMYT, and 
worked directly with Borlaug. Finlay was the only one who regularly wrote about wide 
                                                
19 An organization based in Minnesota that tested wheat varieties in the 20th century. 
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adaptation before being hired by CIMMYT; Krull and Anderson both started talking 
about wide adaptation after having close contact with Borlaug, though Finlay’s influence 
is unclear.  
Countries should focus efforts on only one breeding and testing program for 
high fertility conditions. In this next section, I will address Krull’s efforts in the Near 
East to convince scientists to focus on breeding wheat for fertilized and irrigated 
conditions. This section will include correspondence between Krull and two FAO 
scientists working in the Near East: Abdul Hafiz, a Regional Consultant for the FAO’s 
Near East Wheat and Barley Improvement Project, and located in Egypt in the 1960s and 
1970s, and C. L. Pan, a cereal breeder for the FAO in Iraq and like Borlaug, a former 
student of Hayes and Stackman. Other FAO scientists that the RF regularly corresponded 
with the Near East included Juan Tessi, José Vallega, and J. B. Harrington. In late 1966, 
Gibler wrote to Borlaug that, “working through Tessi, Hafiz, and Vallega, the FAO group 
could be used to concentrate on production. Even now they still aren’t breeding wheats 
for fertilized conditions” (Gibler, December 28, 1966). This indicates that the RF 
scientists were interested in working in the Near East and continuing their collaboration 
with the FAO, but that they recognized a fundamental difference in opinion over breeding 
programs. Krull, through visits to the Near East and correspondence, attempted to 
influence wheat breeders in the Near East to adopt breeding and testing practices more 
similar to Borlaug’s methods. 
Unlike the Sonora of Mexico or the Punjab region of India, the Near East 
contained a diversity of wheat farming practices that included both irrigated and large 
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amounts of rainfed cultivation. In the 1960s, existing wheat breeding efforts in the Near 
East focused on low fertility conditions that farmers were more likely to experience. 
Krull, however, made a very specific argument that wheat breeding efforts should focus 
on highly fertilized conditions.  
Krull made a trip to the Near East in April and May 1966, where he recorded his 
detailed observations and opinions of the wheat programs there. Krull wrote about a 
dryland area of Jordan: 
The yield nurseries showed a decided lack of fertilizer, and this tended to make all 
varieties look the same. The reasoning was that most of the farmers do not use 
fertilizers so varieties must be selected under these conditions. This is a common 
fallacy among wheat breeders in under-developed countries, and there is actually 
little basis for it. Varieties selected under optimum conditions tend to yield 
relatively as well under poor conditions but under low fertility conditions yield 
differences are so small that they cannot be selected. In addition, under low 
fertility conditions the soil variability is more pronounced. (Krull, [Diary notes], 
April–May, 1966, p. 5) 
This excerpt shows Krull’s discontent with the prevailing breeding and testing system, 
and his argument that wheat varieties should be selected under favorable environments. 
His reason here was that favorable environments allow the breeder to see the variability 
between varieties to help them make their selection. In a letter to Hafiz in 1966, Krull 
wrote, “as suggested, I would like to see the nurseries more heavily fertilized. It is simply 
much easier to see yield differences at these high fertility levels. Putting on a good 
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amount of fertilizer tends to iron out any soil differences that there might be, so that the 
differences in yields observed are mainly genetic” (Krull, [Letter to Hafiz], June 23, 
1966). In his 1966 diary, just a few months earlier, Krull wrote, “under low fertility the 
soil difference has to be quite large and it becomes impossible to pick out the genetically 
superior ones from those that just happen to fall on the spot with slightly higher fertility” 
(Krull, [Diary notes], April–May, 1966, p. 12). These arguments are clearly reminiscent 
of Borlaug’s. 
A letter from J. C. Parisinos, a wheat breeder in Cyprus (cited in Hafiz’s letter) 
indicates another purpose of selecting under favorable environments. Parisinos wrote, “I 
have also noticed that varieties with a high potential yielding capacity are usually 
superior under both dryland and irrigated conditions and I also believe that liberal 
quantities of fertilizers should be applied on all variety trials to enable on to select the 
types with the highest yield potential” (Hafiz, September 3, 1966). This statement is very 
similar to the arguments by Borlaug and Krull that yield potential was more important 
than yield under prevailing agronomic conditions. 
For selecting under high fertility conditions, Krull also reasoned, similar again to 
Borlaug, that “If the breeder is only working at the fertilizer level now used by the 
farmers, by the time the variety is actually selected and multiplied, it will already be 
obsolete with the better farmers” and that wheat breeders should anticipate higher 
fertilizer levels in the future and breed for responsive varieties (Krull, [Letter to Hafiz], 
June 23, 1966). Hafiz echoed this, writing to Krull that, “no doubt, the Cereal Breeders 
have now realized the great importance of breeding and testing varieties under high 
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fertilization… the Breeders will have to cater for varieties suitable to be grown under 
high fertilization, which is the only answer to meet the food shortage” (Hafiz, June 30, 
1966). 
In addition to breeding under fertilized conditions, Krull also promoted testing 
under those conditions. Similar to selection under favorable environments, Krull argued 
that testing under high fertility allows the scientist to see the yield potential of the variety. 
While visiting the international yield trials in the Near East in 1966, Krull took note of 
the lack of fertilizers. When visiting Iraq, Krull wrote in his diary that, “The experiments 
needed fertilizers badly and there were water logged spots that damaged parts of most 
experiments... Pan had not fertilized the nursery on the basis that farmers do not fertilize” 
(Krull, [Diary notes], April–May, 1966, p. 12). After some discussion, Krull thought that, 
“Pan finally seemed pretty well convinced” to use higher levels of fertilizer (Krull, [Diary 
notes], April–May, 1966, p. 12). Pan wrote soon after that visit to his former advisor, 
Hayes:  
I have put most of the variety trials in a field entirely with the local method of 
farm management with a brief that any promising varieties thus screened out will 
be adoptable to the local conditions. Dr. Krull’s way of thinking in this respect, 
however, is quite different from mine. He thought that such a variety trial should 
be carried out in a field provided with the best conditions for the growth of the 
plant, such that the experimental plots must be sufficiently fertilized and amply 
irrigated… This seems to me a more realistic way of approach, and I am prepared 
to follow such new approach when I design trials in the future… I would become 
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much more convinced if you also can endorse this new approach. (Pan, April 30, 
1966) 
Unfortunately, Hayes’ response was not included in the archives. 
Krull was palpably frustrated that “there seems to be little basis for the widely 
spread belief that varieties selected under high fertility do not usually do as well under 
low fertility,” especially in the Near East (Krull, [Diary notes], April–May, 1966, p. 12). 
To argue against these critics, Krull drew from the results of the international nurseries, 
where the Mexican semi-dwarfs had high average yield across conditions and locations. 
In the “Results of the Fourth Inter-American Spring Wheat Yield Nursery,” published in 
1967, Krull et al. addressed the prevailing belief that, “each environmental niche must 
ideally have its own set of varieties” (Krull et al., 1967, p. 10). They stated: 
The seeming paradox can be understood by a simple illustration: if five tall, weak-
strawed varieties and five strong-strawed varieties are planted in an experiment 
without fertilizer and also at another site with heavy fertilization, both groups of 
varieties will usually yield similarly without fertilizer but the strong-strawed 
group will yield infinitely better with fertilizer than the weak-strawed group 
(assuming fairly adequate moisture). (Krull et al., 1967, p. 11) 
Krull gave a nearly identical argument in a 1967 presentation to the Crop Quality Council 
in the US: 
If we seed 10 Mexican and 10 Indian varieties without fertilizer in India, we find 
that they all yield about the same. If we then seed the same experiment at another 
site with 120 pounds per acre of nitrogen, we find that the group of Mexican 
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varieties yields considerably more than the tall, weak-strawed Indian lines… The 
varieties that yield well with fertilizer also tend to be the same ones that yield best 
with poor management. This is very nicely illustrated by… literally hundreds of 
smaller tests that were run last year throughout India and Pakistan, and to a lesser 
extent in other countries in the Near East and the Americas. (Krull, 1967, p. 3) 
He stated further that, “my point is that the presence of variety X location interactions 
does not necessarily imply that the same varieties are not the highest yielding in all 
environments” (Krull, 1967, p. 5). He extended his argument to state that, “evidence is 
accumulating that this same thing is true in irrigated versus dryland conditions… Such a 
statement is considered to be rank heresy by most wheat breeders” (Krull, 1967, p. 5).  
Finally, he argued “that varieties that show good adaptation in area are also better 
adapted over time” (Krull, 1967, p. 8). Krull’s statements, all from 1966 and 1967, reflect 
his confidence that widely adapted wheat varieties from Mexico and Columbia were 
genetically superior to varieties from other countries, independent of their environmental 
context.  
Widely adapted varieties could outperform local varieties under both 
irrigated and dryland conditions. Krull also promoted wheat breeding focused only on 
irrigated areas. Krull argued that selecting under high fertility conditions produced 
varieties adapted to marginal conditions, and that they were superior to local varieties. 
Regarding the former, in a 1967 letter to Byrd C. Curtis, a plant breeder at Colorado State 
University, Krull wrote that the Mexican dwarf wheats were “extremely productive under 
irrigation and high fertilization, but the results of our international nurseries indicate that 
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they do as well as supposedly drought-resistant varieties under poor conditions,” 
indicating that they have stable production across different agronomic conditions (Krull, 
January 5, 1967). He wrote further that, “in other words, the dwarfs respond to but do not 
necessarily require irrigation and extremely heavy fertilization” [emphasis original] 
(Krull, January 5, 1967). This argument was a clear departure from Borlaug’s theory on 
wide adaptation centered around adaptation across locations, and is one that implies there 
is some inherent yield of widely adapted varieties. 
Krull explained that regardless of the conditions of a region, the ideal variety 
would be adapted to both irrigated and drought conditions. He wrote to Hafiz:  
When you were here in Mexico you suggested as did Dr. Vallega, that I take a 
look at non-irrigated areas of the Near East to see what can be done in breeding 
wheats for these areas. I spent a good bit of time studying the non-irrigated lands 
wherever I had a chance to see them… It appears that varieties that are adapted to 
intensive irrigation may also be adapted to very droughty conditions. Thus, it is 
not necessary to initiate a separate program for the irrigated and arid areas. (Krull, 
[Letter to Hafiz], June 23, 1963) 
Krull insisted that a country should only have one breeding program to serve both 
conditions.  
Both Hafiz and Pan disagreed with Krull on his suggestions for dryland 
agriculture, although they generally took his recommendations on breeding for higher 
fertility levels. Hafiz wrote to Krull that agronomic improvements (“agrotechniques” 
were necessary for dryland conditions, not just widely adapted germplasm: 
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For dry farming areas we will try to follow your suggestions but still I feel these 
areas require at least one comprehensive programme for the Region not only from 
the point of view of developing drought resistant and higher yielding varieties but 
also for developing better agrotechniques for the efficient use of soil moisture and 
fertilizers… It is really a very big and very difficult problem, but at the same time 
the most important and immediate one. (Hafiz, June 30, 1966) 
Krull responded only to the genetic aspect, writing “I certainly do not disagree that it 
would be worthwhile to concentrate heavily in at least one place on drought resistance. 
My point was simply that I don’t believe it would be wise to separate it from an irrigated 
program as it appears to be possible to produce drought resistance varieties that are also 
adapted to irrigated conditions” (Krull, July 12, 1966). Pan also wrote to Krull about the 
problems of dryland farming, ostensibly arguing that the RF’s wheat breeding program 
did not fit the local conditions. For the wheat growing areas of Iraq, Pan wrote to Krull 
that, “it seems that wheat breeding should concentrate on drought resistance in the north 
and salinity tolerance in the south” (Pan, March 20, 1966). A year later, Pan still insisted 
to Krull that a drought resistant variety of wheat was necessary for Iraq, writing that, “as 
you know more than two thirds of the wheat crop in Iraq are grown in the north in the 
rainfed area. But rainfall varies very greatly from year to year. It seems that the most 
effective way to increase the yield level of wheat in the rainfed area is to use drought 
resistant variety” (Pan, April 18, 1967). 
 But during the mid-1960s the RF’s wheat program ignored breeding drought 
resistant wheat, instead opting to focus on the higher gains that could be made in irrigated 
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wheat production. The evidence presented here shows a very clear contrast between 
views of the RF’s Krull and the FAO’s regional wheat breeders in the Near East. The 
FAO breeders were not only more embedded in the local conditions of the Near East, but 
also evidently held a different philosophy towards agricultural development there from 
the RF wheat scientists. Krull wrote in his diary that, “While there is interest in many 
countries in producing varieties that do not require fertilizer or water, there is no such 
group of varieties. The important thing in changing the production pattern in a country is 
to introduce varieties that will respond to good management and then change the 
management” [emphasis original] (Krull, [Diary, May 28-June 8 1967], pp. 3–4). This 
statement reflects a belief, held by the RF administration and Borlaug, that technical 
change would inevitably create desired social change. Borlaug created a normative 
characterization of what good management meant: maximization of yield under high-
resource conditions. It also gives insight to why Krull so strongly resisted the status quo 
of wheat breeding in the Near East. Similar to Borlaug, he may have believed that the 
conservative views of scientists were a major barrier to progress in wheat production. He 
sought to change these views. 
To conclude, Krull argued in 1965 that “the published results of our first five 
international yield trials have shown that it is possible to produce a series of varieties that 
are capable of outyielding local varieties from Chile to Canada and from Minnesota to the 
Near East. This same high yield and wide adaptation can also be built into a hybrid spring 
wheat” (Krull, October 4, 1965). He believed, like Borlaug, that high yield and wide 
adaptation made the Mexican semi-dwarf wheats superior to nearly all other wheats 
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produced by modern science.  
 Krull ultimately left Mexico in 1968 due to a divorce, but remained affiliated with 
the RF (Romig, February 20, 1968). While Krull seems to have been very influenced by 
Borlaug, Krull left an impression on Borlaug as well, in particular through his ability to 
use empirical data to support Borlaug’s theory on widely adapted, fertilizer responsive 
wheats. In Krull’s 1966 oral history interview, he stated: 
We have come up with systems of breeding and philosophies that in some cases 
are different [from other programs]... One set of experiments that we are 
beginning... is to test some of our philosophies and breeding methods, to come up 
with small groups of experiments that illustrate our reasons for believing this or 
that about plant breeding methods. ([Oral history of Charles F. Krull], 1966, p. 
58) 
Krull argued that the most productive way to improve a national plant breeding program 
was to aim for widely adapted varieties selected under favorable environments. He 
backed up this philosophy with the results of the international spring wheat yield 
nurseries. As we will see in the next section, Keith Finlay used empirical analysis to take 
Borlaug and Krull’s results a step further: to quantify adaptation across environments. 
Part 3: Keith Finlay’s Correspondence on Adaptation, 1963–1968 
Borlaug and Finlay correspond on adaptation. Agriculturalists long regarded 
adaptation as a factor that could not be predicted or quantified, but only tested through 
trial and error when introducing plant varieties to new locations. But starting in the late 
1930s, they began using quantitative methods, based off of analysis of variance models, 
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to analyze crop experiment data with an independent variable of agro-climatic zones or 
agronomic practices (Yates & Cochran, 1938; Horner & Frey, 1957). Then in 1963, an 
Australian wheat breeder, Keith W. Finlay, and his colleague, statistician Graham N. 
Wilkinson, released an experimental design and mathematical model that measured the 
yield stability of plant varieties over variable locations. The model measured what Finlay 
called “phenotypic stability,” but was more often referred to as adaptation at the time 
(Finlay & Wilkinson, 1963). Finlay’s model allowed scientists to more easily classify 
crop varieties as stable (high yielding across varied conditions) versus unstable (meaning 
unusually responsive to more favorable conditions). His model became immediately 
popular among plant breeders and led to a variety of other mathematic models of stability 
that still continues today. The model also became a tool of various ideologies on 
adaptation, as Cleveland described how the prominent physiology Lloyd T. Evans called 
stability models “the plant breeder’s icons, ubiquitous but with a variety of styles to 
support a variety of dogmas” (Evans, 1996, p. 163; Cleveland, 2001). 
 Finlay’s model plotted the yield of an individual variety at a location against the 
mean yield of varieties tested at that site (as a measure of environmental quality) for i 
varieties and j sites. The slope of the resulting linear curve for a variety corresponded 
with the stability of that variety (see Figure 6). Finlay and Wilkinson’s corresponding 
article, the “The Analysis of Adaptation in a Plant-Breeding Programme,” was highly 
cited and influential on the field of plant breeding (1963).20 According to plant breeders, 
Finlay and Wilkinson’s 1963 article was significant in that it was one of the first 
                                                
20 Finlay’s other 1963 article, “Adaptation- its measurement and significance in barley breeding” 
presented at the First International Barley Genetics Symposium in Wagenigen, was also popular 
among plant breeders. 
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computational analyses of plant breeding, and that it turned plant breeders towards 
studying adaptation (Romagosa & Fox, 1993). 
Finlay and Wilkinson’s model, and variations of it, are used by scientists to 
approximate genotype by environment (GxE) interactions for crop varieties (other fields, 
from psychology to ecology, use similar models). Scientists measure GxE by observing 
how much a change in environment leads to a change in a variety’s phenotype. For 
example in Figure 6. Examples of varieties plotted in a Finlay-Wilkinson type model., 
variety 2 is more responsive to improved environments, whereas variety 1 is more stable 
(less GxE interactions) over all environments.  
 
Figure 6. Examples of varieties plotted in a Finlay-Wilkinson type model.  
 Finlay’s work on adaptation, both theoretically and programmatically (through his 
involvement in various international programs) helped solidify adaptation as a 
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measureable object of study in the plant breeding community. Interacting with Borlaug 
starting in 1963, and employed by CIMMYT from 1968 until his death in 1980, Finlay’s 
analysis of adaptation “proved the obvious” of Borlaug’s adaptation program—that 
certain varieties could be widely adapted across environments (Reitz, June 23, 1964). But 
it is only in investigating correspondence between Borlaug and Finlay, and Finlay’s other 
publications, that the nuances of both scientists’ arguments for wide adaptation emerge—
specifically, Finlay’s calls for more understanding of the mechanisms of adaptation, 
while Borlaug focused mostly on yield and production. Finlay appeared to be more 
interested in how adaptation emerged and how it could be developed in a plant breeding 
program, especially through the use of dynamic gene pools. Borlaug, on the other hand, 
seemed more concerned with the practical and immediate uses of widely adapted 
varieties to increase global food production, disregarding empirical evidence at times. 
Despite their differences, Borlaug and Finlay depended on each other for theoretical 
models and experimental data, respectively, which they used to promote wide adaptation 
internationally. 
Before joining CIMMYT in 1968, Finlay was a professor of plant breeding at the 
Waite Agricultural Research Institute at the University of Adelaide, Australia. Borlaug 
became aware of Finlay through the recommendation of Vogel, who considered Finlay a 
“first choice” for the RF’s Indian wheat program (Vogel, Aug 23, 1963). Finlay visited 
Borlaug in Mexico in October through November 1963, hoping for the opportunity to 
work in Mexico; in the meantime Borlaug was evaluating him for the India position 
(Borlaug, September 17, 1963). During Finlay’s visit to Mexico (and subsequently 
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Columbia) he presented his work on adaptation, and later sent his 1963 paper to Borlaug 
(Borlaug, [Letter to Finlay], July 6, 1964). Borlaug, despite finding Finlay “a very 
capable theoretical research scientist,” found him too academically oriented for either the 
India or Mexico position, where Borlaug wanted someone with an inclination towards 
fieldwork (Borlaug, January 6, 1964). 
 Then six months later, Borlaug wrote to Finlay to update him, “since I last saw 
you we have learned considerably more about adaptation of the Mexican breeding 
material in far-away places… The Mexican material was equally as well adapted in India 
as in Sonora” (Borlaug, July 6, [Letter to Finlay], 1964). Finlay responded, “there is 
certainly no doubt that the more recent Mexican varieties have a very wide adaptation” 
and that he hoped they could continue working on adaptation together (Finlay, July 20, 
1964). Finlay also included some preliminary analyses of the 1961–62 and 1962–63 Near 
East-American Spring Wheat Yield Nurseries, where he plotted the varieties’ average 
stability by their average yield, clustering the varieties by these qualities. He found that 
the newer Mexican varieties were definitely superior in terms of being more stable across 
locations and having a higher average yield, although there was not much different 
between the varieties released in 1960, ‘62, and ’64 (Finlay, July 20, 1964).21 In other 
words, there was not much different between the tall and semi-dwarf varieties, both were 
widely adapted and high yielding. 
Contemporaneous with his previous letter to Finlay, Borlaug wrote to Robert 
Osler, then-assistant director of agricultural sciences for the RF: 
                                                
21 For example, the dwarf variety Lerma Rojo 64 had almost no advantage over the tall version of 
Lerma Rojo. 
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 I have now had time to review rather carefully Dr. Keith Finlay’s researches on 
development of flexible gene pools as plant breeding aids for under-developed 
countries, as well as the more fundamental studies relating to the understanding of 
varietal adaptation. I feel that Dr. Finlay has developed some useful information 
to partially explain adaptation phenomena we have already uncovered in the 
FAO-Near East-American Spring Wheat Yield Tests, and the Inter-American 
Spring Wheat Yield Nurseries. (Borlaug, [Letter to Osler], July 6, 1964) 
By flexible or “dynamic” gene pools, Finlay meant the collection of germplasm available 
to a plant breeder (Finlay, 1968, p. 407). Louis P. Reitz, the USDA’s leader of wheat 
investigations, was also corresponding with Osler about Finlay. He wrote, “support of his 
suggestion surely would lead to wider use of the fine Mexican materials and the work 
might lead to improved pools and greater understanding of gene pools. Some benefits 
would come even if the work merely ‘proved the obvious’” (Reitz, June 23, 1964). 
In late 1966, Finlay wrote a long, detailed letter to Borlaug about adaptation, the 
analysis of the international yield trial results, and the future directions of CIMMYT. 
While excited about “Phase 2” of CIMMYT, Finlay also had some concerns about 
Borlaug’s program. One of his main emphases was that Borlaug should focus on 
determining what causes wide adaptation through collection of basic data. He wrote:  
Your present wide adaptation is resulting from selection successively in a number 
of different environments, but the type and degree of adaptation is not known for 
any particular variety until it goes into the International Yield Trial. There is no 
doubting the results obtained, but equally there is no doubt that there is 
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tremendous advantages to be gained by actually measuring and selecting for this 
characteristic during the breeding process. (Finlay, September 6, 1966) 
Further, he disagreed with Borlaug’s shuttle breeding, stating that, “the selection 
technique used at present certainly allows the selection of widely adapted genotypes but 
it also automatically eliminates genotypes with exceptional potential for yield given the 
correct specific environment” (Finlay, September 6, 1966). Finlay’s famous 1963 article 
noted, similarly, that: 
Plant breeders are inclined to ignore the results obtained in low-yielding 
environments (e.g. drought years), on the basis that the yields are too low and are 
therefore not very useful for sorting out the differences between selections. This 
may be a serious error, because high-yielding selections under favourable 
conditions may show relatively greater failure under adverse conditions. (Finlay 
& Wilkinson, 1963, p. 752) 
Despite Finlay and Borlaug’s different views, through their correspondence they both 
appear to be driven to apply plant adaptation on a humanitarian basis. 
 Due to his interest in gene pools, Finlay cautioned plant breeders against keeping 
too narrow a genetic base, and also against selecting for only a specific type/characteristic 
of plant (Finlay, 1968). In this respect, he disagreed with Borlaug’s shuttle breeding for 
wide adaptation (Finlay, 1968), but favored instead “my general thesis at the moment that 
a broad and continuously variable gene-pool is necessary for the production of high 
yielding and widely adapted varieties” (Finlay, June 24, 1965). Finlay’s outlook fit in 
extremely well with the growing movement for collection and protection of global plant 
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genetic resources. 
Finlay promotes adaptation as an object of international study. Finlay worked 
with Australia’s well-known plant breeder and promoter of biodiversity, Otto H. 
Frankel,22 on the International Biological Program’s project: Biology of Adaptation, 
which Finlay convened starting around 1966. The International Biological Program (IBP: 
1964–1976) was an attempt at “big biology” to collect large-scale data sets, modeled after 
the International Geophysical Year (Aronova, Baker, & Oreskes, 2010). The Biology of 
Adaptation project fell within the IBP’s subcommittee on “Use and Management of 
Biological Resources,” of which “plant-germ-plasm pools” was another project on the 
suggestion of G. Ledyard Stebbins (Pistorius, 1997; U.S. National Committee for the IBP 
1965, p. 29). Finlay and Frankel were not unusual in their interest in preservation of plant 
germplasm; it became a major focus of plant breeders around the world, including India’s 
famous M. S. Swaminathan, who was also involved in the IBP program on adaptation. 
The original goal of the Biology of Adaptation project was an “analysis of the 
performance of a large number of varieties in certain standard, selected environments… 
and consequent analysis of productivity in genetic, physiological, and ecological terms” 
for four to six crops (U.S. National Committee for the IBP 1965, p. 29). The Plant Gene 
Pools project later subsumed the Biology of Adaptation working group. But by 1965, 
Frankel, chairperson of the Plant Gene Pools working group, met with the FAO’s Vallega 
where they jointly decided that the FAO should handle agricultural aspects of plant 
germplasm, and the IBP would focus on more basic biology of plants (Pistorius, 1997). 
This led to the FAO/IBP 1967 Technical Conference on the Exploration, Utilization and 
                                                
22 Though Frankel was born in Vienna, not Australia, he worked in Australia in his later life. 
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Conservation of Plant Genetic Resources, which ignited the movement for preserving 
plant genetic resources, led primarily by the FAO and later, the CGIAR (Consultative 
Group for International Agricultural Research) (Pistorius, 1997).23 According to Robin 
Pistorius, however, the 1967 conference dropped the focus on adaptation and gene pools, 
instead concentrating on ex situ preservation of germplasm (1997). Based on my archival 
work, it appears that the biological adaptation program simply moved with Finlay to 
CIMMYT, when he started working there in late 1968. From a preliminary FAO/IBP 
meeting in 1966, there were plans to incorporate Biology of Adaptation into FAO/IBP 
program (Frankel, October 10, 1966). The FAO/IBP would focus on the adaptation of 
spring wheat, rice, and chickpeas. This would be led by Finlay for wheat, B. R. Murty for 
chickpeas (who we will see again next chapter), and Takane Matsuo of Japan and Te Tzu 
Chang of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) for rice (Frankel, October 10, 
1966). The rice and chickpea experiments did take place through other RF-sponsored 
international research centers (ICRISAT, 1975; Matsuo, 1974; Sneep & Hendriksen, 
1979). 
 Although Borlaug and Finlay appeared to have a cordial relationship, Borlaug was 
initially not at all impressed by the IBP’s Biology of Adaptation project. On his copy of 
the “IBP Second Circular” from August 1966, Borlaug wrote into the margins of the 
planned experiments, “Being done by RF,” “Charlie—this looks like our own ISWYN 
[International Spring Wheat Yield Nursery],” and on Finlay as coordinator for temperate 
                                                
23 Other histories of the plant genetic resources movement can be found in van Hintum, Frese, & 
Perret (1991), Busch et al. (1995), Pistorius (1997), and Kloppenberg (2004). 
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zone cereals, Borlaug wrote, “Competition?” (Frankel, August 3, 1966). Borlaug wrote to 
the RF’s Director of Agricultural Sciences, Sterling Wortman, 
Frankly I don’t believe we should spend our money in support of this program, at 
this time. In the first place the work they are proposing on adaptation studies on 
spring wheats and durum wheat tests we are already doing in out International 
Spring Wheat Yield Nursery… Why should we set another organization up in 
competition with our own? (Borlaug, August 24, 1966)  
In fact, the resemblance was likely due to Frankel, who was impressed by Finlay on the 
analytic aspects of adaptation, and Borlaug on the practical aspects (Frankel, 1966). But 
Borlaug, ever-focused on expanding his wheat program, was offended rather than 
flattered. Frankel wrote to Borlaug that, “we are mainly concerned with a broad 
adaptability study on the Finlay pattern; you are, I imagine, mainly concerned with the 
agricultural success,” and became personally interested in getting Borlaug involved in the 
FAO/IBP adaptation program, and to get him to attend the conference meetings in Rome 
(Frankel, August 30, 1966). By January 1967 Borlaug appeared to be onboard with 
supporting the IBP’s adaptation program (Frankel, January 12, 1967). According to the 
results of the sixth International Spring Wheat Yield Nursery of 1969–70, CIMMYT 
collaborated with IBP to conduct their trials in parallel with CIMMYT’s own nursery 
(CIMMYT, 1972). The wheat adaptation program does not seem to have progressed 
much beyond that, however, and likely was simply subsumed by CIMMYT’s existing 
international testing nurseries. 
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This section highlights the RF/CIMMYT’s involvement in the movement for 
conservation of plant genetic resources that preceded the formal and tumultuous 
collaboration between the FAO and CGIAR that started in 1971. One of the linking 
factors was Borlaug’s research program on adaptation, which brought together 
researchers in Australia, Japan, India, the Philippines, and Mexico. 
Conclusion on Finlay. In 1968, Finlay helped organize the Third International 
Wheat Genetics Symposium, held in Canberra, Australia, in early August 1968. This 
conference seemed to signify Borlaug’s wider acceptance by the wheat breeding 
community, and Borlaug gave a public lecture on “wheat breeding and its impact on 
world food supply” (Borlaug, 1968). In addition to organizing, Finlay also presented a 
paper titled, “The Significance of Adaptation in Wheat Breeding.” He stated that after the 
Finlay and Wilkinson paper in 1963 “several other workers including Borlaug (1965), 
Eberhart and Russell (1966), and St. Pierre et al. (1967) indicated the advantages of 
selecting for wide adaptability… Many cereal breeders still consider the wide 
adaptability is synonymous with mediocrity in performance” (Finlay, 1968, pp. 403-404). 
He used the results of Borlaug’s international trials to show that varieties could be bred 
with both high average yield and wide adaptation, or stability. 
 Though Borlaug had passed over Finlay for positions at CIMMYT several times 
already, with the departure of Krull in 1968 he again needed someone with a strong 
mathematical background to help with the international trials and general administration 
of the wheat program (Borlaug & Gibler, August 1, 1968). John Gibler was promoted to 
Associate Director of the wheat program, and Finlay was recruited to assist Borlaug and 
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Gibler. Finlay was quickly hired as “Director, Basic Research and Training (International 
nurseries and data retrieval)” for the maize and wheat programs at CIMMYT (CIMMYT, 
1969), and remained there until his death in 1980. 
Conclusion 
Both Borlaug and Krull believed that by promoting widely adapted varieties and a 
singular research program for favorable environments, that they could promote the 
greatest good for the greatest number of people in the world. Finlay’s involvement with 
Borlaug and CIMMYT over the years points to some problems with Borlaug and Krull’s 
mission-driven approach to expanding their wheat program. Namely, Borlaug and Krull 
focused on irrigated and fertilized conditions through carefully controlled experiments, 
while overlooking the genetic and physiological factors that contributed to wide 
adaptation (besides photoperiod insensitivity). In many cases, they used ‘location’ as a 
proxy for ‘environment,’ which biologists and modern agricultural scientists recognize as 
an important distinction. This helps explain why Krull and Finlay, using the same data 
and different methods, came to different conclusions about the adaptation of Borlaug’s 
wheat varieties. Finlay’s analysis uses the relative performance of varieties as an index 
for the environmental quality, whereas Krull aggregated data based on location, 
weighting each location equally. 
The following few chapters will examine the consequences of Borlaug’s focus on 
wide adaptation. By the late 1960s, RF, CIMMYT, and Indian scientists realized that the 
wide adaptation of the Mexican semi-dwarf varieties did not ensure their adaptation to 
rainfed environments, and that these environments required new approaches to wheat 
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research. Chapters 2 through 5 of this dissertation also show the impact of Keith W. 
Finlay’s mathematical model to measure adaptation.  
 Finally, a pervasive theme throughout my chapters is the assumption that crop 
yield became more genetically controlled and immune to agro-climatic variability. This is 
reflected in the use of stability models to prove yield stability over time and place, and 
Borlaug and his colleague Charles Krull’s rather tenuous leap to define wide adaptation 
as “highest in yield… under both irrigated and nonirrigated conditions” (Borlaug, 
October 1965, pp. 1092–1093) and that “high yield and wide adaptation can also be built 
into a hybrid spring wheat” (Krull, October 4, 1965). These scientists strongly believed in 
the transformative potential of seeds with built-in yield potential. But as others have 
pointed out, yield potential is exactly that: the potential yield dependent on environmental 
influence. Throughout the heyday of agricultural modernization, the 1960s, environment 
was seen as a constant and more importance was placed on plant genetics. At the same 
time, however, the reader will witness Borlaug’s persistent argument for irrigation and 
fertilizers. Scientists later recognized that improved crop production post-green 
revolution was more representative of historically improved environments and fertilizer-
responsive varieties than as a direct result of the supposed inherent yield of widely 
adapted varieties (Simmonds, 1981). 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL ROOTS AND THE INDIAN CONTEXT OF A NEW 
PLANT BREEDING IDEAL, 1960–1970 
 
Indian wheat cultivation changed radically in the 1960s due to new technologies 
and policy reforms introduced during the green revolution, and farmers’ adoption of 
‘technology packages’ of modern seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation. Just prior to the green 
revolution, Indian scientists adopted a new plant breeding philosophy—that varieties 
should have as wide an adaptation as possible, meaning high and stable yields across 
different environments. But scientists also argued that wide adaptation could be achieved 
by selecting only plants that did well in high fertility and irrigated environments. 
Scientists claimed that widely adapted varieties still produce high yields in marginal 
areas. Many people have criticized the green revolution for its unequal spread of benefits, 
but none of these critiques address wide adaptation—the core tenant held by Indian 
agricultural scientists to justify their focus on highly productive land while ignoring 
marginal or rainfed agriculture.  
This paper describes Norman Borlaug and the Rockefeller Foundation’s (RF) 
research program in wide adaptation, Borlaug’s involvement in the Indian wheat 
program, and internal debates about wide adaptation and selection under favorable 
environments among Indian scientists. It argues that scientists leveraged the concept of 
wide adaptation to justify a particular regime of research focused on high production 
agriculture. Scientists utilized wide adaptation—and the practices associated with it, such 
as the release of new fertilizer-responsive varieties and importation and concentration of 
fertilizer—as a rhetorical strategy to justify radical changes in Indian agricultural policy 
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during a time of crisis. Indian and RF scientists ushered in a new doctrine of plant 
breeding under the crisis of food and population.  
While these changes were meant as a stopgap for the food crisis, they became 
embedded as policy and have remained the norm in India. Wide adaptation became a 
vehicle to shuttle in new varieties and technologies with the promise that they would 
promote social equity, while simultaneously cementing a research regime focused on the 
favorable agro-climatic conditions of northwest India. These changes have led to a 
problematic, systemic bias against marginal agriculture in India, despite political efforts 
to the contrary.  
This chapter focuses on why wheat scientists in India and at the RF argued for, 
and in some cases against, centralization of research, wide adaptation, and selection in 
favorable (high fertility, controlled irrigation) environments. Both qualitative and 
quantitative data suggest that widely adapted varieties from Mexico were in fact adapted 
to high fertility, irrigated conditions but not low fertility, rainfed conditions.  
These scientists believed in their noble reasons for holding wide adaptation as a 
breeding goal. With memories of the 1943 Bengal Famine still looming, India aimed to 
rapidly increase food production during the 1960s. Scientists and foundation personnel 
also wanted to reduce the number of wheat varieties in production (Government of India, 
1961). Wide adaptation made pragmatic sense to maximize resource allocation and to 
bring together decentralized wheat research. It also allowed wheat breeders to work 
towards a new blockbuster wheat variety that would bring them personal and professional 
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prestige. But wide adaptation was based on some questionable assumptions that played 
out once Borlaug’s new varieties were planted on a wide scale in India.  
Over the past 45 years, many scholars and activists have criticized the impacts of 
green revolution agriculture in India. Some of these critiques focused on the unequal 
socio-economic spread of technologies that favored the larger, irrigated, commercial 
farms of the Punjab region over smaller, rainfed farms (Anderson et al., 1982; Cleaver, 
1972; Frankel, 1971; Griffin, 1974; Ladejinsky, 1969). Fewer of these critiques identified 
that the varieties of wheat and rice released in the mid-1960s24 were not adapted to low 
rainfall, low fertility agro-climatic conditions that marginal farmers25 typically face 
(Farmer, 1979; Lewontin, 1983; Oasa, 1981; Saha, 2012; Sen, 1974). But few of these 
critiques directly addressed why, in the mid-1960s, Indian agricultural scientists decided 
to focus the national system of wheat research on high fertility and irrigated conditions. 
Understanding why wide adaptation became the dominant framework in Indian plant 
breeding is critical to further cracking open the “black box” around wide adaptation that 
is still extremely influential to modern wheat breeding programs for developing 
countries.  
                                                
24 Varieties developed through Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored international agricultural 
research programs. 
25 Farmers in marginal environments. I use Cleveland's definition of marginal farms or 
environments as “crop growing environments that have relatively high levels of stress for yield 
production (e.g., drought), ...that often have relatively high levels of variability in these stress 
factors through space and time (e.g., rainfall with high spatial, intraannual, and interannual 
variation), and where farmers do not apply many external inputs (e.g., irrigation water)” (2001, p. 
264). 
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Just prior to the green revolution, Indian wheat scientists adopted a new plant 
breeding philosophy that emphasized the wide adaptation of crop varieties.26 Scientists 
defined this as varieties that produce high and stable yields in varying environments, also 
called broad adaptation or phenotypic stability (Finlay & Wilkinson, 1963). Up to the 
mid-1960s, cereal breeders viewed wide adaptation with skepticism, assuming that 
varieties should be bred in the area they are to be grown. But in the late 1950s, Borlaug 
discovered wheat varieties with what he called “surprisingly broad adaptation” due to 
their photoperiod insensitivity (Borlaug, 1968, p. 8). Borlaug’s successful wheat program 
introduced the radical idea of purposeful wide adaptation into mainstream science. 
Simultaneously, Borlaug consulted on Indian wheat research, and is credited with 
introducing his new varieties of wheat and the concept of wide adaptation to India. 
In the mid-1960s the Indian wheat program, under RF influence, underwent three 
significant changes. It became centralized (Raina, 2009; Saha, 2012), varieties were 
tested under soil fertility rates roughly twenty-five times higher than average soil fertility 
rates in India, and varieties were judged based on their average performance over several 
locations in multi-state agro-climatic zones (Proceedings of the Seventh All India Wheat 
Research Workers’ Workshop, 1968). Indian and RF wheat scientists argued that by 
selecting varieties under high fertility and irrigated conditions, they could create high 
yielding, widely adapted varieties. They claimed that widely adapted varieties would still 
produce high yields in marginal environments, ostensibly to placate India’s economic 
                                                
26 Adaptation in this case refers to the performance of a plant in a given environment or condition 
rather than a process (Cooper & Byth, 1996). 
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planners who favored a socialist agricultural system (Saha, 2012). In reality, the Indian 
wheat program focused on the favorable agro-climatic conditions of northwest India. 
The concept of wide adaptation underlies past and present research agendas, 
technologies, and policies in India, yet has seldom been scrutinized through a historical 
lens. Historians of biology can contribute to recent literature on controversial agricultural 
science by exploring the historical roots of agricultural technologies and ideologies.27 
Using historical sources such as conference proceedings, correspondence, and crop data 
from India, this paper highlights the history of the controversy over wide adaptation to 
understand how wide adaptation became a doctrine of Indian wheat science. 
In the next two chapters I examine the consequences of the wide adaptation 
regime in India and other countries. I argue that the conditions under which the Indian 
wheat program developed in the mid-1960s have created a research system that is 
‘locked-in’ to wide adaptation. In my dissertation conclusion I describe this as 
technological momentum, based on Thomas Hughes’ concept (1994). That Indian 
agricultural scientists uncritically rely on wide adaptation is a reflection of the historical 
codification of wide adaptation into the coordinated system rather than the interests of the 
scientists themselves (see interviews in Chapter 5). Nonetheless, a wheat research and 
testing system attuned only to wide adaptation severely limits the capacity of the system 
to respond to the needs of marginal farmers, to incorporate participatory research 
methods, to release more locally-adapted varieties, and to address climate change 
                                                
27 See Sumberg, J. & Thompson, J. (Eds.) (2012). Contested Agronomy: Agricultural Research in 
a Changing World. London: Routledge. 
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adaptation. Understanding the history of wide adaptation in India lends some insight to 
why it became so entrenched in the current system. 
A Brief History of Indian Agricultural Research 
The history of agricultural research and production in India is closely tied to 
British colonialism. Famines frequently occurred in British India due to a combination of 
climatic fluctuations and ineffective famine prevention or relief (Davis, 2002). The 
British Raj focused on improving cash and export crops over food crops, which may have 
continued to the decline in crop yields starting around 1920, reaching a nadir in the Great 
Bengal Famine of 1943 (Parayil, 1992; Perkins, 1997). In 1942, the British Government 
announced a “Grow More Food” campaign in India due to the start of WWII, 
encouraging farmers to switch from cash to food crops (Busch, 1988; Perkins, 1997). 
Grow More Food focused on increasing cereal grain production and availability of 
irrigation (Knight, 1954). Ultimately, the campaign languished due to lack of investment 
and concrete plans.  
The British established the first research institute in India, the Imperial 
Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), in 1905 in Pusa, Bihar (Randhawa, 1987). In 
1908, five agricultural colleges were established in India. By 1910, special government 
laboratories for wheat and rice had been established (Anderson, 1983). Starting in 1919, 
the Government of India delegated authority over agricultural development to the 
provinces, with limited success. The administrative body of the Imperial Agricultural 
Research Council (ICAR) then formed in 1929. IARI moved to Delhi in 1934 after an 
earthquake at Pusa, leading towards Delhi becoming the seat of Indian agricultural 
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research (Busch, 1988). Another main research focus was the Punjab, but mostly in the 
western region that would become Pakistan after the partition. The Punjab region was 
also the major site of canal irrigation by the British imperialists. After India’s 
independence in 1947, IARI and ICAR changed their names to the Indian Agricultural 
Research Institute and Indian Council for Agricultural Research, respectively, but 
retained their abbreviations. According to Perkins, by the end of WWII ICAR had limited 
capacity to plan or achieve agricultural policies (1997). By 1948, ICAR staff had 
increased about 70%, especially in Delhi, and the scientific staff primarily focused on 
food crops, and especially wheat (Perkins, 1997). 
 Indian wheat science and adaptation. Before 1965, wheat cultivation in India 
was mostly limited to the northwest, while rice prevailed in the east and south, and 
millets in the peninsular region (Guha, 2007). Indian wheat breeding programs existed 
from the early 1900s, but efforts were decentralized and resulted in marginal gains in 
wheat yield. Contributing to the marginal gains was the fact that foreign wheat varieties 
were not well-adapted to Indian conditions (Parayil, 1992). Sir Albert and Gabrielle L. C. 
Howard are known as the pioneers of Indian wheat research, working in Pusa, Bihar. 
They wrote in their 1909 book that, “the introduction of exotic wheats into India has been 
a long record of failure” (Howard and Howard 1909, p. 117). This was partly due to the 
different climatic needs of European winter wheat, whereas India’s climate required 
spring wheat. The Howards also noted the location-specificity of agricultural research, 
writing that, “the smallest differences in procedure are closely bound up with differences 
in local conditions” (cited in Saha, 2012, p. 95). Despite early failures, India 
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systematically experimented with foreign plant introduction from 1942 onwards, in line 
with the global movement of plant germplasm at that time (Government of India, 1961, p. 
82). 
Despite early decentralization and generally low support of wheat research by the 
Raj, Indian wheat scientists, often trained abroad, lobbied for ICAR to support their 
programs. Indian wheats faced, and still face, the problem of three different types of rust, 
a viral pathogen that can result in reduced wheat yields (leaf rust, stem rust, and stripe 
rust are the three main types). Benjamin Peary Pal led the charge for the coordination 
wheat disease research in India throughout the 1930s, 40s, and 50s (ICAR, 1952). Pal 
received his PhD in botany from the University of Cambridge in England under Rowland 
Biffen and Frank Engledow. He also mentored India’s most celebrated wheat scientist, 
Mankombu Sambasivan Swaminathan (profiled later this chapter). In 1934 Indian 
scientists decided “that a collaborative beginning for breeding rust-resistant varieties of 
hill wheats should be undertaken at Simla... placed under the charge of Dr. B.P. Pal” 
(Kohli, 1968, p. 20). Two years after Pal was promoted to director of IARI in 1950, in 
1952 ICAR approved Pal’s coordinated scheme to control rust (ICAR, 1954). By 1959, 
Pal and pathologist K. C. Mehta released an “all purpose variety” of wheat, NP800, with 
resistance to all three rusts (Saha, 2012). This idea of a coordinated agricultural program 
and an “all purpose variety” would soon become a central feature of Indian agricultural 
research, as Pal became director of ICAR in 1965. 
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By 1957, the introduction and adaptation of foreign wheat varieties to Indian 
conditions was still mostly unsuccessful. At a 1957 plant breeding conference in New 
Delhi, India, G. Ledyard Stebbins said that, 
The highly productive varieties created by breeders in one country cannot be 
transported to other countries simply by shipments of seeds… This is partly 
because climates vary greatly from one region to another, and a highly productive 
variety is always selected for top performance in its country of origin. (Stebbins, 
1957, p. 127) 
At that same meeting, Otto H. Frankel countered Stebbins’ views, citing Clausen’s 
experiments with hybrids from geographically disparate areas that resulted in plants with 
a wide range of adaptation (Frankel, 1957). 
Stebbins’ statement is similar to the views of Indian scientists who questioned the 
ability of crops to adapt to wide environments even within India. Scientists S. M. Sikka 
and K. B. L. Jain wrote, “The yield is, therefore, at its best when the plants of a particular 
variety are in harmony with the environment. It is now well recognised that a single 
variety of any crop, howsoever improved it may be, cannot be a universal success” (Sikka 
& Jain, 1960, p. 154). Sikka was head of IARI’s botany department at that time, so we 
might assume that his views were not outside the mainstream. Minutes from a 1953 
ICAR advisory board meeting show sugarcane breeder T. S. Venkataraman’s skepticism 
towards wide adaptation, while B. P. Pal reassured him that for crops like sugarcane, “it 
was true that the crosses were best made in certain localities because these crops did not 
produce flowers in all localities... But in the case of crops like wheat and rice their 
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experience was that that did not happen” (ICAR, 1953, p. 32). Pal argued that the 
physiological aspects of wheat made it particularly adaptable as compared to other crops. 
Thus, India began to set the stage for wide scale introduction of foreign wheat and rice 
long before the green revolution. In 1963, Stebbins and Venkataraman’s statements 
would ring obsolete as India shipped tons of Mexican wheat seed to be grown, mostly 
successfully, under Indian conditions.  
Post-Independence Indian Agricultural Policies and Modernism 
India became independent from Britain in 1947, and Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru became the primary influence on Indian politics until his death in 1964. Under 
Nehru’s leadership, postcolonial Indian policies, including agricultural policies, veered 
towards a centralized and socialist agenda (Guha, 2007). India’s constitution prescribed 
for “the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so 
distributed as best to subserve the common good” and against “concentration of wealth” 
(quoted in Guha, 2007, p. 206).  
Nehru was also a strong proponent of modernism and “the scientific temper” 
(Guha, 2007). Both pre- and postcolonial India exalted “planning” and models for 
development (for example, the National Planning Committee established in 1938) (Bose, 
1997; Cullather, 2010; Klingensmith, 2003; Guha, 2007). According to historian Daniel 
Klingensmith, “Indian politicians and engineers of the 1950s were careful to emphasize 
that science and technology were universal, not simply ‘American’… The United States 
as a land of science, affluence, and progress… looms large in the rhetoric of 
modernization in late colonial and post-Independence India” (2003, pp. 132–133).  
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Historian of science Madhumita Saha wrote that, “Moreover science and technology held 
to Nehru promise of social and economic changes without the dislocation and violence 
witnessed in other revolutions” (2012, p. 34). This modernism view of science and 
technology would have profound impacts on agricultural policy. 
 India’s economic planners hoped to separate India’s agricultural from its colonial 
past. Agricultural reforms included socialist land reform, helping landless peasants settle 
new land, and abolishing absentee landlords (Guha, 2007). India’s first five-year plan in 
1951 focused more on industrial production than agriculture, because Nehru and his 
advisors believed that growth in industry to provide jobs for laborers and to prove the 
country as modern (Guha, 2007). Nehru believed that focusing on industry would 
ultimately create more demand for agriculture and would boost production (Parayil, 
1992). The first five-year plan also focused on village self-sufficiency and community 
development—the development model that would prevail until the RF’s involvement in 
the mid-1960s (Perkins, 1997; Saha, 2012).  
 The second five-year plan (1956) expanded support for agriculture and social 
welfare programs, but it reduced spending on fertilizers. India imported its chemical 
fertilizers, which required spending valuable foreign exchange (Cullather, 2010). Thus, 
the second plan aimed to use the scarce foreign exchange supply for industrial rather than 
agricultural purposes. Then due to a crop failure, in 1957 the Indian government set up a 
Food Grains Enquiry Committee (Saha, 2012). This committee recommended a shift to 
chemical (rather than manurial) fertilizers and application to concentrated areas of food 
production (Saha, 2012). India’s Planning Committee rejected those recommendations 
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because they went against Nehru’s and the Planning Committee’s main goal of social 
equity (Saha, 2012). In the third-year plan (1961), the final plan before the green 
revolution, the Planning Committee put a high priority on self-sufficiency in food grains, 
but still reduced spending on irrigation and fertilizer (Cullather, 2010). 
US Foundation Involvement in Indian Agricultural Development 
US foundations became involved in Indian agricultural development in the 1950s, 
after India’s Grow More Food campaign ended. The Ford Foundation, RF, and United 
States Technical Cooperative Administration (which became USAID in 1961) all 
involved themselves in agricultural development in India in the 1950s and 60s. Initial 
programs focused on community development through village-centric programs, and 
technical assistance through demonstrations of new practices and technologies (Guha, 
2007; Perkins, 1997). 
The Ford Foundation started a food production campaign in India in 1951. As a 
result of poor crop yields in 1957-8, the Government of India invited the Ford Foundation 
again to intervene, resulting in a 1959 report titled, “India’s Food Crisis and Steps to 
Meet It” (Sen, 1969). Then in 1961 the Ford Foundation started the Intensive Agricultural 
District Programme (IADP). Also known as the Package Programme, the IADP 
concentrated on improving rural development in selected districts through fertilizer, 
irrigation, and modern crop varieties. The basis of the IADP was as follows: 
Instead of spreading the developmental efforts more or less on a uniform basis 
throughout the country without getting any striking results, intensive efforts for 
production should be undertaken with the combination of all the technological 
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improvements and concentration of man power and resources in selected areas 
which have optimum conditions for stepping up production. (Government of 
India, 1966, p. 1) 
Although the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations had different philosophies towards 
agricultural research and extension, the RF also concentrated their Indian agricultural 
program on areas with high production potential. A 1965 RF report stated that, “Large, 
sustained increases in yield can be expected only on the irrigated areas, and they will 
come only through greatly expanded use of commercial fertilizers” (Rockefeller 
Foundation, 1965, p. 168). Dorris D. Brown, an American extension scientist who spent 
eight years with the Ford Foundation in India, stated at a 1961 IADP training conference 
that “the major criteria for selection of a variety for multiplication should be its ability to 
give higher yields under cultivator’s conditions including responsiveness to heavy doses 
of fertilizer and ample water and plant protection” (Government of India, 1961, p. 10). 
The targets of these programs were unambiguously the irrigated regions of India. 
The RF’s involvement in Indian agriculture started in 1952, when they sent three 
scientists to survey Indian agriculture (refer back to Chapter 1). While the Ford 
Foundation focused on community development through the IADP, the RF thought 
agricultural research was the more effective intervention (Saha, 2012). The Indian 
government worked with the RF on two Joint Indo-American councils, in 1954 and 1959, 
that developed agricultural education and research policy for India (Randhawa, 1987). 
The first Joint Indo-American council recommended that India implement a rural 
agricultural education system based on the US land grant colleges (Abrol, 1983). The RF 
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supported this project, in partnership with five US land grant colleges, in 1955 (Abrol, 
1983). In 1960, with much direction from the University of Illinois, an agricultural 
university was established in Pantnagar, Uttar Pradesh, and six more universities were set 
up in the following five years (Randhawa, 1987).  
The RF and other foundations viewed the Punjab region, located in northwest 
India) as especially fertile grounds for both social and agricultural development 
experiments (Latham, 2011). Known as the Khanna Study, the Rockefeller Foundation 
supported and the Harvard School of Public Health conducted a large-scale study of 
population control in Punjab rural villages from 1953–1969 (Williams, 2012). The 
researchers remarked, “India… is the cauldron in which mankind will be tested” 
(Connelly, 2008, p. 171). US scientists viewed India as a laboratory for democracy and 
the “self-help” ideology that prevailed during the Johnson administration (1963–1969) 
(Latham, 2011). 
 As stated in Chapter 1, the US government passed Public Law 480 (PL480) in 
1954, a law that allowed the distribution of surplus grains to other countries. Shipments 
of cheap grain to India started that year. Previous to this, the US Ambassador to India, 
Chester Bowles, orchestrated cooperation between India and the US under the Technical 
Cooperation Program (Point Four), in 1952 (Saha, 2012). One of the major outputs of this 
program was widescale distribution and demonstration of fertilizers to Indian farmers, 
along with soil fertility testing (Saha, 2012). Frank Parker, an American agronomist 
stationed in India in the early 1950s with the TCPs, stated, “India is not overpopulated, it 
is underfertilized” (quoted in Cullather, 2010, p. 199). A major reason for the US’s 
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involvement in India’s food supply was to promote stability in the region. US foreign 
policy experts believed that supplying food to hungry and politically unstable countries 
was critical to national security (Perkins, 1997; Saha, 2012). 
Reorganizing the Indian wheat program: centralization and a northwest bias 
A major reorganization of Indian agricultural science occurred in 1965, building 
off of both prior institutional innovations and RF involvement. In the 1950s, Indian 
agricultural policy-makers and prominent scientists began a large-scale reorganization of 
crop research programs and agricultural education. The Indian government invited two 
RF scientists, Edwin J. Wellhausen and Ulysses J. Grant,28 to review their research 
system in 1954, concentrating on maize research. The RF scientists noted that a major 
impediment to progress in maize breeding was the lack of coordination between 
decentralized research centers (Grant & Wellhausen, 1955); this was later confirmed by 
an agricultural review team consisting of both RF and Indian scientists (Parker et al., 
December 13, 1963).  
In 1956, the Indian government invited the RF to coordinate maize, millet, and 
sorghum research. The Government of India and RF signed a memorandum of 
understanding and in 1957 started the Coordinated Maize Breeding Scheme under RF 
scientists Ralph W. Cummings and Grant. A subcommittee of ICAR, led by Pal, 
“recommended the division of the country into... four zones for purposes of maize 
breeding work” (ICAR, 1957). This novel idea for coordinated breeding according to 
broad agro-climatic zones ironically led to a centralized research program.  
                                                
28 At that time, Wellhausen directed the RF’s Mexican Agricultural Program, and Grant led the 
RF Columbian Agricultural Program’s corn improvement program. 
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 ICAR started an informal coordinated wheat program in 1961 “modeled on the 
coordinated maize program,” and put scientists at the IARI in Delhi in charge (Anderson, 
1970). According to Cullather, RF scientists guided IARI away from secondary and 
ornamental crops, and towards wheat (2010). The RF supported scholarships for wheat 
scientists to study in the US, and worked closely with Pal to train a generation of wheat 
researchers (Cullather, 2010). 
ICAR then invited Borlaug to consult on wheat research in India in 1963. Borlaug 
recruited R. Glenn Anderson, a Canadian wheat scientist, to join the Indian team in late 
1964 and spearhead the new “unified and aggressive” coordinated wheat program 
(Borlaug, August 18, 1964). In 1965 the All-India Coordinated Wheat Improvement 
Program was officially launched, separating India into five agro-climatic zones for wheat 
production. That same year, the government, through the food minister C. Subramaniam, 
restructured ICAR, appointed Pal as ICAR’s Director General (ICAR’s first scientist, 
rather than bureaucrat, leader), put IARI and other agricultural organizations under the 
jurisdiction of ICAR, and wrote the new agricultural programs into national policy (Saha, 
2012).  
The coordinated wheat program centralized power of the IARI, India’s main 
agricultural research body, and ICAR, the bureaucratic body, in New Delhi (Raina, 
2011a). But IARI scientists had to prove that their research program could still benefit 
farmers in the majority of the country. A shift in emphasis towards a centralized wheat 
program raised “serious questions on the part of the states as to whether the Coordinator 
can fairly represent them,” in addition to in-house claims that “IARI has deliberately 
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usurped credit due to these all-India coordinated projects, to the detriment of the non-
IARI staff concerned.” (Anderson, 1970; Rockefeller Foundation Indian Agricultural 
Program, n.d., p. 14). Under the auspices of IARI coordination, the centralized research 
system benefitted scientists at the top of IARI’s hierarchy. These scientists employed 
wide adaptation as a rhetorical strategy to justify the centralization of agricultural 
research in New Delhi. The RF also utilized wide adaptation to quickly disseminate 
knowledge and technologies throughout India in a politically savvy way. 
With RF support from the 1960s onward, most wheat research efforts in India 
focused on the northwest region of Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh, which 
form an agriculturally productive and mostly irrigated region. Many prominent research 
organizations were located in the northwest, including the IARI in New Delhi, G. B. Pant 
University of Agriculture & Technology (Pantnagar) near Nainital, and Punjab 
Agricultural University in Ludhiana. Other regions of India also grew wheat extensively, 
but crop productivity was low and farmers there lacked assured irrigation. In the 1960s, 
rainfed agriculture accounted for 80 percent of cultivated land and about two thirds of the 
wheat-growing region (Sen, 1969). For farmers dependent on rainfall, the timing of rain 
affected not only their overall yield, but also whether it was economic to apply fertilizer 
(Dawson, Murphy, & Jones, 2008; Gangopadhyaya & Sarker, 1965). 
Norman Borlaug’s Focus on Fertilizers in India 
In order to understand the increased focus on wide adaptation and breeding for 
favorable environments in Indian wheat research, some background on Borlaug’s wheat 
program is necessary. In the 1960s, the RF agricultural science program aimed to 
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dramatically increase food production in tropical countries. RF administrators placed 
Borlaug in charge of the international wheat program29 simultaneous with Borlaug’s 
discovery of widely adapted wheats around 1960 (see Chapter 2). By this time, Borlaug’s 
wheat program operated under exclusively high fertility conditions (Oasa, 1981). Borlaug 
fervently believed that more fertilizers would soon become available and affordable in 
developing countries, and that varieties traditionally adapted to lower fertility 
conditions—including tall-stalked Indian varieties—would fail under higher fertilizer 
levels. Under high fertility field conditions, tall wheats would fall over and heads became 
lodged from the weight of their grain. Borlaug thus developed wheats that were adapted 
to higher levels of fertilizer, including semi-dwarf wheats that would not lodge under 
high fertility.  
Although never stationed in India, Borlaug corresponded with Indian officials and 
scientists directly and through the RF field staff in Delhi. Concerned about the growing 
population in India, he wrote in 1966, “India must really think big and positively on 
fertilizer, or starve,” convinced that more fertilizer levels would create “a complete 
change in the psychology of wheat production—from one of survival to one of high 
yields” (Borlaug, December 21, 1966; Borlaug, April 12, 1966). His wheat program 
aimed to revolutionize Indian agriculture long before the green revolution was coined.  
In 1964 Borlaug presented his recommendations to ICAR. He wrote that despite 
past research efforts focused on local soil fertility levels, “new types of wheat varieties 
are urgently needed” to survive the “anticipated changes that will come about through the 
                                                
29 Started in 1960 as the Inter-American Wheat Improvement Program and then becoming part of 
the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center in 1966. 
   138 
use of heavy rates of chemical fertilizers” (Borlaug, April 11, 1964, p. 2). Next, he 
suggested that, “the major emphasis for the next 5 to 7 years in breeding should be on 
improvement of the varieties for irrigated wheat production,” in order to rapidly increase 
food production in India (Borlaug, April 11, 1964, p. 16). All of his recommendations 
were implemented. 
In response to those who might criticize the focus on breeding for favorable 
environments in India, Borlaug later wrote that, “even at low fertility and on dryland, 
they [Mexican semi-dwarf wheats] do surprisingly well, displaying their efficiency even 
though they were developed under irrigation” (Borlaug, 1972a, p. 586). In a similar vein, 
his RF colleague, Charles F. Krull, argued that, “the dwarfs respond to but do not 
necessarily require irrigation and extremely heavy fertilization” [emphasis original] 
(Krull, January 5, 1967). Krull also proposed that varieties developed in favorable 
environments could perform well in marginal environments, but not vice versa, an axiom 
taken up by N. N. Roy and B. R. Murty of IARI (described later this chapter) (Krull, 
[Diary notes], April–May 1966). 
R. Glenn Anderson joined the RF field staff in Delhi in August 1964 and soon 
became joint coordinator of the All-India Coordinated Wheat Improvement Program 
working with Borlaug to popularize wide adaptation among Indian scientists.30 Anderson 
also heavily promoted investment in chemical fertilizers stating in retrospect at a 1973 
conference in Mexico, 	  
                                                
30 Stating in 1969 that, “the question is often heard of whether greater yield can be obtained from 
the narrowly adapted or widely adapted varieties. I consider the widely adapted superior” 
(Proceedings of the 8th All-India Wheat Research Worker’s Conference, Vol. I., 1969), p. 174). 
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The economist said if you put 30 pounds of fertilizer on 3x acres, you would 
increase production to a higher level than if you applied 120 pounds on x acres. 
This was true. On the biological side, we argued that the latter condition should be 
followed because of the psychological shock effect on the farmer. At the 120-
pound level, he would harvest 2 to 3 times the grain he did formerly. At 40 
pounds he would show a modest increase, but it could be attributed to weather, 
acts of God, etc. With the high yields, there was no questions but what he was a 
convert to the use of fertilizer. (Anderson, 1973, p. 84)	  
Despite Anderson’s ground-level involvement, Indian scientists credit Borlaug with 
bringing wide adaptation in India. Borlaug argued that in India, “every effort should be 
made to develop widely adapted varieties” and further, aimed to “convince the research 
scientists that adaptation of wheat varieties seldom or never coincides with state 
boundaries” (Borlaug, April 11, 1964, p. 18).  
Although the coordinated system of research in India did not initially aim to 
produce widely adapted crop varieties, wide adaptation became mainstream just as the 
program solidified. Wide adaptation happened to dovetail extraordinarily well with the 
scientific and administrative goals of the coordinated wheat program, and in particular 
the shift from a decentralized to centralized program headquartered in northwest India. 
As the remainder of the paper demonstrates, almost all arguments to implement wide 
adaptation came from RF scientists and Indian scientists who worked in northwest India. 
This implies two things: that scientists in the northwest had the most ready access to new 
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ideas and ability to publish, and that they also had some political and personal 
motivations for promoting wide adaptation as the dominant plant breeding ideal. 
Changes in the Indian Wheat Research Agenda: Bias Towards Favorable 
Environments 
Prior to RF involvement in Indian agriculture, Indian plant breeders were part of a 
global network of international scientists, often trained abroad. In the late 1950s Indian 
plant breeders were interested in theoretical questions of genetics, genotype and 
environment interactions, plant adaptation, and other contemporary topics in plant 
breeding (Lele & Goldsmith, 1989; Pal, 1957). But it is clear that prior to RF 
involvement, there was no unified approach to breeding under favorable environments 
and for wide adaptation.31 The structural shift in the wheat program paralleled an 
ideological shift towards new breeding goals, both under the RF’s advisement. 
Although ICAR was ultimately responsible for initiating the coordinated wheat 
program in 1965, Borlaug’s influence is obvious. For instance, ICAR’s proposal for the 
wheat program stated, “the main emphasis will be placed on breeding varieties for high 
fertility anticipating that fertilizer will become increasingly available” and “application of 
heavy rates of nitrogen on varieties bred for irrigation” (ICAR, 1965, p. 18). The wheat 
project coordinator, S. P. Kohli, also advocated “breeding for high fertility conditions,” a 
                                                
31 Dorris D. Brown, an American extension scientist who spent eight years with the Ford 
Foundation in India, stated at a 1961 IADP training conference that “the major criteria for 
selection of a variety for multiplication should be its ability to give higher yields under 
cultivator’s conditions including responsiveness to heavy doses of fertilizer and ample water and 
plant protection” (Government of India, 1961, p. 10). 
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departure from earlier breeding goals (Minutes of the Fourth All India Wheat Research 
Workers’ Seminar, 1965, p. 7). 
One of Borlaug’s main allies in India was M. S. Swaminathan. Swaminathan did 
his graduate studies with Pal, and also at Wageningen in the Netherlands, Cambridge, and 
the University of Wisconsin, Madison (Perkins, 1997). He joined IARI as a cytologist in 
1954 (Perkins, 1997). Swaminathan is known in India for bringing Borlaug to India and 
catalyzing the introduction of Borlaug’s semi-dwarf varieties. Starting in 1963, the 
Mexican varieties Sonora 63, Sonora 64, Mayo64, and Lerma Rojo 64 were tested in 
India under irrigated, “heavily fertilized land” (Rockefeller Foundation, 1964, p. 237). 
 Swaminathan frequently corresponded with Borlaug and often echoed his 
arguments for breeding under favorable environments. Swaminathan drew from Borlaug 
to claim that “when a variety is evolved under high fertility conditions, it can also yield 
well when grown under moderate fertility conditions. It is, however, not possible to 
achieve the reverse” (Swaminathan, 1965, p. 61). Borlaug and Swaminathan also both 
agreed on a ‘betting on the strong’ strategy to test varieties on large plots and under 
irrigated conditions (Cullather, 2010, p. 201). In 1966 Swaminathan became director of 
the IARI.  
 High-ranking scientists such as Kohli, Pal, and Swaminathan, worked in close 
contact with both Borlaug and Anderson to develop a research program that would 
produce wheats adapted to high fertility conditions. Other Indian wheat scientists also 
quickly adopted Borlaug’s progressive view. P. N. Bahl, of the IARI’s Department of 
Genetics, argued in 1966: 
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I am highly convinced that all selection work should be done under highly fertile 
conditions. We should not dissipate our energies by having separate programmes 
for different kinds of fertility levels. A variety that gives high yield under high 
fertility and adequate moisture conditions usually proves to be also good under 
low or average fertility. (Proceedings of the 5th All-India Wheat Research 
Worker’s Conference, 1966, p. 243) 
Bahl and other scientists in India argued that breeding under a set of completely different 
environmental conditions, namely high fertilizer and irrigation, would result in varieties 
also suited for marginal conditions. By 1967, an IARI report stated that, “selection under 
favourable conditions appears to be of promise both in breeding for drought resistance 
and in breeding for wide adaptability” (IARI, 1967, p. 16). High-profile Indian scientists 
justified research based in favorable agro-climatic conditions under the questionable 
premise that Borlaug’s widely adapted wheats would perform equally well if not better 
than local varieties under sub-optimal conditions. 
Crisis in 1965 and Changes in India’s Fourth Plan: From Social Equity to 
Concentrated Capitalism 
Scholars recognize that 1965–66 was a pivot point in Indian agriculture in 
response to both climatic and political factors (Perkins, 1997; Cullather, 2010; Patel, 
2013). From 1965 to 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson and his national security 
advisers used PL480 program as a bargaining tool with India to promote a transition from 
food aid to self-sufficient Indian grain production (Ahlberg, 2007). Simultaneously, India 
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faced both a failed monsoon (leading to drought) and a war with Pakistan in 1965 that put 
the country and its food supply into turmoil. 
Instead of the multi-year bargains employed by his predecessors, Johnson 
strategically used PL480 as a tool to push his political objectives in India, by creating 
shorter term contracts and threatening to withhold aid (Ahlberg, 2007). Robert Komer 
wrote to Johnson in 1966: 
We finally have the Indians where you've wanted them ever since last April—
with the slate wiped clean of previous commitments and India coming to us 
asking for a new relationship on the terms we want. Circumstances helped 
(famine and the Pak/Indian war), but seldom has a visit been more carefully 
prepared, nor the Indians forced more skillfully to come to us (note how little 
press backlash about US pressure tactics—when it's been just that for almost a full 
year)…. Similarly, you have already proved how our holding back on PL-480 can 
force India into revolutionizing its agriculture. Once the famine is licked, I'm for 
continuing to ride PL-480 with a short rein—it will be painful but productive. If 
these points don't add up to requiring self-help, I'll eat them. (R. W. Komer, 
March 27, 1966) 
Around 1964, Johnson and his advisors pressured the Indian government to move 
towards fertilizer-intensive agriculture, through importation and production of chemical 
fertilizers (Cullather, 2010; Weisskopf, 1973). Up to the mid-1960s, the state had not 
supported internal production of fertilizer due to concerns about it causing unequal 
conditions (i.e. one state gets a fertilizer factory and others do not) (Cullather, 2010). The 
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Indian government also highly discouraged foreign investment in fertilizer production in 
India through policies that required companies to have majority domestic ownership 
(Weisskopf, 1973). India stuck with these policies until December 1965. 
Furthering the context of crisis was the death of Prime Minister Nehru on 27 May 
1964. Congress named Lal Bahadur Shastri the next prime minister, and Shastri was 
more supportive of agricultural reform than his predecessor (Cullather, 2010). Shastri 
made the food crisis a high priority and appointed C. Subramaniam as the minister of 
agriculture. Subramaniam supported capital-intensive agriculture as a way to solve the 
food crisis, and oversaw the centralization of Indian agricultural research. He stated, “If 
we concentrate our efforts in a given area where we have assured water supply and we 
have the necessary extension services also concentrated in that area… then it should be 
possible for us to achieve much better results than by merely dispersing our effort in a 
thin way throughout the country” (Subramaniam quoted in Frankel, 1969, p. 694). 
 During Shastri’s term, the Indian government implemented a minimum support 
price for wheat (to incentivize wheat production) (Abel, 1970), imported large quantities 
of wheat seed from Mexico, and created the Food Corporation of India. And, despite 
longstanding opposition from the Planning Commission, in December 1965 Indian 
congress agreed to import large quantities of fertilizer and allow foreign investment in 
fertilizer plants (Cullather, 2010; Weisskopf, 1973). In 1965 and 1966 India decided to 
import wheat seeds from Mexico. The Indian government shipped 250 tons of Borlaug’s 
Mexican wheat varieties to India for direct planting in irrigated areas, and in 1966, 
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18,000 tons (Rockefeller Foundation, 1966).32 These shipments were “the largest single 
seed transaction in history” in response to what Patel called “a political-ecological ‘shock 
doctrine’” (Patel, 2013, p. 14). 
Wide adaptation as a rhetorical strategy. To satisfy economic planners, Indian 
scientists had to convince them that the wheat program contributed to social equality.33 
The doctrine of wide adaptation was a rhetorical lynchpin in these efforts. Saha’s 
dissertation showed how during the green revolution, Indian scientists planned “not to 
restrict cultivation of these high yielding varieties among well-endowed farmers, owning 
or having access to well-irrigated and fertile tracts, but to reach larger geographic and 
economic cross-sections.” (Saha, 2012, pp. 98–99). Indian scientists highlighted the wide 
adaptation of new wheat varieties to argue that overall wheat production could be 
increased and that farmers over a wide geographic area could benefit from new 
agricultural technologies, for instance Kohli’s statement that “to be successful under the 
Indian crop cultivation conditions, the wheat varieties must be adapted to a wide range of 
environmental conditions” (Kohli, 1968, p. 9). The concept of wide adaptation helped 
scientists appeal to economic planners while centralizing research. 
To ensure the wide adaptation of a variety, Indian scientists tested new wheat 
varieties under different locations and agronomic conditions, and only approved varieties 
with high average yields. While most breeding was done under favorable environments, 
the program coordinators promised that “the extensive breeding material which will 
                                                
32 The Indian government was also under pressure from the United States, which withheld food 
aid as a political bargaining device during this time. See Ahlberg (2007). 
33 Economic planners in India favored equally distributing fertilizer across farms, whereas the RF 
field staff favored concentrating fertilizer on high production potential farms growing Mexican 
wheats. 
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become available from the strengthened programs at the main centres will be fully tested 
under barani [rainfed] conditions and the most promising strains will be selected for 
release to cultivators for barani production” and that “a variety performing well under 
both conditions would be desirable” (ICAR, 1965, p. 18; Proceedings of the 5th All-India 
Wheat Research Worker’s Conference, 1966, p. 25). Thus, the central research facilities 
argued that they could provide varieties widely adapted across agro-climatic zones and 
conditions. 
Simultaneous with the RF’s involvement in Indian wheat research, the study of 
wide adaptation soon became a major focus in India’s wheat program—just as it did 
internationally. Studies focused on how to produce and identify widely adapted varieties 
of wheat  (e.g., through the use of summer nurseries for breeding and testing), as well as 
the biochemical and morphological characteristics of widely adapted varieties. At the 
annual research meetings of 1966, 1967, and 1969, sections of the reports were titled 
“Genetics of wide adaptation in wheat” and “Breeding for wide adaptability” 
(Proceedings of the 5th All-India Wheat Research Worker’s Conference, 1966, p. 226; 
IARI, 1967, p. 16; Proceedings of the 8th All-India Wheat Research Worker’s 
Conference, Vol. I., 1969, p. 174). Varieties like Lerma Rojo 64, developed by Borlaug’s 
program in Mexico, were celebrated for their “adaptability over wide regions” (ICAR, 
1966, p. 9). 
Scientific justifications for wide adaptation. Many high ranking Indian 
agricultural scientists argued that selecting under optimum environments could lead to 
varieties with wide adaptation, even in marginal and drought-prone environments. Indian 
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scientists produced their own studies to support this standpoint, some of which were cited 
internationally in adaptation studies. They also relied on international literature, 
especially from American and Japanese researchers,34 to argue that, “a crop plant which 
shows adaptive response under non-stress environments could also be able to produce 
adaptive phenotype under stress environments” (Das & Jain, 1971, p. 83). In other words, 
a variety bred under irrigated conditions, if widely adapted, could still adapt to drought 
conditions. Indian scientists used explicitly scientific arguments about wide adaptation to 
support breeding for favorable environments. 
Published articles from 1960 through 1970 show how Indian scientists justified 
wide adaptation and selection under favorable environments in biological terms. For 
example, IARI scientists N. N. Roy and B. R. Murty, both of whom studied at Cornell 
University, produced a study that found varieties selected under high fertility usually had 
a higher yield than varieties selected under “suboptimal conditions” (1967, p. 481). They 
reasoned that under suboptimal conditions, environmental variation caused too much 
phenotypic variability in the test varieties, making selection inefficient.  
In a 1970 paper again by Roy and Murty, the authors drew directly from RF 
scientists: “Krull et al. (1966) reported that wide adaptation is genetically controlled and 
that varieties do not require to be bred for the particular conditions. This indicates that 
minimizing G x E [genotype by environment] interaction is important for the choice of 
environment” (1970, p. 516). Roy and Murty assumed that if wide adaptation was 
genetic, varieties selected for their yield response under high fertility and irrigated 
conditions would still produce high yields in marginal conditions. At a 1967 conference, 
                                                
34 Especially the work of K.J. Frey, of Iowa State University, K. Gotoh and S.I. Osani of Japan.  
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Roy and R. D. Asana, also from IARI, gave a different biological reason for wide 
adaptation. They argued: 
Although it might be possible eventually to define the characteristics for the ideal 
plants adapted to a specific environment like drought, it would be much more 
difficult to define all possible combinations of a range of characteristics necessary 
to provide good adaptability in an otherwise fluctuating environment. 
(Proceedings of the 6th All-India Wheat Research Worker’s Workshop, Vol. II., 
1967, p. 124)  
Roy and Asana argued that it was better to have a variety that could adapt to a range of 
conditions than one that only performed well under the specific condition of drought.  
Many of the scientists who argued for wide adaptation and selection under 
favorable environments were affiliated with the IARI. As previously noted, the IARI 
served as a hub for the Indian coordinated wheat program, and benefitted from the 
centralization of power at its New Delhi headquarters. The next few sections will show 
that outside of the IARI research stations, theory did not match practice in most of the 
country. 
Questioning Wide Adaptation and Favorable Selection Environments 
The Mexican wheats were touted as widely adapted, and fast-tracked for release 
in India largely because of this (Government of India, August 6, 1965). Not all Indian 
scientists agreed with this decision. In light of the research focus on irrigated wheat in 
northwest India, some scientists wondered whether the wheat program would also serve 
the needs of the extensive area of marginal agriculture. Scientists who questioned the 
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release of Mexican wheats also tended to argue against centralization of research, 
breeding under favorable environments, and wide adaptation. These dissenting scientists 
argued that more localized research programs were needed to address the variety of agro-
climatic conditions in India, specifically farming under low fertility and rainfed 
conditions.   
Most dissents against selecting wheat under favorable environments do not appear 
in the official records. At least one strong claim remains from J. S. Kanwar, a respected 
soil scientist and Deputy Director General of ICAR at that time. At a 1969 wheat research 
meeting, Kanwar stated: 
It will be drought tolerant or drought escaping varieties that are badly needed for 
different trials. It is suggested that the breeding programme for wheat be oriented 
to develop varieties for rainfed conditions. An active testing and demonstration 
programme is also required… There is a need for an active programme of 
selection of varieties for rainfed conditions. (Proceedings of the 8th All-India 
Wheat Research Worker’s Conference, Vol. I., 1969, pp. 34–35) 
Kanwar reacted strongly against the push for the Mexican varieties on a wide scale, and 
for further breeding and testing under only highly fertilized, irrigated, and managed 
conditions. Kanwar, while not explicitly disagreeing with wide adaptation, highlighted 
that “there is very inadequate data about the adaptability of new high yielding varieties 
for rainfed and unirrigated conditions” (Proceedings of the 8th All-India Wheat Research 
Worker’s Conference, Vol. I., 1969, p. 36). Kanwar and a few other scientists resisted the 
new regime of research, and held to the more traditional viewpoint that crops should be 
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bred in the conditions that they are grown. Even Cummings, director of the RF’s Indian 
Agriculture Program, was skeptical of how easily the Mexican wheats would perform in 
marginal areas, stating that, “as a complementary variety, the best Indian variety should 
be recommended” in 1965 (Government of India, August 6, 1965). Cummings’ hesitation 
likely stemmed from his experience with hybrid maize in India, which was poorly 
adapted to Indian conditions. He was also concerned about the availability of irrigation 
and fertilizers (Cummings, March 17, 1964). 
Other Indian scientists began to note that widely adapted wheats from Mexico did 
not live up to their reputation as universally high yielding. At a 1967 conference, S. M. 
Gandhi, a wheat scientist working in the mostly dryland state of Rajasthan, reported that 
“yield results obtained under rainfed conditions are particularly interesting in the present 
context of intensive efforts in breeding short strawed varieties. C306, CA82, K65 and 
D144, all tall varieties, have come in the first group of highest yielding entries in the 
series under rainfed conditions,” although the tall varieties did not perform well under 
high fertility conditions and intensive irrigation (Proceedings of the 6th All-India Wheat 
Research Worker’s Workshop, Vol. II., 1967, p. 17). In other words, the “Mexican wheats 
were superior under intensive farming conditions while, Indian varieties were superior 
under average or below average conditions” (Proceedings of the 6th All-India Wheat 
Research Worker’s Workshop, Vol. II, 1967, p. 12). In some cases, local varieties were 
not even included in trials to compare them to Mexican wheats, as Kanwar reported, “it is 
also not possible to conclude anything regarding the performance of high yielding 
varieties as different varieties including local variety was not compared. More trials are 
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needed” (Proceedings of the 8th All-India Wheat Research Worker’s Conference, Vol. I., 
1969, p. 34). Quantitative data from the Indian wheat trials appears to support Gandhi’s 
claim. 
Meanwhile, RF agronomist Bill C. Wright noted that in state of Gujarat, “tall 
varieties have consistently yielded as good or even better than the dwarf wheats,” but he 
considered this “unusual” (Wright, August 29, 1967). Then in 1967 Indian scientists 
decided to not include the Mexican varieties in the southern Peninsular zone experiments 
because the Indian varieties had consistently higher yields. This prompted one Indian 
scientist to argue, “I do not agree with Dr. Upadhyaya that dwarf varieties have no place 
in the Peninsular Zone if proper agronomy is practiced” (Proceedings of the 6th All-India 
Wheat Research Worker’s Workshop, Vol. II., 1967, p. 17). In response Y. M. 
Upadhyaya, working for IARI in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, simply stated, “proper 
agronomy is not possible under farmers’ conditions” [emphasis added] (Proceedings of 
the 6th All-India Wheat Research Worker’s Workshop, Vol. II., 1967, p. 17). “Proper 
agronomy,” which we can assume meant timely application of fertilizers and irrigation, 
was a necessary part of the package for Borlaug’s widely adapted wheats. His entire 
wheat program rested on the assumption that wheat would be grown in controlled, 
carefully managed, and favorable field conditions. 
Mexican varieties and fertilizer: unfulfilled expectations. In 1965, after two 
years of testing, the Mexican varieties did not perform as well as expected, due to their 
different agronomic needs from the tall Indian varieties, such as need for more irrigation 
and a shallower planting depth. The Mexican varieties initially germinated poorly in 
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India, which may have been due to chemical damage when they were transported from 
Mexico. The lack of assured irrigation and conditions of drought also limited their yield 
(Sen, 1974). 
Yet most scientific discussions after 1965 centered not on whether the Mexican 
varieties should be promoted, but rather on the amount of fertilizer to be used in field 
experiments.35 Anderson argued that field trials did not have high enough levels of 
fertilizer, arguing that, “the Mexican varieties show their potential only under very high 
fertility levels,” directly contradicting Krull’s finding that “the dwarfs respond to but do 
not necessarily require irrigation and extremely heavy fertilization” (Minutes of the 
Fourth All India Wheat Research Workers’ Seminar, 1965, p. 14; Krull, January 5, 1967).  
In response to the failure of Mexican wheats in the early coordinated trials, a 
“committee on high fertility and agronomic trials” from the Indian coordinated wheat 
program decided that for the next season, the Mexican varieties should be tested in 
separate trials with high levels of fertilizer (Minutes of the Fourth All India Wheat 
Research Workers’ Seminar, 1965, p. 42). In fact the committee decided in 1967 that 
these Uniform High Fertility Trials would only test at 135 kilograms of nitrogenous 
fertilizer per hectare (120 pounds per acre), the level that Borlaug recommended for 
semi-dwarf wheat (Borlaug, April 12, 1966; Proceedings of the Seventh All India Wheat 
Research Workers’ Workshop, 1968). Yet the average annual rate of nitrogenous 
fertilizers applied to cropland in India between 1965 and 1970 ranged from only 3.7 to 
8.2 kilograms per hectare, roughly 25 times less than the rates used in high fertility 
                                                
35 Some discussion of whether the varieties should be released occurred at the Fourth All India 
Wheat Research Workers’ Seminar in 1965. 
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testing (The Fertilizer Association of India, 2012). Only in recent years has the average 
fertilizer use in India even approached 135 kilograms of nitrogenous fertilizer per 
hectare. 
 The initial poor performance of the Mexican varieties in India concerned both 
scientists and economists, from India’s Planning Commission. A letter from W. David 
Hopper, of the Ford Foundation in India, to Borlaug stated,  
The Mexican developed varieties gave only marginally better responses to 
nitrogen application, and on the basis of these results the Planning Commission is 
raising questions about the policy of the Agricultural Ministry that seeks to 
concentrate nitrogen, which is in short supply, primarily in the areas where the 
exotic varieties will be grown. (Hopper, February 10, 1966) 
Further, one Planning Commission member asked “whether the Indian varieties which 
showed high response to fertilization at the lower levels may be fully exploited instead of 
using heavy doses of the limited quantity of the fertilizer with the Mexican varieties… 
especially when there is a shortage of fertilizers in the country” (Minutes of the Fourth 
All India Wheat Research Workers’ Seminar, 1965, p. 14). The Indian economic planners 
believed that fertilizer should be distributed equally throughout the country, which 
Borlaug and Anderson strongly resisted ([Oral history of Norman Borlaug], 1967, p. 196; 
Government of India, August 6, 1965).  
The fertilizer situation threatened the entire premise of the RF’s Indian wheat 
program, which was based on the concentration and availability of fertilizers in irrigated 
regions. From a 1966 RF field directors meeting, Borlaug “said there is a complete lack 
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of understanding among people in government of the kinds and quantities of fertilizer 
needed. Expanding fertilizer capacity requires a great deal of capital which raises the 
problems of foreign investment versus nationalism” (Report and summary of the 
agricultural science field directors' meeting, 1966, p. 8). Borlaug wrote in 1966, “I am 
against this dispersion and dilution of fertilizer application, and instead feel that the 
program should try to produce tremendous yield increases on the area where the dwarf 
varieties can be heavily fertilized and properly watered” (Borlaug, April 12, 1966, p. 11). 
He was still convinced that the Mexican wheat agenda should move ahead as planned. In 
1967 Borlaug encouraged his collaborators in India and Pakistan to “Get them [the seeds] 
multiplied—abandon the three year yield testing program that is being followed” 
[emphasis original] (Borlaug, October 15, 1967). 
Mexican varieties and irrigation: an uneven landscape. Whether or not the 
Mexican varieties could perform well at lower levels of soil fertility, the level of 
irrigation or rainfall was likely more important. The Mexican wheats required irrigation 
at precise times, which was not usually possible under prevailing irrigation systems.  
Borlaug and his colleagues had introduced the semi-dwarf wheat into the commercial 
irrigated areas of Mexico, but India was a different landscape in that the majority of 
wheat cultivation was rainfed. Scientists and planners alike found classifying landscapes 
as rainfed or irrigated to be problematic (Sen, 1969).  
Scientists affiliated with the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations noted the lack of a 
steady water supply even in areas classified as irrigated. Anderson wrote to Borlaug in 
1966,  
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We have as yet not had any winter rains in the Delhi area and the crops which are 
not under irrigation are very thin and I am afraid yields will be quite low. Even on 
the irrigated acreage that is under canal control, many of the crops are suffering 
appreciably from lack of water because the canals have not been delivering water 
at regular intervals. (Anderson, January 24, 1966) 
Cummings, upon visiting a tubewell project in Uttar Pradesh, wrote, “the technology in 
establishing and maintaining the wells was extremely poor. They have much too a great 
number of power failures and actual burning out” (Cummings, February 5, 1966). Indeed, 
many of India’s canals “were designed to provide protection against drought rather than 
productive irrigation” (Sen, 1974, p. 27).  
Quantifying Wide Adaptation: The Case of Lerma Rojo 64 
Despite the aforementioned inconsistencies, Borlaug and Anderson fiercely 
promoted the release of Lerma Rojo 64 in India on the basis of its high yields and wide 
adaptation. India imported Lerma Rojo 64 in large quantities in the 1960s, and it was one 
of the first Mexican varieties approved in India. Borlaug himself stated in his 1967 oral 
history that Lerma Rojo 64’s most important trait was its “wide adaptation—fertilized or 
unfertilized” ([Oral history of Norman Borlaug], 1967, p. 196). Anderson recalled at a 
1969 conference in India that “I am firmly convinced that the adoption of cultivation of 
dwarf wheats in this country was materially hastened through the wide adaptation of 
Lerma Rojo” (Proceedings of the 8th All-India Wheat Research Worker’s Conference, 
Vol. I., 1969, p. 174). For a few years in the 1960s, Lerma Rojo 64 gave outstanding 
yields in the RF’s international wheat yield trials, which Borlaug took as proof of its wide 
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adaptation. Historical evidence, however, suggests that Lerma Rojo 64 is adapted to 
specific conditions of high fertility, but was able to be grown over a wide area due to its 
photoperiod insensitivity and its high response to fertilizers. 
Borlaug frequently used Figure 7Error! Reference source not found. to support 
the superiority of Lerma Rojo 64 to tall Indian varieties such as C306.36 This figure 
shows the yield of three varieties—Sonora 64, Lerma Rojo 64, and C306—grown under 
fertilizer levels ranging from 0 to 200 kgs/ha. It clearly shows that C306 marginally 
responds to higher fertilizer, while the two Mexican varieties increase in yield 
proportionally to the fertilizer level. A version of this figure appeared in the 1965–66 RF 
Agricultural Sciences Program Annual Report, and Borlaug included this figure in 
various letters, publications, and talks about the RF’s Indian Agricultural Program. 
                                                
36 The data for the figure was based on an agronomic test performed in 1966 by K. C. Sharma and 
D. Misra of Pantnagar and Wright of the RF. 
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Figure 7. Agronomic response to fertilizers of the wheat varieties Sonora 64, Lerma Rojo 
64, and C306. Image reproduced from Norman Borlaug (1972b, p. 634) and digitized by 
Google, Inc. 
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Borlaug’s colleague in Australia, Keith W. Finlay, wrote to Borlaug in 1966 that 
“Lerma Rojo 64 is of particular interest because it is even less stable—indicating that it is 
better adapted to ‘higher yielding’ environments” (Finlay, September 6, 1966). Finlay 
based his analysis on a model that he developed with statistician Graham N. Wilkinson in 
1963. The pair released an experimental design and mathematical model that measured 
the yield stability, or adaptation, of a plant variety over multiple locations. Finlay applied 
this model to Borlaug’s data from the international wheat tests, finding that while the 
group of Mexican varieties were generally higher yielding and more stable across 
locations, the results varied by year. Facing his data own analyzed by a new method, 
Borlaug responded to Finlay’s concern about Sonora 64’s low yields: 
In trying to develop as rapidly as possible a dwarf variety with good gluten 
quality, we settled for a variety, such as Sonora 64, with less yield stability. This 
variety is high yielding when grown under heavy fertilizer conditions and is 
properly irrigated… but it will produce lower yields generally when in the hands 
of the average farmer. [emphasis added] (Borlaug, July 7, 1965) 
Despite Finlay’s critique and this admission, Borlaug canonized Lerma Rojo 64 for its 
wide adaptation across conditions. 
In light of the confusion over Lerma Rojo 64’s wide adaptation, I used Finlay and 
Wilkinson’s analysis to test the adaptation of Lerma Rojo 64 and C306 using yield trial 
data from India (Figure 8).37 Unlike Wright’s figure that plotted only yield of a variety by 
fertilizer level, Finlay’s model plots the yield of a variety over the average yield at that 
                                                
37 Data was collected from the Results of the Coordinated Wheat Trial Results, 1964–65 and 
1965–66 for the Northwest Plain Zone Uniform Regional Trials. Directorate of Wheat Research 
library, Karnal, and Indian Agricultural Research Institute archives, New Delhi. 
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location (a proxy for the environmental index), and then uses a regression analysis. A 
variety with a high regression coefficient (slope) is better adapted to favorable 
environments, and a low slope indicates stability across conditions, or wide adaptation. A 
slope of one is average stability.  
 
Figure 8. Regression lines of varieties C306 and Lerma Rojo for 1964–65 and 1965–66 
wheat seasons in northwest India, over both rainfed and irrigated conditions. Lerma 
Rojo’s average yield was 27.3 ± 11.2 quintals per hectare (q/ha) and C306 was 27.5 ± 
10.0 q/ha. Figure rendered by Erick Peirson. 
 
C306 and Lerma Rojo 64, tested under this wide range of locations and 
conditions,38 did not have significantly different yield responses according to Finlay’s 
model. Both varieties show average stability (a slope near one), though C306 is more 
                                                
38 This included both irrigated and rainfed conditions, and nitrogen fertilizer levels that ranged 
from 45 and 90 kgs/ha in 1964–65 and in the range of 0 to 120 kgs/ha in 1965–66. 
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stable (slope of 0.936) and Lerma Rojo 64 is more slightly adapted to better 
environments (slope of 1.024) (Table 4). But if I follow Finlay’s 1966 analysis of 
Borlaug’s data and separate the data into irrigated and rainfed conditions, the results 
change (Figure 9, Figure 10). While both varieties performed about equally under 
irrigated conditions under rainfed conditions C306 was more stable and higher yielding 
than Lerma Rojo 64.39  
 
 
Figure 9. Regression lines of varieties C306 and Lerma Rojo for 1964–65 and 1965–66 
wheat seasons in northwest India, over only irrigated conditions. Figure rendered by 
Erick Peirson. 
 
                                                
39 Using the raw data under rainfed conditions, Lerma Rojo had an average yield of 21.14 q/ha, 
whereas C306 was 23.58 q/ha, p=0.088. 
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Figure 10. Regression lines of varieties C306 and Lerma Rojo for 1964–65 and 1965–66 
wheat seasons in northwest India, over only rainfed conditions. Figure rendered by Erick 
Peirson. 
Table 4  
Results of Analysis of the Varieties C306 and Lerma Rojo Based on Slope and Average 
Yield under Irrigated, Rainfed, and Both Conditions. 
 Both conditions Irrigated only Rainfed only 
C306 slope 0.94 0.98 0.91 
Lerma Rojo slope 1.02 0.97 1.07 
C306 average yield (q/ha) 27.5 28.9 23.6 
Lerma Rojo average yield (q/ha) 27.2 29.6 21.1 
 
My analysis of this data suggests that Lerma Rojo 64 is adapted to irrigated 
conditions, and it more strongly suggests that C306, the tall Indian variety, is not only 
widely adapted, but is better adapted to rainfed conditions. Even under irrigated 
conditions and varying levels of fertilizer, Lerma Rojo 64 did not have higher average 
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yields than C306. Trials conducted at higher fertilizer levels could have different 
outcomes, given Lerma Rojo 64’s fertilizer responsiveness.  
In light of the evidence presented, I agree with B. H. Farmer’s analysis of the 
adaptation of green revolution rice varieties in South Asia (Farmer, 1979). Farmer wrote 
that green revolution era scientists introduced varieties were photoperiod insensitive, thus 
making them adapted to a broad range of locations, given adequate inputs. RF affiliated 
scientists, however, claimed a second type of adaptation: adaptation across varied 
environments that included pests, monsoon, and drought. Farmer wrote that, “the two 
kinds of adaptability have been confused, or at any rate not sufficiently distinguished” 
(1979, p. 308). This appears to be the case with Borlaug and the Mexican semi-dwarf 
wheats as well, which were photoperiod insensitive and thus better adapted to Indian 
conditions than other foreign wheats. Mexican wheats showed wide adaptability across 
locations with similar agro-climatic conditions and management, not across field 
conditions of the average farmer. 
Conclusion 
Scientists in the green revolution era defined wide adaptation based on 
convenience to their research agenda, and unsurprisingly, they gravitated towards data 
that proved their agenda. Although the Mexican semi-dwarfs did have higher average 
yields under certain conditions, time has revealed that only a small area of India fit those 
constraints. Further, even varieties that perform well in low fertility experimental 
conditions do not always have that same performance in farmers’ fields (Dawson, 
Murphy, & Jones, 2008). The actual performance of Mexican varieties in India in the 
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1960s, through both qualitative and quantitative historical evidence, supports this 
analysis. 
By the time critiques of the green revolution emerged in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Indian wheat science had embraced the dogmas of wide adaptation and selection 
under favorable environments and codified it into the wheat program (All-India Wheat 
Research Worker’s Workshop [9th annual], Vol. IV, 1970). In this author’s interviews 
with Indian wheat scientists in 2013, most scientists agreed that wheat should be bred for 
wide adaptation, and made statements such as, “every breeder likes to go for developing 
the material which can fit everywhere.” Although controversy still exists around the 
conflicting goals of wide versus specific adaptation (Swaminathan, 1993), the 
institutional structure of the Indian wheat program effectively weeds out alternative 
views. 
Contemporary scholars argued that wide adaptation and the strict institutional 
structure of Indian agricultural research have discouraged alternative views on 
decentralized research for marginal environments, where the majority of farmers deal 
with variable agro-climatic conditions such as drought and heat stress (Cecceralli, 1989; 
Cleveland, 2006; Mishra, Ravindra, & Hesse, 2013; Raina, 2011a; Witcombe, Dirk, & 
Farrington, 1998). While marginal farmers in India may benefit from higher wheat yields 
if they have access to fertilizer and irrigation (or during years with adequate rainfall), the 
mainstream research system has mostly ignored alternatives such as different cropping 
systems or, until recently, varieties that can better withstand climatic variations and 
stress. Further, global climate change and other agro-ecological concerns will determine 
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the future of wheat production in India. A more diverse scientific and institutional 
approach to wheat research in India is necessary to successfully adapt agriculture to 21st 
century challenges.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERNATIONAL WHEAT PROGRAMS IN THE WAKE OF THE GREEN 
REVOLUTION 
The International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) continued 
to expand their wheat program internationally in the 1970s, bolstered by the declaration 
of the green revolution in 1968 and Norman Borlaug’s Nobel Peace Prize in 1970. 
During this expansion of CIMMYT’s wheat program and the establishment of new 
national and international research networks in Turkey and the Middle East, agricultural 
researchers faced new pressure from their administrators and from external critics to 
address a new agenda: rural equity. Researchers also attempted to improve wheat 
production and rainfed and dryland areas of the world, as they realized that the gains in 
production through green revolution wheat technology had only spread to irrigated areas. 
In the first part of this chapter, I examine Indian wheat research in the wake of the 
green revolution. While Chapter 3 demonstrated the significant shift of Indian wheat 
breeding goals during the tumultuous mid-1960s, the late 1960s and 1970s brought 
serious critiques of changes in the system. With the departure of RF staff from Delhi, 
Indian scientists also asserted their own project goals and more critically examined 
assumptions about wide adaptation. Influential factors in this period included new 
administrators of the coordinated wheat project; new analyses of wheat stability; and 
ongoing failures of green revolution wheat varieties—including the “over-success” of 
two Mexican-derived wheat varieties, Kalyansona and Sonalika. 
In the second and third parts of this chapter, I document the expansion of 
CIMMYT’s wheat program in the Middle East and Turkey. CIMMYT shifted many of 
their staff from the RF’s Indian agricultural program to Turkey and to lead new 
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international research centers in the mid-1970s. I also examine CIMMYT’s shift to 
research on rainfed dryland areas, including the Plan Puebla for maize in Mexico and the 
formation of the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas 
(ICARDA). 
Part 1: Indian Wheat Research in Late 1960s and into 1970s 
 By 1968, the narrative of the wheat revolution was solidified in India. Indian 
farmers had adopted new semi-dwarf wheat varieties at rapid rates, and overall wheat 
production increased (Wheat: Total Production, Total Area, and Area Under High-
yielding Varieties (HYV) by States, 1970). But soon after 1968, both the excitement over 
semi-dwarfs and the panic over the food crisis faded. Top-level scientists, administrators, 
and policy-makers recognized that the existing wheat program had mostly benefitted 
large farmers with access to controlled irrigation and cheap fertilizers. While wheat 
production did increase, the concentrated investment in irrigated areas led to disparities in 
equity. Consistent with existing social policy, many of these actors pushed for more 
research directed at rainfed and marginal agriculture, not to mention the large area of 
dryland wheat in central and southern India that had not adopted new wheat varieties.  
External criticisms of Indian wheat research addressed both social and food 
security aspects. Socially, critics pointed to the disparity of regional and economic 
impacts, beginning with Francine Frankel and Wolf Ladejinsky’s respective studies on 
the inequities caused by the green revolution (Chakravarti, 1973; Cleaver, 1972; Frankel, 
1969; Ladejinsky, 1969, 1970). But perhaps more worrisome, a 1973 report by USAID 
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found that when comparing overall grams of cereals produced to the population in India, 
the Green Revolution had not made a significant impact. RF staff wrote in response: 
Further increments of gain can be achieved through continued emphasis on high 
yielding varieties, fertilizers and irrigation in systems designed to maximize 
production per unit area over time. But, as indicated above [by the USAID 
report], India has made no real progress in improving her people-food equation in 
the decade of 'the green revolution' and there's no new agricultural technology on 
the drawing board as glamorous and promising as was the HYV's at the beginning 
of the decade. (Rockefeller Foundation Indian Agricultural Program, 1973) 
Despite these limitations, the green revolution had nonetheless become canonized among 
agricultural scientists as preventing mass starvation in Mexico, India, and Pakistan. 
Kalyansona and Sonalika: wide adaptation gone too far? In 1967, the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research’s Central Variety Release Committee approved the 
release of two new semi-dwarf wheat varieties, known as Kalyansona and Sonalika.40 
Indian scientists selected Kalyansona and Sonalika from segregating lines of Borlaug’s 
semi-dwarf wheats from Mexico (Nene, 1970; Swaminathan, 2009). These varieties 
quickly replaced the direct introductions from Mexico—Sonora 64 and Lerma Rojo 64—
which both had an undesirable red grain color.  
Promoted on a wide scale throughout north India for their yield potential, farmers 
rapidly adopted Kalyansona and Sonalika in both northwest and northeast India and 
                                                
40 The Central Variety Release Committee and State Variety Release Committee were the two 
governing bodies over the release of government-approved seeds in India. For more information 
on the process of seed approval and notification, see Chapter 6 of Witcombe, Virk, and 
Farrington, 1998. 
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under both irrigated and rainfed conditions. For over a decade, these two varieties 
dominated wheat production in north India (Singh & Pawar, 2006), until the release of 
several new varieties in the mid- to late-1970s including HD2009, WL711, and WH147 
in the northwest, all three of which spread quickly, and UP262 in the northeast, which 
took almost another decade to become popular in the northeast. C306, the tall Indian 
variety, also remained popular in both the northwest and northeast for rainfed 
conditions.41  
Kalyansona and Sonalika exemplified Borlaug’s research program for wide 
adaptation. But as one can imagine, the dominance of one or two varieties is not optimal 
for disease resistance. From 1967 to 1977, sixty-eight wheat varieties were released in 
India, and only five of these were approved for multi-zonal release42 (Munshi, 2004). Yet 
these multi-zonal varieties ruled over zonal or state-specific varieties, creating a 
monoculture vulnerable to pests and disease (Nene, 1970). M. V. Rao, coordinator of the 
Indian wheat program, stated in 1975, “Large tracts in the country are occupied by very 
few varieties primarily Kalyansona and Sonalika. This is a dangerous situation and if any 
new race of any pathogen comes up in severe form, the situation would be disastrous” 
(Rao, 1975, p. iv).  
Other scientists observed that Kalyansona and Sonalika were thermosensitive 
(sensitive to temperature) during their growth stage. This could result in reduced yields, 
                                                
41 It is not surprising that C306 remained popular in rainfed areas: according to results of the 
regional trials in India, C306, used as a check against new varieties, frequently appeared in the 
top one or two best performing varieties on a zonal basis for rainfed conditions from 1964 
through 1989. Based on data aggregated from coordinated trials. 
42 Approved by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research’s Central Variety Release 
Committee. 
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an especially significant problem if farmers were not growing other varieties of wheat to 
offset their losses. Rao stated in 1977: 
Varieties like Sonalika, Kalyansona suffered the most due to high temperature. 
On the other hand locally bred or selected materials… were least affected. This 
only shows that we should not neglect the local germplasm which got evolved 
over a period of time and which developed its own buffering mechanisms to face 
the adverse weather like the one we experienced this year. (Rao, 1977, p. 1.2) 
J. P. Srivastava found similar results, and he wrote to the RF’s R. Glenn Anderson in 
1972: 
I have data indicating differential response of varieties to higher temps in the 
early stages of plant growth. The indigenous Indian varieties grow and tiller 
normally in spite of above normal temperatures. Short duration varieties like 
Sherbati Sonora, Hira, UP301, UP310, Sonalika and Safed Lerma, at higher 
temps, completed their vegetative growth rather quickly and entered into 
reproductive growth. This resulted in reduced tillering, stunted growth, small ears, 
increased sterility and low yields. (Srivastava, August 9, 1972) 
And despite Kalyansona’s apparent wide adaptation, group of authors from Punjab 
Agricultural University found that Kalyansona was adapted to favorable environments 
rather than stable over environments, though it did have a higher than average yield 
across environments (Bhullar, Gill, & Khehra, 1977). One might wonder whether these 
biophysical problems might cause scientists to reconsider wide adaptation as a primary 
goal of the wheat program. 
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The limits of research. The 1970s also highlighted new problems in the wheat 
research system and administration. First, Kalyansona and Sonalika’s dominance 
highlighted the gap between the varieties scientists released, and what varieties the 
government seed company decided to multiply and sell. In 1974 Rao asked “why many 
of the new varieties we are recommending for release did not catch up with the farmers. 
Is something wrong with our present system of testing and release?” (Rao, 1974, p. x). 
Rao also noted that: 
In certain states the spread of the new varieties is very fast while in others it is 
indifferent, as a result, farmers unaware of the new varieties are growing only the 
old varieties. A critical and unbiased review of the whole system of varietal 
release, multiplication, popularisation, replacement and implementation of a 
sound policy in this respect is warranted. (Rao, 1980, p. 18) 
Scientists were aware of issues within their own wheat research system, but perhaps due 
to the structure of the system, individual scientists did not consider it their responsibility 
to become involved in promoting new varieties—that was considered the job of 
“extension.” But a later CIMMYT report found that one of the weak links in India’s seed 
production system was the lack of “breeder’s seed,” which is seed that plant breeders are 
supposed to provide to the seed companies for further multiplication (CIMMYT, 1984). 
 Anderson reviewed the Indian wheat program near the end of his tenure there, and 
his notes were not optimistic. He wrote to Borlaug that the coordinated wheat program 
was not officially funded through the government until the very end of 1969 (Anderson, 
December 20, 1969), causing him to be “literally ashamed to go out and ask the various 
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cooperators to carry out essential actions when they have no money” (Anderson, 
November 22, 1969). In comparison, the coordinated rice project and other crops were 
funded by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) at least as early as 1965 
(Sen, February 17, 1967). It is not clear why funding for the coordinated wheat program 
was delayed for so long: whether it was a reliance on RF staff or a political issue.  
 Anderson ended up leaving India in May 1971 to work with CIMMYT in Mexico, 
effectively ending the RF’s direct involvement in the Indian wheat program (though it 
was continued somewhat through other RF and FF field staff). On a visit back to India in 
November 1973, Anderson found a lack of labor for the coordinated trials, and the trial 
plots were “only half plowed after harvest of the corn crop,” not irrigated or leveled, and 
a forty percent shortage of fertilizer needed for rabi (the season in which wheat is 
planted) crops in the country (Anderson, November, 1973, p. 1). He also found that due 
to the lack of manpower and coordination, more varieties were being released than 
needed, due to fractured research efforts. 
Poor administration and stifling bureaucracy also limited the Indian wheat 
program. For example an internal RF report stated that the Indian Agricultural Research 
Institute (IARI) “minimize[d] contributions of research in the coordinated cereal 
improvement projects made by stations other than IARI or its regional stations,” in favor 
of research done at the IARI headquarters in Delhi (RF Indian Agricultural Program, 
n.d.). The same report mentioned the “duplication of effort on research both within and 
between Divisions... Even within a given Division research on a particular crop is often 
far from coordinated” (RF Indian Agricultural Program, n.d.). There was also an issue of 
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ineffective leadership from S. P. Kohli, the wheat program coordinator, who was “being 
forced out by ICAR” as well as IARI in 1970 (RF Indian Agricultural Program, 1970). 
Kohli soon moved to work in the Middle East with the United Nations Development 
Program and M. V. Rao, a geneticist at IARI, took over as coordinator. 
Finally, K. Kanungo and P. E. Naylor, in a report for the World Bank, wrote a 
scathing review of the coordinated crop improvement programs in the mid-1970s. They 
found that the “common denominator of the gaps identified in almost all types of research 
activity is the weakness of the link between research and the actual needs of farmers in 
their specific location and environment” [emphasis added] (Kanungo & Naylor, ca. 1975, 
p. 5). According to them, the new coordinated system had in fact centralized research and 
supplanted local research efforts, while scientists had little incentive to address local 
issues. Kanungo and Naylor proposed developing decentralized, regional research 
facilities “on the basis of agro-climatic suitability in order to strengthen a reorganized” 
research system (Kanungo & Naylor, ca. 1975, p. 6). Based on this review, the World 
Bank and ICAR started a National Agricultural Research Project in 1979, which 
continued until 1996 (Balaguru, Venkateswarlu, & Rajagopalan, 1988). This program, 
funded by the World Bank, was meant to support state-level and interdisciplinary 
agricultural research efforts in India, and one of its first tasks was delimiting 127 agro-
climatic zones within India.43 
Biophysical limitations on the Green Revolution and an increase in research 
on rainfed conditions. In India, rainfed agriculture typically means areas that still 
receive adequate rainfall, but are not irrigated (prevalent in the northern wheat belt), 
                                                
43 A map of the 127 agro-climatic zones is available at http://www.imdagrimet.gov.in/node/290  
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whereas dryland specifically refers to unirrigated regions in central and southern India 
(Byerlee, 1992). At a 1968 dryland wheat conference held in Bangalore, scientists 
presented arguments and research results that were scarcely seen in the mainstream 
documentation of wheat research in north India. In Bangalore there was no celebration of 
the wheat revolution. K. C. Naik stated, “any talk of Agricultural revolution in an area 
subject to the worst scarcity conditions in the country and in a year when 17 out of the 19 
Districts [in the state of Mysore] were in the grip of drought would be unrealistic, if not 
flippant” (Naik, 1972, p. 3). He spoke further that “it is high time States like Mysore shift 
the focus on drought and dry farming rather than imitate and adopt programmes which 
are designed exclusively to help the farmers with assured irrigation facilities” and that a 
focus on irrigated agriculture would lead to further economic inequity (Naik, 1972, p. 3).  
Scientists from Madhya Pradesh found that “light insensitive varieties also require 
a precise management, particularly timely irrigation schedule” and that in rainfed areas 
that dominated the state, “photoinsensitive varieties, under such conditions are not 
suitable. The local varieties appear to be better adapted to such variable conditions” 
(Sisodia, 1977, p. 173). These views from scientists in dryland India were consistent with 
what economist Bandhudas Sen wrote about “the dependence of the high yielding 
varieties on irrigation” (1974, p. 25). He wrote further:  
We are not suggesting that the high yielding varieties cannot be grown at all on 
unirrigated land. They can perhaps be grown in areas supposedly blessed with 
‘assured rainfall’. But the area officially classified as under assured rainfall does 
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not mean much… nor is the distribution of rainfall in these areas over the season 
such as to meet the exacting demands of the new varieties. (Sen, 1974, pp. 25–26) 
Sen, among others, found that the semi-dwarf varieties were not widely adapted across 
rainfed conditions, especially in dryland India.  
From the beginning of the Borlaug’s involvement in Indian wheat research, he 
had planned on concentrating on the irrigated areas and then addressing rainfed areas at a 
later time. This was consistent with other programs like the Ford Foundation’s Package 
Programme, which focused on rural areas with assured irrigation or adequate rainfall. 
Saha has unveiled that despite India’s focus on social equity, a Food Grains Enquiry 
Committee report in 1957 also favored concentrated efforts, but this was rejected by 
Nehru’s Planning Commission (Saha, 2012). As Cullather described, both “Swaminathan 
and Borlaug openly advocated a ‘betting on the strong’ approach” of testing on large, 
irrigated plots (Cullather, 2010, p. 201). 
Initially, RF scientists justified the lack of research for wheat varieties adapted to 
dryland conditions that prevail in central and southern India. Anderson wrote in 1966, “In 
the case of varieties for dry land production, less attention is being paid to this aspect 
until the shortage gap is filled. It is not being completely neglected but there is simply a 
preference for production of varieties for high yield under high fertility and irrigation” 
(Anderson, March 2, 1966, p. 2). Despite this focus on irrigated areas, the RF scientists 
had some hope that the varieties developed under irrigated conditions would still be 
adopted in rainfed areas, as their wide adaptation would suggest. But in 1970, the RF’s 
Guy B. Baird wrote that, “the impact of the dwarf wheats has been limited almost entirely 
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to the irrigated areas; the improved technology has not yet materially affected the two-
thirds of the wheat acreage under rain-fed (generally dry land) conditions” (Baird, 
February 4, 1970). In the late 1960s and early 1970s the RF scientists realized their 
international wheat, maize, and rice programs had only reached irrigated areas. Soon 
after, they expanded their national and international programs into dryland research (see 
Chapter 4). 
Indian wheat scientists were not unaware of the problems of semi-dwarf wheat 
and their limited spread to irrigated areas. J. S. Kanwar, Deputy Directory General of 
ICAR’s soil and water division, began corresponding with various groups in the US that 
supported dryland research around 1967. Kanwar presented his views at various 
conferences, highlighting the lack of attention paid to rainfed and dryland wheat 
production, and the need for better irrigation systems. In 1973, Kanwar became the First 
Deputy Director General of the RF’s International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-
Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in Hyderabad, which was formed in 1970 and focused on semi-
arid crops.44 
 Administrators in India and of the RF also recognized the socioeconomic 
inequities between irrigated and rainfed farmers caused by the green revolution. Sterling 
Wortman (RF’s Director for Agricultural Sciences) wrote to Guy B. Baird (director of the 
RF’s Indian Agricultural Program) in 1969: 
The importance to India of her irrigated area is quite obvious. Do you have any 
information on the number of farmers who are largely dependent upon unirrigated 
                                                
44 ICRISAT’s mandate is for chickpea, pigeonpea, groundnut, pearl millet, sorghum, and other 
millets. 
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wheat as a means of livelihood? I think that we must increasingly consider in our 
projections not only total national output, but as well, the number of people 
needing benefit. [emphasis original] (Wortman, September 15, 1969) 
Ralph W. Cummings, formerly of the RF in India and at USAID at that time, wrote to 
Bill Wright in India inquiring about a program to evaluate “the problems of rainfed lands 
and small farmers” (Cummings, June 2, 1969). RF staff in India also mentioned in 1969 
that Indian policy-makers were interested in implementing something like Plan Puebla, 
the CIMMYT project for rainfed maize, in India, due to “growing concern about the lot 
of the small farmer” (Baird, December 10, 1969). According to W. David Hopper, 
“knowledge of the Puebla experiment is fairly widespread among senior Government 
officials here” (Hopper, December 2, 1969). 
India’s Fourth Five Year Plan for 1969 to 1974 was the first national plan to 
mention the need for rainfed-specific research, though the fourth plan overall reinforced 
concentrating resources in the northwest. This, among other factors, led to the formation 
of a coordinated dryland research program, proposed and initiated in 1970. In January of 
1970 the Government of India held an “All India seminar on dry land farming,” and at 
the 1970 ICAR Advisory Board meeting, A. B. Joshi emphasized “the importance of dry 
farming and the widening gap in production between the irrigated and unirrigated arid 
areas,” thus “a coordinated scheme on Dry Farming has been formulated” (Government 
of India, January, 1970; Joshi, 1970, p. 6). According to the diary of an RF officer, the 
All-India Coordinated Research Program on Dryland Agriculture was launched in 
coordination with the Government of Canada, and the initial research of the program 
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focused on screening varieties under rainfed conditions, soil conservation practices (i.e. 
tillage), intercropping, and dryland crops (Starnes, [Diary notes], September 25–28, 
1972).  
 While my archival research in India did not focus on this topic (rainfed research 
in the 1970s), later documents help display the efficacy (or non-efficacy) of rainfed 
research in India in the 1970s. Rao stated in 1978 that one of the general problems facing 
wheat research and production was: 
Raising wheat yields under unirrigated conditions… In the last several decades 
we must have attempted thousands of crosses to improve yield by genetic 
manipulations. The progress is very limited and the locals or selections from 
locals or varieties bred long time ago are still hard to be beaten... What should be 
our approach to improve wheat yields under these unirrigated conditions? (Rao, 
1978, pp. 1.12–1.13) 
That year, a National Drought Screening Nursery was initiated for wheat, perhaps 
inspired by CIMMYT’s first Drought Screening Nursery in 1976 (CIMMYT, 1992). Rao, 
as we have seen in his other statements this chapter, raised some formidable questions. 
By 1993, however, scientists were still aware that “we have given little more than lip 
sympathy to rainfed wheat. Is anyone multiplying seeds of rainfed varieties?” 
(Swaminithan, 1993, p. 35). But as Saha pointed out, in the same volume, one wheat 
scientist stated “we have found it necessary to focus on the farmer in the irrigated, 
productive areas because they are more rewarding. We have a result-oriented program 
and that has to continue” (quoted in Saha, 2012, p. 172).  
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 While India’s agricultural researchers have given “lip sympathy” to developing 
rainfed varieties, many scholars point out the continuing marginalization of rainfed 
research and investments (Saha, 2012; Shankar, 2011; Witcombe, Virk, & Farrington, 
1998). Some scholars blame the centralization of research funding under ICAR for the 
lack of research on rainfed problems. They argued that projects with wide national 
coverage override those like rainfed and dryland agriculture, which “tend to be region 
specific” (Easter, Bisaliah, Dunbar, 1989, p. 1203). This is as unfortunate consequence of 
the philosophy of centralization and wide adaptation as described in Chapter 3. 
 A changing landscape of fertilizers. 
Fertilizer supply was a continuous problem for Indian wheat production in the 
1970s, due to rising energy prices and the low levels of domestic production. Though 
fertilizer consumption tripled from 1964-5 to 1970-71, the average in 1970-71 was still 
only 12 kg/ha, and varied widely between states (Sen, 1974). E. E. Saari of the FF in 
India wrote to Anderson in 1972: “Fertilizer supplies (N and P) are short by 30%... There 
is a big push to increase the acreage but it will take about a million hectares to make up 
the fertilizer deficit” (Saari, September 28, 1972). Anderson himself noted that in 1973, 
fertilizer supplies were forty percent short for rabi (fall-planted) crops such as wheat 
(Anderson, November 1973). 
In part because “farmers are not adequately fertilizing these wheats” in north and 
northeastern India and in part because of new experimental data, Indian scientists rolled 
back their recommended fertilizer levels from Borlaug’s suggested 120 kg per hectare of 
nitrogen (Joshi, 1970, p. 1). A. B. Joshi wrote in 1970 that  “experimental evidence now 
   179 
clearly shows that the new wheat varieties, especially Kalyansona, should not be given 
less than 80 kg. of nitrogen per hectare” (Joshi, 1970, p. 1). In an undated report from the 
1980s, scientists from the Wheat Project Directorate (WPD) sent Borlaug a report to 
justify their use of lower fertility levels in the coordinated trials: 
In earlier years trials were laid out using 120 kg.N/ha which has been reduced to 
100-80 kg/ha. as most of the crop in the country is sown with the use of very 
small doses of fertilizers. This has also affected overall performance of trials. It 
has been observed that the most successful varieties in India are not the ones with 
the highest yield potential under the best managed conditions but ones which 
perform well over a wide range of cultural environments specifically lower 
fertilizer levels and fewer irrigations. Some of the examples are WL 711, WH 147 
and HD 2189. Even Sonalika is of the same type. This has necessiated [sic] 
development of genotypes which can do well at moderate fertility levels. (Wheat 
Project Directorate, n.d., p. 2) 
Borlaug responded that “none of them are justifiable reasons for low yield in 
experimental plots where one is trying to measure the true genetic potential of new 
genotypes” (Borlaug, January 6, 1987). Borlaug’s wheat empire in India had begun to 
crumble, as the limits of wide adaptation to agronomic conditions were recognized in 
India. CIMMYT scientists now realized that the key to green revolution production was 
higher levels of fertilizer, and that “you can not produce high yields without N [nitrogen]. 
I think this is a dangerous opinion” (Anderson, 1973, p. 61), directly contradicting 
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Borlaug’s claim that Lerma Rojo’s best feature was “its wide adaptation—fertilized or 
unfertilized” ([Oral history of Norman Borlaug], 1967, p. 196). 
Changing concepts in plant adaptation and evaluation in Indian wheat 
science. If one could very coarsely summarize Chapter 3, it would be this: a shift in focus 
from combined genotype by environment (GxE) interactions to a focus on a stable 
genotype under favorable conditions. We saw a shift from the 1960’s view that:  
Yield in wheat, as in other crops, is the ultimate expression of the interactions 
between the genetic constitution of the crop variety and the environmental factors 
in which it is grown. The yield is, therefore, at its best when the plants of a 
particular variety are in harmony with the environment… (Sikka & Jain, 1960, p. 
154) 
…to the view that “wide adaptation is genetically controlled and that varieties do not 
require to be bred for the particular conditions. This indicates that minimizing G x E 
interaction is important for the choice of environment” (Roy & Murty, 1970, p. 516). The 
latter view was directly adapted from Borlaug and Krull’s arguments for widely adapted 
wheat. But later in the 1970s, Indian wheat scientists regained a more nuanced view of 
GxE interactions and how they contribute to yield. This included a shift to thinking about 
yield not as a genetic property that was transitive across environments. This shift led to 
some focus on specific adaptation of wheat in the later 1970s. 
 S. P. Kohli, soon before his departure from IARI, wrote a scathing review of 
Indian wheat breeding in 1969. He asked, “actually what is ‘yield’ and… to what extent 
might this be regarded as an inherited character?” (Kohli, 1969, p. 25), in contrast to 
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prevailing methods that examined yield “only to be a direct ‘gene-controlled plant 
character’” (Kohli, 1969, p. 28). He referenced scientists’ study of genetic combining 
ability in wheat, which Kohli argued should only be applied to hybrid crops, and which 
lacked nuance in discovering what traits were actually responsible for increases in yield. 
Kohli stressed in his paper the importance of environment on yield, which he felt had 
been overlooked by Indian wheat breeders. He used the example of the tall, Indian variety 
C306 versus two semi-dwarf varieties to show that at low fertility environments, C306 
had a higher yield than the semi-dwarfs. This seemingly obvious example, using data 
from the coordinated trials, was somehow still counter to the mainstream thought of 
Indian wheat breeders. 
Kohli’s critical review may have influenced Indian scientists’ shift to more 
nuanced views on adaptation and environment. Another component of the shift appears to 
be scientists’ use of more complex statistical analyses of yield in the context of different 
environments, such as the Finlay and Wilkinson’s influential model that allowed 
scientists to quantify adaptation, also known as a stability analysis because it measured 
the phenotypic stability of traits (such as yield) under different environments. In other 
words, the Finlay-Wilkinson model could measure GxE interactions. 
Keith Finlay himself influenced Indian wheat scientists in the later part of the 
1960s, visiting India in 1966 to lecture on adaptation (Anderson, October 24, 1966). Then 
in 1968 he helped organize the Third International Wheat Genetics Symposium, along 
with M. S. Swaminathan. At least two influential Indian wheat scientists, J. P. Srivastava, 
from Pantnagar, and H. K. Jain, of IARI, met with Finlay during their conference travel 
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in Australia, where Finlay gave a lecture on “The significance of adaptation in wheat 
breeding” (Finlay, April 15, 1968). 
Interestingly, while RF and Indian wheat scientists used Finlay’s model to support 
wide adaptation, they did not actually often apply the model to data in the 1960s. In fact 
when used, the model often indicated that so-called widely adapted varieties were 
adapted to high fertility conditions. Instead, scientists used the model to justify the 
structure of the All India Coordinated Wheat Improvement Program, which promoted 
varieties with high average performance over locations, rather than high performance 
under a specific set of conditions. It is not clear why applications of the Finlay-Wilkinson 
model to wheat were so scant in the 1960s. Other crop scientists applied the stability 
analysis to millet (Athwal & Singh, 1966), gram (lentil) (Chandra, 1968), sorghum (Rao 
& Harinarayana, 1969), and rice (Ram, Jain, & Murty, 1970). All of these scientists 
worked at IARI’s division of genetics in Delhi, or at Punjab Agricultural University in 
Ludhiana and Hissar, which were the major research hubs in the northwest (excluding 
Pantnagar). Romagosa and Fox (1993) reflect that the analysis required transferal of 
punch cards between institutions, which in the 1960s, limited which research centers 
could perform the analysis. 
Then the 1970s brought a renaissance of studies on wheat stability, producing 
nearly 200 papers by 1980 (Bhullar, Gill, & Khehre, 1977; Das & Jain, 1971; Gupta, 
Virk, & Satija, 1980; Luthra & Singh, 1974; Mohan, Das, & Jain, 1974; Verma, Chahal, 
& Murty, 1978). Wheat scientists applied the stability analysis to intra- and interplant 
variation in wheat’s characteristics, to see how that variation was inherited and how it 
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expressed in different environments. Kohli criticized these studies for being academic 
rather than practical, chastising “mathematicians and biometrical geneticists, who are 
after simple mathematical ‘models’” rather than contributing to improved breeding 
practices or better varieties (1969, p. 28).  
 After the stability analysis entered the toolkit of Indian wheat scientists, scientists 
began to reconsider or recognize the limits of wide adaptation starting in the later 1970s 
and into the 1980s. S. Tara Mohan, P. K. Das, and H. K. Jain in 1974 showed the 
contingency of earlier scientific assumptions. They wrote, 
Kalyan Sona the best known variety from the adaptation point of view, is 
characterised by a relatively large G x E interaction. This finding suggests that 
capacity to generate variability under diverse environments may be an important 
attribute of a well adapted variety. The finding calls for a review of our earlier 
concepts on adaptation. (Mohan, Das, & Jain, 1974, p. 1124) 
Similarly, Bhullar, Gill, and Khehre 1977 studied the heritability of stability, and wrote 
extensively about Kalyansona: 
The general experience is that this variety has wide adaptability, as it is grown 
throughout the world, particularly in South Asia, the Middle East and North 
Africa… At the same time it is known to be highly responsive to high fertility 
conditions… The wide adaptability of this variety, therefore, may not be due to its 
inherently greater stability but due to its distinctly greater yield potential 
compared with previous commercial varieties. (Bhullar, Gill, & Khehra, 1977, p. 
44) 
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If the reader has accepted the arguments I presented in Chapter 3, these results are not 
surprising. In 1978, Rao, director of the coordinated trials, presented data indicating that 
wheat had different responses to environments, finding that “the two environments bring 
about tremendous changes in the yield attributing characters… The studies revealed that 
selection parameters have to be different for different environments” (emphasis added) 
(Rao, 1978, p. 1.10). These findings challenged the supposed inherent yield advantage of 
widely adapted varieties. It is astounding that in 1978, it was considered a radical 
proposal that wheat yield was affected by environment, but this demonstrates the 
pervasiveness of Borlaug’s argument for wide adaptation. 
 Not until the later 1980s did scientists to seriously again consider local or specific 
adaptation as a desirable research pathway. This was consistent with broader trends in the 
agricultural research community in the 1980s, which was pressured to address the 
problems of marginal farmers through locally adapted research (Douthwaite, Keatinge, & 
Park, 2001). In a book celebrating the 25th year of India’s coordinated wheat program, 
then-coordinator J. P. Tandon and former coordinator Rao wrote, “till recently the 
workshops considered proposals for the zonal releases only. But now it has been decided 
to identify varieties with more specific adaptability also for a state or parts of it” (1986, p. 
11). On the next page, however, they revealed their still-skeptical stance towards 
decentralizing research among India’s states, stating: 
Although very elaborate and extensive system of thorough testing and 
identification of suitable varieties has been developed under the AICWIP [All 
India Coordinated Wheat Improvement Program], yet some of the states continue 
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to organise regional based programmes. The utility of such programmes has been 
questioned but agriculture being a state subject, it can not be banned. Moreover, 
possibilities of developing varieties with very specific adaptability cannot be 
denied and some times there may be a need to develop varieties for specified 
regional problems. However, it is interesting to note that example of state released 
varieties having become popular any where are very rare. [emphasis added] 
(Tandon & Rao, 1986, p. 12) 
This reveals that although Tandon and Rao seemed to appreciate specific adaptation as a 
way to address “specified regional problems,” they did not view it as particularly useful. 
They also dismissively referred to the state mandates for agriculture as simply “it can not 
be banned,” implying that agricultural research was better coordinated on a national or 
zonal level.  
In the next chapter of the 25th anniversary book, R. K. Agrawal lamented the lack 
of new widely adapted varieties, finding that based on the “revival and again 
discontinuity of National Trials, it seems that the Indian wheat breeding programme has 
either not succeeded to develop varieties of wider adaptability like Kalyansona and 
Sonalika for irrigated condition and like C306 for rainfed cultivation” (Agrawal, 1986, p. 
60–61).45 But into the 1980s and 90s, Borlaug was still very much convinced that trials 
should be conducted at high fertility and aimed at wide adaptation. Borlaug wrote to 
Tandon in 1984 that,  
The fact that some varieties such as Sonalika, Kalyansona, HD2009 and WL711 
are grown commercially over wide areas, indicates that it is possible to breed 
                                                
45 The National Trials were created to test one set of varieties across the entire country. 
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varieties with broad adaptation... This would seem to me to indicate that there are 
altogether too many zones that are used in the varietal release programs and that 
these could be greatly simplified by fusing a number of smaller ecological zones. 
(Borlaug, October 17, 1984). 
By 1984, Indian wheat scientists operated on the basis of nine agro-climatic zones, 
increased from the initial five zones. Thus while Indian scientists recognized the limits of 
wide adaptation, Borlaug continued to push wide adaptation and the consolidation of 
agro-climatic zones. 
In 1993, Borlaug feared that international research centers were moving away 
from wide adaptation (Swaminathan, 1993). While it was perhaps on the decline in 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and other centers, in the 1990s CIMMYT 
reaffirmed its commitment to wide adaptation. Within India, the initial excitement over 
wide adaptation faded and troubling questions emerged. Although scientists held multiple 
and nuanced views over what type of adaptation was best for India, wide adaptation 
remained codified in the wheat research testing and system. 
Part 2: CIMMYT in the Middle East 
In 1972, the Government of India ended its collaboration with USAID and several 
US universities over political tensions with the US (Busch, 1988). The RF also began 
phasing out the Indian Agricultural Program in the mid-1970s, believing that the Indian 
research system was sufficiently developed and no longer required outside intervention. 
The RF ended their involvement in the wheat program in 1970, when Anderson was 
transferred to Mexico to work with CIMMYT. This was not an adversarial break up, and 
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CIMMYT and the RF would continue to collaborate with Indian researchers through the 
international wheat program and the newly-formed research center, the International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid-Tropics (ICRISAT), in Hyderabad (RF Indian 
Agricultural Program, June 1, 1972). Ralph Cummings, former director of the RF’s 
Indian Agriculture Program, soon became director of ICRISAT. The RF distributed some 
of their field staff from India to their four international research centers. Other staff were 
sent directly to Turkey, for the RF’s newest country-wide wheat program (RF Indian 
Agricultural Program, December 1, 1973). The RF program in India officially terminated 
in 1976. 
After the success of the wheat revolution in India, both the RF and Ford 
Foundation (FF) planned to intensify their research in the Middle East (Cullather, 2010). 
In the late 1960s, CIMMYT’s international reach expanded, in 1968 to Pakistan, UAR, 
Tunisia, Morocco, and Argentina, and in 1969 to Turkey (Wortman, August 11, 1970).  
We have already seen in Chapter 2 that the RF in Mexico had been involved in 
wheat research in the Middle (Near) East starting around 1960. The RF, working with the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), brought scientists from the Middle East to 
Mexico for training, and working with local and FAO scientists, also established several 
wheat nurseries around the Middle East. CIMMYT had hoped in 1963 that “the wheat 
research work in India might serve as the eastern anchor for cooperative activities 
through the Near East countries” (Moseman, February 25, 1963, p. 71). In the mid-1960s, 
both the RF and FF considered starting a regional agricultural research center in the 
Middle East. The RF sent scientists Elvin Stakman and John Gibler to the Middle East in 
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the fall of 1966 to prepare a proposal on a regional wheat program there (Remenyi, 
1978). According to a later evaluation by the FF, the RF was “posed to initiate a wheat 
research center, involving a 10-year commitment of around $4 million” in Lebanon, with 
RF wheat breeder John Gibler as its director (Remenyi, 1978, p. 21). Then war broke out 
in Lebanon in June 1967 and the RF withdrew completely. The FF already had staff in 
Beirut, so they established a research center called the Arid Lands Agricultural 
Development (ALAD) Program. The RF lacked agricultural field staff in the Middle East 
until 1970 in Turkey, discussed later this chapter. 
While the RF and FF’s decisions to work in India in the 1960s were politically 
motivated by the Cold War, their expansion into the Middle East in the late 1960s 
appears less ideologically-driven or related to Cold War politics. Fueled by their success 
in raising wheat production in India, the foundations hoped to extend the green revolution 
to wheat-producing countries in the Middle East. There are certainly shades of neo-
imperialism in these foundations’ drive to expand to throughout the Middle East. And 
given the political instability throughout the region, foundation scientists and 
administrators may have already internalized the Population-National Security Theory to 
an extent that the reasons for their expansion was more implicit than the previous decade 
(Perkins, 1997). In other words, these foundations may have implicitly assumed that 
higher food production would lead to greater political stability. 
Despite wanting to simply extend the green revolution into the Middle East, 
CIMMYT and the foundations came upon new challenges that led to shifts in their 
research programs and to create new institutional arrangements. Turkey, for example, 
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was a major wheat producer that was beginning to adopt semi-dwarf wheats, but farmers 
in the low-yielding, unirrigated plains of Turkey grew winter wheat, of which semi-dwarf 
versions were not available. I will explore the international shift to rainfed and dryland 
research in the remainder of this chapter. 
The Arid Lands Agricultural Development Program. The FF started the Arid 
Lands Agricultural Development (ALAD) Program in Lebanon in 1968. Although the FF 
founded ALAD, it was also important to the trajectory of CIMMYT and RF wheat 
programs. First, ALAD’s infrastructure and staff directly contributed to the formation of 
the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) in 1977, 
which collaborated with CIMMYT on wheat research. Second, Robert Havener, once-
director of ALAD, later became the third director general of CIMMYT from 1978 to 
1985. Finally, Eugene Saari, who worked with the FF and RF in India, joined ALAD and 
CIMMYT staff from 1973 to 1975 and then remained affiliated with CIMMYT until his 
retirement (Remenyi, 1978). Because of the lack of published secondary sources on this 
subject, much of this section draws on one 1978 report, “ALAD: An evaluation” by 
Joseph Remenyi, an economist with the FF, which I accessed from the Ford Foundation 
archives, located at the Rockefeller Archive Center.  
The FF’s Forrest F. Hill (then-vice president for oversees development) had 
suggested a regional agricultural center in the Middle East in the early 1960s, and David 
E. Bell, who succeeded him in 1966, continued on that path. Important to the FF was to 
not create another CIMMYT or IRRI, but rather to follow the FF’s outreach/extension 
and community development-based model for their agricultural programs (Remenyi, 
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1978). As previously mentioned, ALAD was founded after war broke out in Lebanon in 
1967. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Hugh Walker, an FF representative located 
in Beirut, lobbied for the creation of ALAD. ALAD was actually started in Lebanon 
before it was approved in the FF’s main office in New York, but officially, the FF 
initiated ALAD in February 1968. Walker was ALAD’s first director, and then Havener 
took over in 1971. ALAD continued until December 1976, when it had been decided that 
ICARDA would succeed ALAD. 
ALAD focused on agriculture issues of the Middle East and North Africa, 
especially the countries from “Afghanistan to Morocco and Turkey to Sudan and 
Ethiopia” (Ford Foundation, December 1973; Remenyi, 1978, p. 1). Noting that “the 
national agricultural institutions in the region lacked the capability or interest in testing, 
evaluating and modifying them [CIMMYT and IRRI varieties] to fit local conditions,” 
ALAD at first focused on extending “the benefits of the green revolution to the Middle 
East through adaptive research” (Ford Foundation, December 1973, p. 2; Remenyi, 1978, 
p. 2). One of ALAD’s early goals was to “lead with wheat” based on CIMMYT’s 
successful international wheat programs (Remenyi, 1978, p. 61). ALAD initially focused 
on irrigated crops, especially irrigated wheat, where training and materials were easily 
available, but later expanded to course grains such as sorghum and millet. According to 
Remenyi, a review of the program in 1971 brought the “realization that the region 
demanded location specific research” for disease, rainfed agriculture, water management, 
etc. (Remenyi, 1978, pp. 2–3). This focus on location specific research would carry on to 
ICARDA. ALAD also preceded ICARDA with its focus on what is now called 
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participatory agricultural research, a way of involving farmers in agricultural research 
(Ceccarelli & Grando, 2002). Remenyi wrote in 1978: 
In the nursery programs especially ALAD was innovatory [sic]. Responsibility for 
selection of well adapted high yielding varieties was not kept at the ARI 
[Agricultural Research Institute in Lebanon] for ALAD staff. They sent their 
cooperators seeds of early generation materials that would segregate when grown 
out. The cooperators would then need to select out the best varieties, making them 
real partners in the regional breeding and improvement program. (p. 13)  
This is an early example of what is called participatory plant breeding, which became 
more popular in the 1980s.  
ALAD and RF/CIMMYT in the Middle East. As mentioned, ALAD aimed to 
“lead with wheat” and according to Remenyi, their wheat program was influenced by 
CIMMYT and IRRI’s model of research (1978). Remenyi wrote that, “ALAD functioned 
essentially as a relay station for CIMMYT and other ‘green-revolution’ technology and 
training centers” (Remenyi, 1978, p. 61). This is consistent with what scholars now call 
the “transfer of technology” or “linear model” of agricultural development—where 
technologies are assumed to be easily transferrable across sociocultural contexts. ALAD 
also complemented the work of CIMMYT in Mexico and Turkey: ALAD focused on 
spring wheats while RF’s Turkey program focused on the separate class of winter wheats.  
The RF and CIMMYT became more directly involved in ALAD a few years after 
it was established. Borlaug was appointed as an advisor to ALAD, and in 1971 the RF 
provided Leland R. House, who had worked with the coordinated maize program in 
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India, as staff for ALAD. Saari, also coming from a position in India, joined ALAD in 
1973 under a complicated directive: he was considered staff of CIMMYT, ALAD, and 
FF all at once. 
Saari had worked with the FF and RF in India and helped establish a regional 
disease screening nursery, which would soon be extended to the Middle East. In 1969 the 
FF, through ALAD, started establishing wheat nurseries in the Middle East (Anderson, 
1973). But realizing the overlap between their programs, FF and RF, FAO, and 
CIMMYT consultants establish a set of unified wheat nurseries for the region in 1971 
(Points discussed between the wheat program staff, May 31, 1971). One of these 
nurseries was the Regional Disease and Insect Screening Nursery, which grew out of the 
Indian coordinated wheat program due to fear of disease spreading through green 
revolution wheat varieties (Remenyi, 1978). Collaboration between the FF, RF, and 
CIMMYT continued throughout the 1970s in the Middle East with the establishment of 
ICARDA, which was first proposed in 1973. Part 3 of this chapter will address ICARDA 
in further detail. 
CIMMYT’s wheat program in Turkey. In 1969 CIMMYT—in collaboration 
with Oregon State University (OSU), the RF, and USAID—started a bilateral agricultural 
program in Turkey, aimed at training Turkish agricultural scientists and increasing 
Turkish wheat production (CIMMYT Board of Directors, September 25-26, 1969). 
CIMMYT’s board of directors found that “Turkey itself represents an important wheat 
production area of the world” and “the program could serve as a CIMMYT ‘outpost’ 
for… a larger area” (CIMMYT Board of Directors, September 25-26, 1969). The Turkish 
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wheat program was funded by both the RF and USAID, but CIMMYT and OSU provided 
much of the staff and the coordination of programs. 
 According to a USAID report in 1969, Turkish wheat production had improved 
from 1958 to 1967 due to improved agronomic practices, but using only local varieties. 
Then in 1966, a group of “progressive farmers” purchased some Sonora 64 seeds from 
Mexico and by 1968 two percent of Turkey’s wheat acreage was planted under new 
varieties (Kronstad, 1969, p. 32). The coastal areas of Turkey, which were well irrigated, 
rapidly adopted semi-dwarf wheat varieties in the later 1960s and early 1970s. 
Turkish wheat production faced problems of overall low yields, plant diseases 
such as rusts and septoria (a fungal infection), and that wheat grown in the majority of the 
country was rainfed winter wheat. This was important because the wheat varieties 
produced by CIMMYT thus far were spring varieties of wheat. Winter wheats differ from 
spring wheats in that they need a cold period before they develop. There was also a 
significant disparity between the coastal wheat-region of Turkey—which had a moderate 
climate, was mostly irrigated, and grew spring wheat—and the Anatolian Plateau, which 
contained the majority of wheat production. The Anatolian Plateau was mostly rainfed, 
and due to its different climate, could only grow winter wheat. Because “most of the 
winter wheats introduced into Turkey are not well adapted,” CIMMYT initiated an 
international winter wheat screening nursery in Turkey in 1972 (Klatt, May 25-June 17, 
1971, p. 10; Klatt, September 21, 1972). Engaging in Turkish wheat production, 
CIMMYT pushed beyond the agro-climatic constraints of its program on irrigated, spring 
wheat. 
   194 
 In 1970 the RF chose Bill C. Wright as the project leader for Turkey, transferring 
him from India. CIMMYT then brought on Arthur Klatt in 1971 as a wheat breeder, and 
J. M. Prescott as a pathologist. Prescott was stationed in India before coming to Turkey, 
and Klatt with CIMMYT in Mexico (Wright, October 5, 1971). CIMMYT’s Turkish 
wheat program shared similarities with the Indian wheat program beyond its staff: the 
initial philosophy and methods of the program were based on coordination of research 
and creation of uniform conditions (Cummings, Rodenhiser, & Gibler, 1968). The 
program also aimed, according to Klatt, to “test our materials under varying 
environmental conditions… and also identify lines with broad adaptation” (Klatt, [Letter 
to Zoltan Barabas], n.d.). By 1974 Floyd Bolton (an agronomist appointed by USAID), 
Michael Lindstrom (a soil scientist), Charles K. Mann (an economist), and Dwight 
Finfrock (appointed to help develop the extension stations) had also joined the 
RF/CIMMYT staff in Turkey.  
The RF/CIMMYT program in Turkey was a major site of wheat research in the 
early 1970s, and has received relatively little attention from historians. The project there 
coincided with criticisms of the green revolution, thus researchers were under pressure to 
prove themselves against these critics. One of these criticisms was that green revolution 
varieties had less stable yields over time than did traditional varieties, due to drought 
susceptibility of the new varieties or other factors (Michaels, 1982). CIMMYT countered 
this by making “yield stability” one of their core goals in the 1970s. Yield stability meant 
stability over time, not just space, and was touted as a complementary characteristic with 
wide adaptation. When it first became a topic of interest, it was implied to be a result of 
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wide adaptation. For example Anderson stated to the US National Academy of Sciences 
in 1972, “Stability of yield, therefore, is of paramount importance. If we develop varieties 
with wide adaptation which are able to do well in widely separated geographic areas, the 
effect of variations in climate from year to year at any one location can be expected to 
have considerably less effect on yield” (Anderson, October 11, 1972, p. 17). This 
conflation of time and space may have been due to Keith Finlay and others using yield 
stability and wide adaptation interchangeably (Finlay, 1963). But in the rest of my 
dissertation, yield stability will mean temporal yield stability, which is the common usage 
at present. 
Klatt, the CIMMYT wheat breeder in Turkey, spoke at a 1973 CIMMYT wheat 
symposium about yield stability. He opened, “Since the science of varietal improvement 
was initiated, we have worked to increase maximum yield potential. Today, I would like 
to discuss this as well as a new topic, stabilizing minimum yield levels” (Klatt, 1973, p. 
104). Working with winter wheat varieties in Turkey, Klatt noted that it was more 
difficult to obtain a stable, minimum yield there. He explained: 
The main reason is the climatic instability of the winter wheat growing regions. 
Most winter wheat areas are characterized by large annual fluctuations in 
temperatures and precipitation and also large monthly fluctuations. This creates a 
need for yield stability as well as a need for increased yield potential. (Klatt, 
1973, pp. 104–105) 
In contrast, CIMMYT’s economist in Turkey, Mann, wrote to a statistician at the 
University of Readings, “since for a long time people have talked of greater yield 
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stability with improved technology, it seemed important to distinguish between higher 
average yields and lower year-to-year variation” (Mann, September 8, 1977). But Mann, 
along with other critics, pondered whether “because of the interactions between the 
package and moisture, annual variation may actually become greater rather than 
smaller” [emphasis added] (Mann, September 8, 1977). This remained a major point of 
contention throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Figure 11. Wheat yields in Turkey from 1961 to 2012. Data retrieved from FAOSTAT. 
Ultimately, Turkish wheat production increased due to more efficient (and not 
necessarily intensive agronomic practices, and not improvements in germplasm (i.e. so-
called genetic gains) (Figure 11) (Villareal, & Klatt, 1985). In fact as of 2001, no semi-
dwarf variety of winter wheat has been released for Turkey’s rainfed areas (Braun, 
Zencirci, & Altay, 2001). Because of the limited rainfall and climatic variability of 
central Turkey, CIMMYT scientists decided to focus on improvements in soil moisture 
conservation rather than promoting new varieties, which did not perform substantially 
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better than local varieties there. Two scientists at the later-formed ICARDA, E. E. Saari 
and J. P. Srivastava (who both worked in the Indian wheat program), explained:  
There are two distinct but interrelated factors for improving and stabilizing the 
production of winter cereals. One factor would be to tailor the desired genotypes 
to exploit a given set of agroclimatic parameters and the second would be to 
execute agronomic techniques and methods to maximize the production of the 
existing crop cultivars presently available. (Saari & Srivastava, 1977, p. 3)  
RF/CIMMYT scientists in Turkey chose the latter technique because there was no widely 
adapted winter wheat. Winter wheat, by its nature, winter wheat has certain agro-climatic 
requirements (cold exposure) that spring wheat does not. This is consistent with the later 
finding that “between areas where photoperiod sensitive or photoperiod insensitive 
varieties have a clear adaptive significance, the annual variations in climate make it 
extremely difficult for breeders to produce varieties with good adaptability to changing 
environmental conditions” (Worland et al., 1998, p. 385). This supports my argument that 
wide adaptation was only a result of daylight insensitivity and fertilizer responsiveness. 
Turkey significantly increased its fertilizer consumption starting in 1974, as seen in 
Figure 12.   
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Figure 12. Consumption, production, and imports of nitrogenous fertilizers in Turkey 
from 1961 to 2002. Data retrieved from FAOSTAT. 
In 1976 the RF/CIMMYT Turkey program started downsizing staff because 
Turkish scientists now had the necessary experience to start taking over. By 1976 
CIMMYT also decided to phase out countrywide programs and focus on providing 
regional assistance, working with the newly formed ICARDA. The CIMMYT program in 
Turkey officially ended in 1982, and in 1986 both CIMMYT and the Government of 
Turkey joined the International Winter Wheat Improvement Program, a collaboration that 
ICARDA later joined (Braun, Zencirci, & Altay, 2001). 
Part 3: CIMMYT and Research for Rainfed and Marginal Lands 
 By 1967, before the green revolution was even coined, CIMMYT and IRRI 
administrators and researchers began to realize that in order to continue to reach farmers 
in tropical and sub-tropical areas, they needed to expand their research goals to address 
the needs of small farmers and marginal agriculture. Up until the late 1960s, most of 
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CIMMYT and IRRI’s research programs focused on crops under high fertility and 
irrigated conditions. Then in the late 1960s and early 1970s CIMMYT and IRRI started 
to focus on rainfed and dryland cultivation, including a shift from focusing on breeding to 
a focus on agronomy, as seen in the Turkey program. These organizations were 
responding to pressure from RF and FF administrators as well as following a desire to 
expand their own programs. 
In the 1970s, international organizations also shifted their focus from improving 
aggregate production to improving rural people’s livelihoods. While social commentators 
criticized the uneven spread of green revolution benefits and technologies, administrators 
from the RF and USAID began asking critical questions about how or whether research 
had improved the livelihoods of marginal farmers. These factors were a reaction against 
criticisms that green revolution technologies had led to inequities in rural areas of less 
developed countries. 
Another factor behind the shifting goals in international agricultural research was 
the changing institutional context of international aid. In the 1970s, foreign assistance 
programs shifted from bilateral to multilateral, led by the World Bank’s new president, 
Robert McNamara (Lancaster, 2008). The United Nations Development Program, 
founded in 1965, along with the FAO and World Bank began focusing on poverty 
reduction and “a new ethos focusing on equity” as their primary goals (Latham, 2011, p. 
169). McNamara, becoming head of the World Bank in 1968, “introduced into the Bank 
the ‘people's basic needs’ approach, and shifted investments from a focus on the physical 
to the human part,” as well as increasing overall investments from the Bank (Jefferson, 
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2010, p. 459). According to historian Michael Latham, McNamara had supported the 
modernization approach during his tenure as US Secretary of State, but he realized by the 
later 1960s that modernization and industrialization had not less to more political 
stability, even in the US (Latham, 2011). He believed that poverty reduction, more than 
infrastructure development and industrialization, would increase global stability  
Then in 1969 McNamara proposed a new institutional arrangement to support 
long-term agricultural research. He felt that the global need for agricultural research and 
development had outstripped the capacity of US foundations (Ozgediz, 2012). This new 
institution became the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) in 1971, a network that brought together CIMMYT, IRRI, as well as two other 
RF and FF supported centers, the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture and 
International Center for Tropical Agriculture. The CGIAR was initially supported 
primarily by the World Bank, the RF and FF, and individual member countries (Pistorius, 
1997).  
The World Bank started financially supporting CIMMYT in 1972 (CIMMYT, 
1972). But CIMMYT’s primary donor organizations up to 1972—the RF and FF—were 
already giving attention to rural equity and rainfed research. As described earlier this 
chapter, the RF’s Wortman argued that “we must increasingly consider in our projections 
not only total national output, but as well, the number of people needing benefit” 
(Wortman, September 15, 1969), and Cummings wondered about “the problems of 
rainfed lands and small farmers” (Cummings, June 2, 1969). Lowell S. Hardin, from the 
FF and on CIMMYT’s Board of Directors in 1968, asked in 1969: 
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Programwise, is it time to give greater research attention to photosynthetic 
efficiency of wheats under dry land and natural rainfall conditions? If the plant 
type is really superior, then shouldn't this superiority be engineered into varieties 
which are also superior under stress?” [emphasis added] (Hardin, September 17, 
1969) 
This technical-sounding question reflected a rising socio-political and ethical concern for 
marginal farmers in rainfed areas. Hardin’s question also directly challenges Borlaug’s 
widely adapted “plant type,” which despite Borlaug’s claims, was not adapting to rainfed 
areas. 
CIMMYT scientists also broadened their research program to rainfed agriculture 
in order to work in the Middle East. Borlaug wrote to CIMMYT’s director E. J. 
Wellhausen in late 1967, “We now talk about expanding the CIMMYT wheat work to the 
Anatolian Plateau, Iranian Plateau and the Mediterranean belt of North Africa and the 
Near East. To be successful there we must develop experts in wheat dry land farming 
techniques” (Borlaug, November 10, 1967). After seven years of disregarding the needs 
of rainfed areas in the Middle East, Borlaug now saw the need to expand to those areas. 
This also coincided with a shift in other international agencies that began funding rainfed 
research programs in the 1970s.  
Borlaug was not alone in realizing the limits of research focused on favorable 
environments. The authors of the report presented to CIMMYT in 1971 noted: 
Until the beginning of 1968, CIMMYT's wheat program concentrated almost 
exclusively on irrigated wheat. With the exception of international yield nurseries 
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which were grown also under rainfed conditions, the varieties have been bred and 
produced primarily for the high producing, fertilizer-responsive irrigated 
conditions, which existed in a number of the Near East and Asian countries. In 
1968, however, several agricultural assistance programs were initiated within the 
Mediterranean region in which there was a large predominance of rainfed wheat 
producing areas. (A proposal for regional coordination of the Mediterranean and 
near east cereal programs, ca. 1971, p. 56) 
Edwin Wellhausen, the director of CIMMYT up to his retirement in 1972, also 
recognized the limits of existing programs, stating in 1973: 
As we continue to push production in the more favored zones, we must also make 
a special effort to speed up the use of modern technology in the more marginal, 
but economically viable regions. This will mean further strengthening research 
activities, the development of more elastic varieties, more precisely suited 
agronomic practices and, above all, new delivery systems and incentives if we are 
to get the technology applied. We must remember that these delivery systems are 
going to be location specific and vary from region to region. What works in one 
place may not work in another. (Anderson, 1973, p. 23) 
By 1972, CIMMYT had shifted their main objective to include assisting the 
“development of food grain improvement programs... which will benefit the largest 
possible number of farmers, especially in developing countries” (CIMMYT, December 
1972). While still concerned with the “optimum production environment,” a CIMMYT 
report stated that this meant only, 
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To eliminate, insofar as possible, variations in seedbed and moisture, and thus 
permit each experimental seed line to express its full production potential. This 
does not mean that CIMMYT is trying to benefit the irrigated, mechanized 
farmer, but only that CIMMYT provides a dependable first step for breeding and 
experiments. (CIMMYT, December 1972) 
During this time, CIMMYT became involved in two programs that were representative of 
these broader trends in agricultural research: Plan Puebla in Mexico and ICARDA in the 
Middle East. 
Plan Puebla—Motivations for it and Lessons from it. As Chapter 1 hinted, 
CIMMYT’s Plan Puebla (sometimes known as the Puebla Project) was the first modern 
agricultural program in Mexico aimed specifically to help rainfed farmers (Arce, 1987). 
Proposed by Wellhausen in 1966, Plan Puebla aimed to increase maize yields for farmers 
in the Puebla region, who did not have access to irrigation (Wellhausen, October 14, 
1966). This would demonstrate, counter to critics, that irrigation was not necessary for 
farmers to increase their crop production.  
A 1969 CIMMYT report described Plan Puebla as “CIMMYT's answer to the 
question: how can the large traditional-agriculture sector be transformed into modern 
farming?” and that if it succeeded, scientists could “bring the green revolution to 
thousands who have heard of it or seen its benefits— in the fields of the large farmer and 
on state-owned lands” (Bruner, 1969, p. 20, 25). Thus, Plan Puebla was a case study for 
whether the benefits of the green revolution could be extended to marginal lands. This is 
obvious in the follow up reports on Plan Puebla, titled, “Plan Puebla: Transferable and 
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Generalizable?” and “The lessons of Puebla and the potential of the Puebla approach” 
(Hertford, August 17, 1970; Myren, 1972). 
The imperative of Plan Puebla was obvious in the correspondence between 
Forrest F. Hill of the FF and Borlaug in 1967. Hill wrote: 
Sometime I want to talk to you about the problems of production on Ejidal lands. 
Del Myren recently sent me a paper for comments in which he talks about the 
need for incorporating Mexico's low-income farmers into her modern agricultural 
economy. If this cannot or is not being done in an environment as favorable as the 
Yaqui Valley [where CIMMYT was located], it certainly is not going to be done 
under less favorable circumstances. (Hill, June 29, 1967) 
In this, Hill implied that if Plan Puebla could not succeed in this area of Mexico that had 
adequate rainfall, then it was not likely to succeed in in less ideal agro-climatic 
conditions. 
CIMMYT researchers worked with the Agricultural University of Chapingo and 
smallholder maize farmers in the state of Puebla to enact the plan in 1967 (Redclift, 
1983). While rainfed, Puebla faced reliable rainfall and was considered relatively 
favorable for maize production. Researchers promoted the package of Green Revolution 
technology, including fertilizers, improved seed, and agronomic management. Plan 
Puebla aimed to dramatically increase maize yields “by adapting existing technologies to 
ecologically specific growing conditions” (Redclift, 1983, p. 552). Ultimately, Plan 
Puebla did increase the yields of farmers in the Puebla region in a short period of time, 
but with two interesting results: farmers very often did not adopt the “complete package” 
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of recommended practices, and farmers found that local seed was more responsive to 
fertilizer than CIMMYT varieties (Redclift, 1983). CIMMYT’s economic analysis of 
Plan Puebla also found that farmer net income increased due to increased yields, and 
farmers who had access to credit especially benefitted (CIMMYT, 1974). 
But by 1973 CIMMYT discontinued the Plan Puebla, to the disappointment of 
RF-affiliated advisors (Wortman, October 26, 1971). A 1972 report by Delbert T. Myren, 
formerly of the RF and then at USAID, outlined some of Plan Puebla’s constraints. One 
of the main findings of Plan Puebla was that CIMMYT’s maize varieties were not 
competitive with local varieties, which as Wellhausen stated in Chapter 1, were selected 
over time by Mexican maize farmers for their adaptability to stress conditions. Myren 
wrote that “in contrast to the experience with the ‘green revolution’ in wheat,” for maize, 
“identifying improved germ plasm for rainfed production is much more complex than it 
is for irrigated conditions. It also appears that up to now most breeding programs have 
focused on selecting material for optimum moisture conditions” (Myren, 1972, p. 10). He 
indicated that the high yield potential of CIMMYT maize varieties was the result of a 
“good fit between the characteristics of that variety and the particular environment” 
rather than an inherent adaptability (Myren, 1972, p. 10). 
 Myren concluded that contrary to CIMMYT’s program of centralized and shuttle 
breeding, “in the Puebla area the variability in soil and climate made it impossible to 
select one central spot that would give results applicable to the whole area” (Myren, 
1972, p. 12). This led CIMMYT to decide, “that this project is too far afield from its main 
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interest in plant breeding” (Myren, 1972, p. 14.) Plan Puebla was subsequently adopted by 
the Mexican government as a program for rainfed agriculture (Redclift, 1983).  
Plan Puebla was also CIMMYT’s first experience in social and economic 
research. Alberto Arce attributed Plan Puebla to paradigmatic shifts in agronomy and the 
influence of rural sociology on agricultural research (Arce, 1987). One of the innovations 
of Plan Puebla was that it brought an agricultural economist to CIMMYT’s team. Don 
Winkelmann was hired as CIMMYT’s first economist and social scientist, and provided 
feedback on Plan Puebla. His review focused on not its success or failure, but on the 
aspects of the program that could be transferred to other cases, as well as the “spill-over 
effects” of site-specific research, a conversation that would carry on into the 2000s 
(CGIAR Science Council, 2006; Winkelmann, November 13, 1970).  
Dryland research in the Middle East and India: ICARDA. Plan Puebla was 
CIMMYT’s first coordinated attempt at increasing yields for rainfed maize. For wheat, 
the project in Turkey was CIMMYT’s first attempt at improving rainfed, winter wheat. 
These programs shared the similar characteristic that CIMMYT varieties did not result in 
higher yields in these specific locations, thus scientists turned to improvement in 
agronomic practices to raise yields.  
An international rainfed spring wheat research program was not started until 1977 
with the formation of ICARDA.46 ICARDA, or an earlier version of it, was initially 
proposed to CIMMYT’s Board of Directors. In late 1971, a “proposal for regional 
coordination of the Mediterranean and near east cereal programs” was presented to the 
                                                
46 CIMMYT and ICARDA collaborated on wheat adapted to marginal areas starting in 1979, 
focused on Africa (Byerlee & Morris, 1993). 
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CIMMYT Board of Directors’ executive committee (A proposal for regional 
coordination of the Mediterranean and near east cereal programs, ca. 1971). Though the 
authors are not listed, this report was likely based off of Stakman and Gibler’s report 
from 1966 and 1967 on the Middle East. The report noted existing collaboration between 
the RF, FF, and USAID in the Middle East region. The CIMMYT Board of Directors 
were reportedly “enthusiastic” about this proposal (Finlay, September 20, 1971).  
 The next step towards a dryland research center in the Middle East occurred and 
an administrative level about CIMMYT: the newly formed CGIAR. The Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC) guides the CGIAR’s decisions about their direction of 
research (Pistorius, 1997). This committee evaluated the Research review mission to the 
Near East and North Africa by Skilbeck et al. (1973), who proposed a new center in the 
Middle East to the TAC in 1973. A subcommittee was formed in 1975, led by David 
Hopper of the International Development Research Centre of Canada (formerly of the FF 
in India), to go about establishing ICARDA (CGIAR, January 3, 1975). 
 The CGIAR gave ICARDA a global mandate for dryland field crops, especially 
barley, but also including durum wheat and triticale, and later, bread wheat (Yau, 1992). 
As for ALAD, which would provide the infrastructure and staff for ICARDA, Remenyi 
wrote that, “it was inevitable that the majority of its resources were optimal in 
environments that could most benefit from these [green revolution] technologies, 
typically the irrigated wheat areas. Little in the way of rainfed wheats was to be found” 
(Remenyi, 1978, p. 61). ICARDA would be “a dryland agriculture successor to ALAD” 
(Remenyi, 1978, p. 62).  
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ICARDA was officially formed in 1976, with funds from Canada and sixteen total 
donor countries and institutions, and located in Aleppo, Syria (IDRC, 1976). Most of the 
ALAD staff was transferred to ICARDA when it began operating on 1 January 1977 
(Remenyi, 1978). Its initial objectives were “to improve the level and stability of 
production of the staple food crops of the region,” especially for rainfed conditions 
(Russell, January 1975, p. 1). Though the FF disagreed with giving ICARDA an 
international mandate for one crop, ICARDA was given international responsibility on 
the fundamental research, germplasm collection, and varietal improvement for barley, 
durum wheat, lentils, and broadbeans (Russell, January 1975). ICARDA was also to 
focus on the socio-economic well-being or rural populations by hiring sociologists and 
economists. 
ICARDA was in many ways an extension of CIMMYT/IRRI model, but changing 
demands of the 1970s broadened its research program to rainfed areas and to explicitly 
consider socio-economic factors. Despite its similarities to CIMMYT, IRRI, and other 
international research centers, ICARDA was a deliberate shift away from the Green 
Revolution focus on only irrigated regions, and highlighted agronomy and socio-
economic analysis over strictly germplasm improvement. ICARDA grappled with this 
new direction, as M. B. Russell, an FF consultant, asked, “Should ICARDA devote a 
major part of its effort and resources to programs which will not yield an identifiable 
production such as a IR-8 or dwarf wheat? If so wheat criteria should be used to measure 
Program effectiveness? Will such criteria be accepted as valid by donor agencies and the 
general public?” (Russell, January 1975, p. 31).  
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Conclusion 
While this chapter pulls together crop improvement programs from four different 
continents, it highlights in each case, a shift away from green revolution research that 
focused on favorable environments. The programs were a result of, to varying degrees, 
external pressure from critics, donors, and administrators, and also internal desires to 
expand the global reach of CIMMYT. Related, Indian wheat scientists began to question 
the dogma of wide adaptation, nonetheless constrained by the rigid structure of the 
coordinate program. Finally, this chapter contributes to the generally understudied history 
of wheat improvement in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
INDIAN AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE POLICY 
 
Introduction 
It is now obvious that wide adaptation helped justify a research system focused on 
favorable environmental conditions in India. Unfortunately, these conditions do not exist 
in the majority of India’s agricultural landscape. Even as national and international 
research goals have shifted towards promoting equity of rural populations and alleviating 
poverty, the existing Indian wheat research system has embedded many unhelpful 
assumptions about the connections between wide adaptation and these social goals. The 
Indian wheat research system is still very much in line with the policies implemented 
during the green revolution that assume that technologies are widely adaptable. Wheat 
breeders can assume that the benefits of their research will spillover into more marginal 
production areas, and are not required to participate in the agricultural innovation system 
beyond developing and releasing varieties. On the policy level, changes in the 
organizational structure of Indian wheat research have had limited impact since the 1970s 
(Raina, 2003). Policies and programs implemented through a variety of mechanisms have 
not led to a more responsive, client-oriented, or self-evaluative system (Raina, 2003). 
Scientists today, especially in countries like India with a long history of adhering 
to wide adaptation, must decide whether the green revolution narratives will hold up 
under climate change and other constraints, new and old, to food security. While wide 
adaptation had some success during the green revolution by increasing overall food 
production, those gains have stagnated and have not improved overall food security. In 
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this final chapter, I will analyze the current state of agricultural science policy in India, 
and give suggestions for how science policies can lead to improved food security. 
 Two recent publications (Acharya & Das, 2012; Mishra, Ravindra, & Hesse, 
2013) are a call-to-arms for investment in India’s rainfed areas, especially the 
northeastern region that suffers from a number of problems including low crop 
productivity, lack of electrification, and pervasive poverty. According to an Indian 
coalition called the Revitalizing Rainfed Agriculture network, “state-directed policies 
relating to the Green Revolution have resulted in a situation in which any kind of state 
support for the agriculture sector becomes effective only when there is availability of 
water for agriculture” (Acharya & Das, 2012, p. 105). These authors argue that the Green 
Revolution policies and technologies cannot be simply extended east, but that new 
institutional systems are needed. Mishra, Ravindra, and Hesse also identifies the need for 
a complete overhaul of the Green Revolution strategy of top-down, resource intensive 
agriculture in favor of a “location-specific, decentralized” system that will help revitalize 
rainfed areas (Mishra, Ravindra, & Hesse, 2013, no page number). Despite these calls for 
change, which date back to the Green Revolution,47 the Indian wheat research system is 
still seen by many as excluding rainfed research. A recent article from India’s Economic 
Times found that ICAR spends only 13% on rainfed research, and rainfed areas receive 
6-8 % of national agricultural subsidies (Srinivas, 2012). Nor is there any indication that 
an increased investment in rainfed research would actually benefit end-users in areas, 
such as Bihar, that are marginalized from the research and extension system. Based on 
                                                
47 India’s Fourth Five Year Plan for 1969 to 1974, was the first five year plan to draw attention to 
rainfed areas. 
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area alone, this suggests a severe underinvestment, as rainfed lands account for 68% of 
India’s agricultural land (Mishra, Ravindra, & Hesse, 2013). 
History of Location Specific Research in India  
 As agricultural scientists in India realized that the benefits of the green revolution 
had been limited to irrigated areas, the concept of location specific research gained 
popularity in the 1980s. In many ways, location specific research is shorthand for 
research that specifically focuses on small and rainfed agricultural systems. These 
systems typically face more agro-climatic variability and have a lowered capacity to 
control that variability through irrigation or other management practices. Many of the 
people who advocate location specific research also call for more specific adaptation of 
crop varieties and technologies. Historically, calls for specific adaptation and location 
specific research have been linked with client-oriented research and participatory 
breeding programs (Annicchiarico, 2002). These programs have become increasingly 
popular in developing countries since the 1980s (Annicchiarico, 2002). 
 The idea of delimiting research programs to a smaller regional level emerged in 
India in the late 1960s, in response to green revolution-era research. The famous 
agricultural economist and Planning Commission member Samar Ranjan Sen wrote in 
1969 that “only recently, the experience of IADP [Intensive Agricultural District 
Program] has led to the recognition of the importance of delimiting agro-climatic zones 
within the district for purposes of policy and programme formulation” [emphasis added] 
(Sen, 1969, p. 33). In his 1969 book, Modernising Indian agriculture, Sen wrote 
extensively about the need for research “directed to local situation at the field level and in 
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the various agro-climatic regions to meet local needs” (Sen, 1969, p. 123). He wrote 
further: 
To be really effective it is necessary to evolve specific programmes to suit the 
agro-climatic conditions in each zone and to communicate the specialized, 
localised aspects of this programme to all the farmers in the zone… Needless to 
say that programmes, even if excellently prepared at the national level or state 
level, do not exactly fit into the local conditions at the operational level (Sen, 
1969, p. 46). 
It is not clear how influential Sen’s ideas were at that time, but in the wake of the green 
revolution and over the next few decades, calls for more location specific research 
entered the discourse of Indian agricultural science policy. Economists Kalirajan and 
Shand wrote in 1982 that the All India Coordinated Rice Improvement Program 
“recognized in recent years that paddy breeding research must be decentralized to 
become location-specific” (p. 538), though there was no similar action from the wheat 
program. This was largely because rice-growing conditions in India varied significantly 
more than wheat-growing conditions. 
The World Bank-support National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) ran 
from 1979 to 1996, after being renewed once in 1986. This program was created in 
response to the limitations of green revolution-style research, which operated on a highly 
centralized basis and failed to address local variability, especially in rainfed conditions. 
NARP aimed to support decentralized, location specific research through the state 
agricultural universities and extension (Balaguru, Venkateswarlu, & Rajagopalan, 1988). 
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It also aimed “to give special emphasis to cereals, pulses and oil seeds under rainfed and 
mixed farming conditions” (World Bank, 1997, p. ii). Related to the NARP, in 1988 
India’s Planning Commission created the Agro-climatic Regional Planning program in 
order to support location specific research and development, based on the relatively new 
farming systems approach as well as emphasizing inter-generational sustainability 
(Singh, 1990). 
But because of the dominance of wide adaptation, research organizations have 
struggled to support locally focused research. Even 10 years after NARP was 
implemented, centralization and wide adaptation were still dogma in Indian wheat 
research. A 1989 report on the state of India’s State Agricultural Universities found that 
the “government requires all donor funds to be channeled through ICAR, which delays or 
even prevents extramural funding of projects. In addition, it means that research projects 
that receive high priority are the ones which have a broad national coverage” (Easter, 
Bisaliah, & Dunbar, 1989, p. 1203). The authors highlighted “the need to decentralize 
decisions concerning research budgets,” and concluded that the existing system was 
biased against rainfed agriculture due to its location-specific nature (Easter, Bisaliah, & 
Dunbar, 1989, p. 1203). Even with repeated calls to focus research on rainfed and dryland 
areas, these efforts have had only marginal success.  
To help explain why efforts at organizational reform have had limited impact, 
science policy scholar Rajeswari Raina has written extensively on the barriers to 
institutional change in Indian agricultural science. She argued that, “by the mid-1970s, 
agricultural science had become one of the administrative inputs locked into India’s food 
   215 
security goals by weeding out the variety or organizational formats and sources of 
funding and eulogizing the achievements of the green revolution” to the detriment of 
state level agriculture (Raina, 2011a, p. 109). Raina has ultimately found that repeated 
calls at organizational change have failed because they do not address the existing norms, 
values, and incentives of research that were created before and during the green 
revolution. She has suggested that scientists and administrators need to adopt new norms 
that encourage the researcher to “cater to the local farming communities, respond to 
different biotic and abiotic stress, and foresee and warn the state and stakeholders… 
about possible risks” (Raina, 2011a, p. 112). 
Today, Indian wheat scientists still fervently discuss the merits of wide adaptation 
versus decentralized, location specific research. Polarized views on either side exist, as 
well as those holding hopes of a more pluralistic system that can address country-wide as 
well as region-specific problems. In order to further investigate the current context of 
values towards various research models, in 2013 I conducted nearly fifty interviews with 
current and retired wheat scientists from a variety of research institutions in north India 
(see Introduction for interview methodology). The results, which are explored in the next 
section, indicate that Indian wheat scientists hold a great diversity of views on the current 
research system. While wide adaptation has been the dogma of Indian wheat science for 
fifty years, many (roughly half) of the scientists I interviewed expressed a desire to see 
more location or condition specific research, through methods such as breeding for 
specific conditions. Currently, only the well-funded states such as Punjab and Haryana 
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have this capacity. This research capacity is severely lacking in rainfed (northeast) and 
dryland (central and south) areas in India. 
Interviews: Overview 
My interviews covered a broad range of topics related to wheat research in India 
(see Appendix 1). From these interviews, I learned a great deal about how the All India 
Coordinated Wheat Improvement Program presently works, and also a bit about its 
history, from more senior scientists and administrators. One of my primary goals was to 
elucidate on what scale scientists conducted their plant breeding, pathology, agronomy, 
and quality research, i.e., on a national, zonal, state, or district level. I asked this directly 
through question 10 of my interview: “Does your research focus on a wide area or 
specific location?” Responses could be coded from twenty-five of the interviews I 
conducted.48 The coded responses to interview question 10 are given in Table 5. This 
question and the follow up, question 11, “Do you consider factors like micro-climate and 
marginal environments in your own research?,” elicited nuanced and extremely varied 
responses from the scientists on the present state of location/condition specific research 
as well as their personal views on the topic. 
In both questions 10 and 11, I let scientists define for themselves what they meant 
by wide area, specific location, micro-climate, and marginal environments. To some, 
specific location meant the district or even sub-district level. To others, a state or multi-
state agro-climatic zone represented a specific location. The majority of scientists 
responded that they considered microclimatic factors in their research program, or that 
                                                
48 I chose these interviews for coding based on whether the scientist answered all of the questions 
and allowed me to record the interview. 
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they hoped in the future to consider microclimate in the research. Scientists in 
northeastern India noted that there were several location specific challenges there, 
including a lack of late-sown (short duration) varieties. Other challenges in the northeast 
included terminal heat stress, moisture stress, the need for more effective extension, and 
the need to recommend the right varieties to farmers and to take old varieties off the 
market.  
 Research by area. As Table 5 shows, most of the wheat scientists that I 
interviewed were working on research delimited by an agro-climatic zone. These agro-
climatic zones are determined by the All India Coordinated Wheat Improvement 
Program, and as described in Chapter 3, the concept of delimiting research by broad agro-
climatic zones was codified during the RF’s involvement in Indian wheat research in the 
1960s. India is presently divided into six agro-climatic zones for wheat. Because my 
study was restricted to the Northeastern and Northwestern Plains Zone, most of my 
respondents were also working in this area. Five of the scientists interviewed worked in 
northeast India while the remaining respondents were located in the Northwestern Plains 
Zone. Scientists who responded that their research area was the state were those working 
at a state agricultural university. The two scientists who responded that they work on the 
basis of specific conditions were both located in Bihar. Those who were working for the 
whole country were located at the Directorate of Wheat Research (DWR; headquarters of 
the All India Coordinated Wheat Improvement Program). These responses are consistent 
with the mandates of the different research organizations. 
Table 5 
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Coded Responses to Interviews with Indian Wheat Scientists. 
Question: Does your research focus on a 
wide area or specific location? 
Specific conditions only: 2 
By state: 3 
By agro-climatic zone: 15 
General conditions only: 5 
 
Influence of the Green Revolution. Many of the scientists’ responses reflected 
the influence of the green revolution and Borlaug’s concept of wide adaptation. It is clear 
that wide adaptation still remains a major goal of the wheat-breeding program. One 
respondent said, “in the All India Coordinated program our aim is to have varieties with 
the wider adaptability” (S22). A scientist at the Directorate of Wheat Research said, “our 
mandate is complete India. We are not confined like in state universities, which have 
location specific mandate” (S6). Other statements reflected opinions such as “every 
breeder likes to go for developing the material which can fit everywhere” (S1). Several 
scientists supported research on a zonal basis only, stating that, “In my opinion we should 
breed for larger area… The conditions for wheat cultivation do not vary much” (S3) and 
that “we need varieties that should not be very specific to any particular location, but 
should have a wide adaptability” (S9). Others noted that even though their focus was at 
the zonal level, “it applies to whole India” (S18). 
Breeding methods and philosophies also reflected the historical influence of 
Borlaug’s belief that wide adaptation means a stable phenotype, regardless of 
environmental context. While they were not asked to define wide adaptation, scientists 
generally referred to wide adaptation to mean a variety that can be grown over a wide 
area and that is resistant to different types of stress. For example, “if a varieties having 
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wider adaptability, it means it is not much influenced say by climate” (S1). One scientist 
stated, “whether it is due to disease, biotic stresses, abiotic stresses, whatever the stress is, 
we breed so the losses to the stresses are minimized because of inherent capacity of the 
variety” (S6). Another scientist mentioned shuttle breeding as a way to breed climate-
resilient varieties, stating:  
Our main challenge is to select and breed the varieties which are adapted to wide 
range of climates. So being climate resilient varieties, a particular variety can 
yield higher under higher temperature regimes, under low irrigation, or even after 
if the cooler period is gone. We are using this shuttle breeding program to select 
such varieties. (S11) 
The interviews also reflected that many scientists were satisfied with the prevailing 
system of “working for the wheat improvement for optimal environment” (S18). One 
scientist noted that, “better performing genotypes having wider adaptability are selected 
on the mean basis only. Environment effect is not taken into account” (S14). Although 
the same scientist stated that “varieties developed for high yielding environments” did not 
perform well for marginal farmers, because “they’re not putting input so they’re not 
getting yield” (S14). These statements and those reflected in the previous paragraphs are 
extremely resonant of the green revolution-era arguments seen in Chapter 3. There are 
strong institutional values towards wide adaptation and breeding under favorable 
environments, as I have claimed throughout my dissertation. They also reflect Borlaug’s 
bias towards the “inherent capacity” of the genotype and a neglect of the environmental 
context of yield. 
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Location specific research for microclimatic variation. Despite widespread 
acceptance of wide adaptation as a main goal of the wheat improvement program, many 
of the scientists expressed a desire to see more location specific research and in situ 
breeding and research of wheat varieties. Scientists reflected statements such as “in future 
I’m hopeful that we are going to consider the microclimates at the district level” (S15) 
and “because our zones are so large… if you propose a single variety for such a large 
area, it’s not a good practice” (S6). One research administrator stated that the “varietal 
development and testing program needs to be very careful today according to a smaller or 
different type of agro-climatic significant difference… maybe the number of varieties 
will be more… but the productivity, I believe personally, productivity may go up” (RA1). 
One scientist in northeast India stated that, “I would like to recommend the varieties 
suitable for specific conditions. Because the conditions differ very widely, if you go for 
15 km, 10 km, there is difference” (S2). A wheat quality scientist noted that, “the zones 
that they have made are basically from a yield point of view or similarity of the agro-
climate. But that doesn’t suit for me as a quality person… we get location specificity in 
case of quality” (S19). These concerns were closely tied to ideas that the agro-climatic 
conditions within a zone, state, or even a district are too varied to address with a one-size-
fits-all breeding program.  
These scientists conveyed varying levels of dissatisfaction with the present system 
of breeding and testing, where breeding is done under favorable conditions, and then 
finished varieties are sent out for multi-location testing. One scientist described the 
system of multi-location testing as “just looking into our selection of varieties and if 
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something clicks, by chance, we send it” (S19). In other words, varieties are not bred for 
specific conditions, and this assessment for their fit under rainfed or other conditions is 
only post hoc.  
Among other critiques of the coordinated system, one researcher argued that the 
testing and release program should be opened up to more players: 
It will be better if we open our system of testing and releasing the varieties. …our 
system of the coordinated trials has evolved about 20 to 30 years before, when 
there was limited players in the seed production and the private players were not 
even present, but now that the country has grown very fast, the number of private 
players, particularly for the seed production, are interested, so you should propose 
or let the system be open to accommodate a large number of varieties…. I 
presume it’s suicidal to promote a single variety to be grown in a zone like the 
northwestern plain zone, where one variety at a particular point, say PBW343, 
CIMMYT’s strain, was dominating over 9 to 10 million hectares, and that variety 
during its period of time, was susceptible to yellow rust, but by chance it escaped 
during its period of dominance… you are serving on the plate the condition for 
epidemic by growing a single variety… so you must… even through other routes 
than the coordinated program, to develop the strain and get it released to the 
farmers, so that diversity is created. [emphasis added] (S6) 
This researcher also noted that in the current system, the best one or two varieties are 
released in a zone, and usually only one is promoted by the extension program, leading to 
a wheat-growing area more vulnerable to abiotic stresses. 
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Finally, based on my interviews, it appears that very little research, if any, is done 
in situ for specific conditions or locations (other than for favorable conditions). Despite 
this, many scientists conveyed a desire to see more in situ wheat breeding and testing 
programs. A scientist reflected: 
To select for the area for which we are targeting, we should do our whole plant 
breeding in that area, meaning we should not put our finished material in that 
area… Then we will be able to get better yield. If we do the breeding for drought 
in irrigated areas … then we might get some of the genotypes but that might not 
be true for all. (S14)  
One scientist noted the vast difference between the breeding station and the farmers’ 
field, “whatever we breed at the research institution we give all required input, and then 
we say this is the yield potential, but the same may not be reflected in the farmers’ field” 
(S5), particularly in Bihar where most farmers do not irrigate more than once or twice a 
season.  
A retired administrator also remarked on the historical evolution of the wheat 
research program, and how that has codified several problematic assumptions.  
You see, exactly thus far, with the introduction of the high yielding varieties and 
the urgency to increase production the focus was in the well endowed, irrigated 
areas, very little attention to rainfed areas. Also the general philosophy was that 
there are always spillover effects and therefore—and there are good examples 
where those spillover effects have affected—for example, some of the marginal 
varieties were bred for the irrigated areas, they found a place in the rainfed 
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areas… The elements of development are the same: varieties plus fertilizers. Even 
that addressing the specific needs of a region was never on the agenda. And this 
was true even for the agricultural universities. Because largely when we received 
international germplasm the flow was from the center to the ICAR institutes to the 
coordinated projects down the line. Now primarily a lot of work they’re doing 
under the local conditions, but… ultimately bigger funding comes from the 
central sources. The specific focus on rainfed areas, my own feeling is… limited. 
And at least definitely varieties are not bred with those situations in mind. The 
kind of region-specificity is one of the major changes looking forward that should 
happen. [emphasis added] (RA2) 
While I previously stated that there are strong institutional norms of wide adaptation, my 
interviews reveal that many scientists value location specific research. They may feel a 
personal obligation to address the problems of rainfed farming, or they may feel that the 
current system has led to the release of inferior varieties. Despite this pluralism of views, 
however, these perspectives are marginalized by the centralized research system. This is 
one of several roadblocks to agricultural innovation and food security, which I will 
discuss in the next section. 
Roadblocks to Agricultural Innovation and Food Security 
The roadblocks to food security in India are complex and deeply embedded. 
These roadblocks occur at nearly every step of the food system. On the production side, 
constraints include abiotic and biotic stress, climate change, slow varietal turnover, and 
lack of extension in marginal areas. Recently, several Indian wheat scientists have 
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brought up the recent convergence of climate change with the stagnant growth of varietal 
yield potential (Joshi et al. 2007, Yadav et al. 2010). Yadav et al. point out that gains in 
production from the green revolution are stagnating because adoption of semi-dwarf 
varieties, fertilizer use, and irrigation have reached a saturation point (2010). Climate 
change is just one of many ecological threats to Indian wheat production. Other 
ecological threats include decreased groundwater levels in the Punjab and Haryana, 
terminal heat stress, and the global threat of the Ug99 pathogen, which 90% of wheat 
varieties are susceptible to (Aggarwal et al. 2004; Joshi et al. 2007, Ortiz et al. 2008, 
Singh et al., 2011; Yadav et al. 2010). While Ug99 has not yet reached India, Indian 
wheat production is vulnerable due to the widespread adoption of the susceptible 
PBW343 variety (Singh et al., 2011).  
 When analyzing the Indian wheat research system as a whole, a persistent 
problem is the poor linkages between research and extension (i.e. development of 
technologies and ground-level promotion and education of new technologies). In other 
words, there is a significant disconnect between the goals of wheat researchers and the 
practitioners of agriculture. Raina et al. wrote that, “The need to increase funding for and 
strengthen research-extension linkages in order to deliver knowledge about modern 
technologies has been a consistent refrain in every single review of agricultural research 
and extension, agricultural policy, trade and development since the 1970s (Raina et al., 
2007, p. 14). From my analysis, I attribute this poor linkage to three main factors: 1) 
persistent reliance on the transfer of technology model of research, 2) lack of incentives 
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within the public sector for client-oriented research and extension, and 3) what Raina 
calls the “blame game.” 
Transfer of Technology Model. Many scholars have pointed out that agricultural 
researchers very often adhere to the transfer of technology model of research, also known 
as the linear model of innovation (Biggs, 1990; Hall et al., 2000; Klerkx & Leeuwis, 
2008; Thompson & Scoones, 2009). The linear model is defined as: 
A simplistic conception of scientific and technical advance that nonetheless 
remains an influential driver of science policy. According to the linear model, 
innovation happens in the following way: basic or fundamental research 
contributes to a general pool of knowledge; that pool of knowledge provides a 
resource for engineers or other innovators, who then apply it to create products 
that increase productivity, drive economic growth, enhance military power, and 
otherwise enrich lives and benefit society. This model assumes that advances in 
knowledge are by and large beneficial to society, and that the benefits are both 
automatic and unpredictable. It also assumes a unidirectional flow of knowledge 
that privileges basic research above applied as the originator of all scientific 
benefit. (Meyer, 2011, p. 64) 
In this agricultural research community, adhering to the linear model of science means 
that researchers do not focus on the impact of their research. Instead, they focus on 
producing basic science and assume that this will lead to socially desirable outcomes. 
Others have described this as the “loading dock model” of research, meaning “You take it 
out there, and you leave it on the loading dock and you say, there it is. And then you walk 
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away and go back inside” (Cash, Borck, & Patt, 2006, p. 484). Like the linear model and 
the loading dock model, the transfer of technology model assumes a linear flow of 
knowledge and benefits from the scientist to the end-user, in this case the farmer. It also 
reinforces a sharp divide between scientists as producers, extension personnel as strictly 
educators, and farmers as passive consumers. 
 We see evidence of the linear model of science in the hierarchy of agricultural 
sciences in India. The more basic sciences, such as plant breeding and biotechnology, are 
more prestigious, while the applied agricultural sciences, such as agronomy and 
extension, are less so. Yadav et al. wrote that for Indian wheat production, “Germplasm 
improvement is still paramount” (2010, p. 166). The centralization of wheat research in 
the northwest also represents the belief that basic research from this area can be 
transferred equally well to other areas. Thus, there is no need for strong state and regional 
research if one believes in the linear model. This is shown in statements such as, 
“Supporting basic and strategic research that generate ‘spillovers’ broadly” 
(Mruthyunjaya & Ranjitha, 1998, p. 1095). While basic research such as plant breeding is 
obviously important, what is the point of it if most new technologies are not reaching 
farmers? Hall et al. recommend that, “the public sector needs to shift from scientific 
research per se to R&D activities focused around themes relating to improved economic 
production” (2002, p. 174). I will further explore this at the end of this chapter. 
 Public Sector Research. Another major barrier to an effective agricultural 
innovation system in India is the public sector orientation of wheat research. Because of 
the public sector orientation, there is a lack of incentive to achieve specific outcomes. 
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Hall et al. wrote, “the broad patterns of institutional arrangements in the public sector 
remain unchallenged” (2002, p. 173), resulting in strong disciplinary divisions and 
isolation among and between organizations. This isolation between different research 
organization and between research, extension, and seed production is a major problem in 
the wheat sector. 
For wheat, research is almost all performed in the public sector—by the state 
agricultural universities, IARI, and the DWR. Because wheat is self-pollinating and not 
hybridized, farmers can save their seed (Krishna et al., 2014). Thus the public sector has 
a mandate to focus on wheat, which may otherwise be a “market failure,” unlike hybrid 
vegetables and other crops that are more appetizing to the private sector. These public 
sector organizations help decide what wheat varieties to release, and then seed 
producers—which include the National Seed Corporation, state seed corporations, and 
private seed producers—put in requests for seeds that they will then multiply and 
distribute. Extension programs in India are also largely public sector (Babu et al., 2013). 
Wheat procurement and distribution are supervised by the Food Corporation of India, a 
government-run organization. 
 While public sector system of research, seed production, and marketing operates 
efficiently in Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh, the situation in northeast and 
central India is quite different (Nagarajan, 2005). Based on my own interviews in 
northwest and northeast India, there was a very stark difference in farmers’ access to 
extension, markets, and inputs between the regions. In the northeast, extension efforts are 
concentrated around the research stations, and the main source of information for farmers 
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is from seed and fertilizer sellers. Babu et al. reported that in 2003, “Sixty per cent of the 
farmer-households in India did not access any information on modern technologies that 
year” (2013, p. 162). According to my interviews, there is also a definite gap between the 
varieties that scientists recommend for particular areas and the varieties that are actually 
multiplied and provided to farmers. This is partly because some farmers demand older 
varieties, for example the variety UP262 (released in 1977) is preferred for its quality in 
northeast India. Recently, it has also been more difficult to establish the yield advantage 
of varieties over PBW343 (released in 1995). But the lack of adoption of new varieties 
also points out the poor linkages between research, extension, and seed production. 
Krishna et al. wrote:  
First, the research system may not be efficiently identifying and translating farmer 
preferences for varietal attributes into cultivars that they are willing and able to 
adopt. Second, the seed production system may not be producing what farmers 
actually demand due to a poor seed demand assessment system. Third, extension 
programs and other distribution mechanisms may be underperforming in their 
efforts to convey the genetic superiority of improved varieties to farmers. 
(Krishna et al., 2014, p. 18) 
In my research I observed that the first topic is seldom discussed. There was a near 
universal agreement that the biggest farmer preference was for yield, thus, the entire 
research system is built around evaluating varieties for their yield. Studies have shown 
that farmers do not only value yield, and that they will accept lower yields for higher 
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yield stability over time (Bellon & Risopoulos, 2001). All three of these points merit 
further research, as they are extremely underdeveloped in existing data and literature.  
 The ultimate problem with so much of the wheat sector being public is there are 
few incentives for the system to either set or meet outcomes (e.g. replacement of 
varieties, increased on-farm profits, food security). There is a variety of evidence from 
other sectors that just because a public sector intervenes to fill a market failure, this does 
not ensure a successful outcome (Bozeman & Sarewitz, 2005; Meyer, 2011; Trouiller et 
al. 2002). Barry Bozeman (2002) has called this a public value failure. Public-private 
partnerships are typically recommended to support inefficient public sector activities, and 
there is some evidence that privatized extension services are successful in India (Babu et 
al., 2013). But the general institutional barrier that the public sector faces is the lack of 
client-orientation.49 But despite a shift in global research trends, Indian wheat research 
holds strong institutional hierarchies that discourage consulting end-users of 
technologies, ultimately resulting in technologies that are not adopted (Hall et al., 2002; 
Yadav et al., 2010). 
The Blame Game. While India’s wheat production has increased since the green 
revolution, the food security of its residents has not. Naturally, policymakers and 
researchers try to explain this disconnect between production and food security. What 
results, however, is what Raina called “the blame game.” Policymakers blame scientists, 
scientists blame extension, etc. for not carrying through with transfer of new 
technologies. Raina wrote: 
                                                
49 Client-oriented agricultural research surfaced in the 1980s along with farming systems 
research (Byerlee & Tripp, 1988). 
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When it comes to credit for food production, the agricultural technologies – the 
very varieties, irrigation, chemicals and pesticides, and the research organizations 
take it all. When it comes to the blame game – about persistence of rural poverty 
and hunger, child and adult malnutrition, environmental and social disruption, it is 
the other organizations and policies – the Food Corporation of India and the 
Public Distribution System, state and national level schemes for rural employment 
and poverty alleviation, input subsidies, rural credit, irrigation policy, 
international trade and the WTO, that are accused. (Raina, 2011b, p. 2) 
This is supported by my interviews, where extension efforts in northeastern India were 
often blamed. S. Nagarajan, former director of the IARI and the coordinated wheat 
program, wrote in 2005 that “National-level wheat production will change if only the 
states in NEPZ [northeastern plains zone] and CZ [central zone] take their assigned 
responsibility with seriousness” (Nagarajan, 2005, p. 1468), blaming lack of wheat 
production on the lack of “seriousness” in those areas (and conveniently forgetting about 
the structural barriers to research and production there). In a 1998 paper by agricultural 
researchers Mruthyunjaya and Ranjitha, they wrote, “extension will necessarily have to 
adopt problem-solving approaches, and develop methods for transferring more site 
specific information and technical knowledge” (Mruthyunjaya & Ranjitha, 1998, p. 
1095). While this is certainly true, the already-overburdened extension system is made 
the sole responsible party for ensuring that location-specific information is transferred 
(Raina et al., 2007). And finally, I found that scientists blamed intellectual property rights 
(IPR) for creating a hostile system for scientists. For example, it was mentioned that 
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unfinished varieties simply could not be given to farmers (a critical step in participatory 
breeding methods) due to the IPR restrictions. 
 The persistence of the blame game has two primary negative outcomes. One, of 
course, is that parties tend to absolve themselves of blame and fail to recognize their own 
role in the innovation system, instead sticking to the rigid idea of the transfer of 
technology, or loading dock, model. Two, parties overwhelmingly fail to recognize that 
production is only one part of the food security equation. Scientists tend to focus on the 
“yield gap” between optimal and actual field conditions, and are constrained to the 
production paradigm. Sen’s classic text (1983) on entitlements and the distribution of 
food is certainly worth considering. Within India, there are serious problems with wheat 
procurement, distribution, and storage that must be addressed. That said, Indian scientists 
and policymakers must critically reconsider the agricultural innovation system—
including its goals, linkages, and outcomes—in order to improve food security in the 
country. 
Abiotic Stresses and Climate Change 
 Many scientists now imagine agriculture under a post-climate change landscape. 
The concept of adaptation plays two parts in these future scenarios: the more narrow 
study of plant physiological adaptations to climate, and the broader suite of socio-
ecological and technological changes in agriculture and rural economies needed to adapt 
to climate change. In international agricultural research organizations, the first vision—of 
plant physiological adaptation—is most prominent (Reynolds, Pask, & Mullan, 2012).  
This is not surprising given the historical trajectory of green revolution research. Araus et 
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al. state, “plant adaptation is a key factor that will determine the future severity of the 
effects of climatic change on food production” (2008, p. 379). Scientists seek to create 
climate-proof or climate-resilient plant varieties, in other words, they seek varieties that 
can tolerate or escape abiotic stresses. This approach is supported by literally decades of 
institutional support that favors plant breeding and varietal improvement as a primary 
motivator of agricultural production. It also fits perfectly into the narrative of widely 
adapted crop varieties; i.e. one variety that can be grown over a variety of locations and 
conditions. The problem with the abiotic stress approach is threefold: 1) the current 
Indian wheat research and testing system is poor at identifying and releasing abiotic 
stress tolerant varieties, 2) new abiotic stress tolerant varieties are not likely to reach the 
rainfed and marginal farmers who would most benefit from them, and 3) it ignores the 
synergistic effects of climate change on abiotic and biotic stresses (e.g. how pathogen 
ranges and vulnerabilities will change due to climate change). 
Indian farmers face a range of abiotic stresses, but especially drought and heat 
stress. A pervasive abiotic stress in the wheat-growing areas of the Indo-Gangetic Plains 
is terminal heat stress, which is a sudden rise in temperature at the end of the wheat 
season that results in shriveled grains. According to Yadav et al., 
A significant portion of wheat growing areas in India comprising southern 
Haryana, whole Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujrat, eastern Uttar Pradesh and 
part of Bihar faces abiotic stresses particularly terminal heat and water deficiency 
during reproductive phase. In most of these areas except Haryana, the yield gain 
due to green revolution has been limited. (2010, p. 167) 
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Further, while the wheat producing areas of India are officially classified as over 80% 
irrigated,  “only one-third receives full irrigation” and most wheat, by area, is grown 
under partial irrigation (Joshi et al., 2008, p. 437). These existing abiotic stressors are 
compounded by the predicted impacts of climate change (O’Brien et al., 2004; Ortiz, et 
al., 2008) 
While abiotic stress tolerance has become a major goal of some agricultural 
research organizations, the national mandates for research and testing provide limited 
avenues for scientists to develop stress-tolerant varieties. Wide adaptation still rules 
implicit and explicitly in Indian wheat research. Because of the wheat research system’s 
orientation towards wide adaptation and the way it is codified into the wheat testing 
system, the identification and release of varieties targeted towards a specific set of stress 
conditions is severely hampered. For a new wheat variety to be released in India, 
scientists must prove that it is widely adapted within an agro-climatic zone. Wide 
adaptation is measured by the average yield over location; thus, potentially stress-tolerant 
varieties that have lower average yields are ignored. This constrains location specific 
research towards problems like terminal heat stress; further compounded by the 
northwestern centralization of Indian wheat research that marginalizes research in other 
agro-climatic regions. Research funding is largely centralized, leaving little leverage for 
location specific endeavors. Relying on wide adaptation means scientists are still focused 
on developing a few varieties, leaving a vulnerable genetic base against abiotic stress and 
pathogens (Krishna et al., 2014). Not only does this create a system vulnerable to stress, 
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but it overlooks the needs of marginal farmers who work under low inputs and high 
climatic variation. 
In India, a senior wheat breeder reflected on challenges of wheat breeding for 
abiotic stresses. He stated, “We never really talked of heat tolerance. I remember the 
early parts of my work here, working with my senior colleagues, we didn’t talk of heat 
tolerance as such, neither drought tolerance as such, though we were breeding for a 
rainfed environment, in one situation, and a late sown environment in another situation” 
(S24). He hypothesized that “because much less success, historically, has been witnessed 
in this area compared to the biotic stresses, compared to the plant architecture… that 
sometimes puts apprehension in the mind of the [research] worker” to work on heat and 
drought tolerance (S24). He further noted that heat tolerance and climate change will be a 
major issue in the future, because “the way we are growing it [wheat] here is already 
stretching its adaptation” (S24).  
Technological ways to ameliorate terminal heat stress exist, such as developing 
shorter duration or heat tolerant varieties. Developing so-called climate-resilient wheat 
varieties has been the focus of a USAID-supported project in India (USAID, 2013). But 
these basic research-oriented approaches to abiotic stress and climate change ignore the 
many biophysical and socioeconomic constraints to diffusing new varieties in heat 
stressed areas such as the northeastern Indo-Gangetic Plains, where research, extension, 
and seed distribution systems are poorly developed and networked. While the silver 
bullet of abiotic stress tolerant varieties is appealing, it ultimately falls into the loading 
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dock model of research, and fails to recognize the limitations of technological 
agricultural solutions in India.  
Agricultural Science Policy in India 
As an American historian of science, I am not in a position to recommend any 
specific policies for Indian wheat research. But as the result of my research and 
observations of the Indian wheat research system, I find the works of science and 
technology scholars Raina and Desai compelling in their unified call for Indian scientists 
and policymakers to articulate the science policy goals for Indian wheat research, and I 
would add, a frank look at the tradeoffs of different outcomes.  
In early 2013 I attended a science policy workshop in New Delhi, populated by 
Indian science and technology scholars and activists. A refrain established early in the 
day was, “there is no Indian science policy." The same can be said for Indian agricultural 
science policy. The goals established by the Indian Planning Commission and 
ICAR/DARE (Indian Council of Agricultural Research the Department of Agricultural 
Research and Education) have a long history of mismatch and neglect. Current 
agricultural science policy is schizophrenically divided between increasing aggregate 
production while calling for more attention to rainfed agriculture (Mishra, Ravindra, & 
Hesse, 2013). As Raina described, the only goals are currently articulated as “economic 
growth rates or food production targets” (Raina, 2011b, p. 1). This is under the implicit 
understanding that “agricultural growth is a means to the larger goals of employment-led 
growth and poverty reduction” (Desai et al., 2011, p. 43). The Government of India has 
repeatedly called for a more inclusive type of agriculture, as seen in recent campaigns 
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such as “Bringing the Green Revolution in Eastern India,” National mission for 
sustainable agriculture, and the National food security mission (Government of India, 
2007; Government of India, 2010; Government of India, 2014). But when scientific 
outcomes are only measured by agricultural growth and production, there is no way that 
these promulgations can succeed in their stated goals. 
 To begin, it is obvious that the Indian wheat science policy is in need of change. 
From the policy planning side, Desai et al. wrote,  
Policy planners recognised the need for higher agricultural growth, but they 
placed too much faith in the reforms and not enough emphasis on critical policy 
changes. More specifically, policy neglected basic institutions such as the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), state agricultural universities (SAUs) 
and departments of agriculture in the central and state governments. It relied on 
the market to evolve and transfer relevant technologies rather than getting it being 
done through institutions that governments had arduously built over the earlier 
decades. (Desai et al., 2011, p. 42)  
They wrote further that: 
The central government should aim at is visualizing the “outcomes” related to 
seed/breed-cum-resource centered technical change. These outcomes would relate 
to the productivity of field crops, livestock and horticulture; the real agricultural 
GDP growth; this growth as a ratio of real overall GDP growth; the change in the 
number of poor and poverty ratio; the change in real earnings of farm labourers; 
and the incidence of food inflation. (Desai et al., 2011, p. 48) 
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Finally, Desai et al. listed some of their recommendations, the first three of which are 
listed here: 
(1) The central government must adopt and encourage decentralization of the 
ICAR’s organisation and management and funding operations, as recommended 
by the Mashelkar Committee and the Swaminathan Committee. 
(2) The ICAR’s system and SAUs must be restructured to produce relevant 
research and higher agricultural education by granting them academic autonomy 
and the funds to effect a change in the paradigm to that of the new technology.  
(3) This paradigm requires human resources that will implement location-specific 
integrated farming instead of advocating reducing the gap in yield by tinkering 
with farmers’ fields and experimental farms. (Desai et al., 2011, p. 46) 
Policy makers must decide what, exactly, are the goals of continued investment in public 
wheat research. Are the goals simply increased wheat production? Improved nutrition? 
Higher exports? Higher per capita consumption? Inter-regional equity? Poverty 
reduction? Or, as recently discussed by IFPRI researchers, should public policy “support 
small family farms in either moving up to commercially oriented and profitable farming 
systems or moving out of agriculture to seek nonfarm employment opportunities” (IFPRI 
2015, p. 29)? All of these have come up throughout discussions over the years, but there 
is no meaningful connection between these goals and measureable outcomes. 
 Raina, in turn, called for scientists themselves to “articulate the goals, demands, 
inadequacies, advances, and improvements needed in S&T to ensure delivery of 
development goods for the agricultural sector” (Raina, 2011b, p. 5). If scientists can 
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identify their own goals—not just research goals, but outcomes, such as varietal adoption, 
etc.—they can assess their own research system and critically engage with policymakers. 
Finally, with a nod to history, India faces the same question that ICARDA did in 1975, 
which is whether it should “devote a major part of its effort and resources to programs 
which will not yield an identifiable production such as a IR-8 or dwarf wheat? If so wheat 
criteria should be used to measure Program effectiveness? Will such criteria be accepted 
as valid by donor agencies and the general public?” (Russell, January 1975, p. 31). Indian 
wheat research is publicly funded, thus it does have a fulfillment to stakeholders in India. 
Whether they want to be measured as “a burden on the State as it failed the farmers and 
the farming sector,” as Kerala Agricultural University was recently called, or not, is in 
part up to scientists and policymakers (Sudhi, March 27, 2013).  
Conclusion 
In summary, I will reference Thomas Hughes’ theory of technological momentum 
and examine the possible ways that the Indian wheat research system can emerge from 
the current track of institutional path dependency. My main argument is that radical 
institutional change (changing of values, professional norms, and bureaucracy) is 
necessary to make a lasting change in Indian wheat research.  
Raina, among others, has written that, “There is a pervasive inability to perceive 
and change these institutional rigidities within the agricultural research and extension 
system in the country” (Raina et al., 2009, p. 10). These institutional rigidities were 
formed during the green revolution, as I have shown in Chapter 3, and continued up to 
today due to bureaucracy, professional norms, and the rules of the wheat research system 
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that have all been strengthened by the green revolution narrative. Indian research 
administrators must seriously consider whether the top-down, centralized system is 
sustainable. When faced with a food crisis in 1942, 1958, and 1965, India chose the top-
down approach, now canonized as the green revolution. It is true that the green revolution 
increased wheat production. But if Indian administrators want to support small farmers, 
as they have claimed since Indian independence, the current institutional arrangement of 
Indian wheat research must be seriously overhauled. Raina pointed out that traditional 
prescriptions of organizational change have for the most part failed at creating 
institutional change because these policy prescriptions fail to address “rules, norms or 
habits” (2003, p. 97). As I have shown, continued calls for more attention to marginal and 
rainfed research have failed because they do not change the key factors of technological 
momentum in the wheat research system. 
I suggest that while wide adaptation theoretically would be helpful in buffering 
the impacts of climate change, in reality, the current system is focused on favorable 
conditions. In order to create a research system that can address issues such as climate 
adaptation, terminal heat stress, and water stress, we must dismantle the narrative of wide 
adaptation and the problematic assumptions that it encodes. This requires a massive shift 
in the policy, values, and structure of Indian wheat research, requiring an overhaul in 
agricultural education, policies, and administration. But if accomplished, this could open 
the door for research focused on location specific problems and abiotic stresses. Further 
than dismantling narratives, however, Indian agricultural science policy faces serious 
hurdles to deliver food security. These can be partially addressed by syncing science 
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policy goals across sectors and more closely aligning public sector systems with the 
demands of end users. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
My dissertation is a historical exploration of how certain plant breeding practices 
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became embedded in Indian and international wheat science. I initially set out to study 
how the agricultural research institutions set up during the green revolution were 
responding to impending climate change. But upon my first site visit to India, I was 
immediately intrigued by the pervasive rhetoric of wide adaptation in plant breeding 
experiments, and in the prevailing notion that abiotic stress tolerance could simply be 
“added” to crop varieties without considering the likely tradeoffs between yield and stress 
tolerance. These topics are, as I have learned and shown, both linked to Norman 
Borlaug’s concepts of wide adaptation and plant breeding under favorable conditions that 
he developed in the 1960s, and his subsequent deployment of these concepts to argue that 
certain varieties were superior under both favorable and stressed conditions.  
While my historical approach and topic (the green revolution) are by no means 
novel, my study reinforces existing historical work and adds new insights to the 
literature. I reinforce the work of Cullather (2010) and Perkins (1997) to show that the 
green revolution was not a linear transfer of technology, but rather a result of coinciding 
socio-political forces such as the Cold War, concerns over population, a faith in 
technological solutions, the rising status of plant breeders, new institutions in 
international aid and development, and policy changes in India and other countries. This 
narrative rebuts the typical claim held by agricultural scientists that the green revolution 
was primarily driven by the discovery of semi-dwarf wheat. 
If there is one thing the reader can take away from this dissertation, it is that 
Borlaug’s use of wide adaptation was both political and flawed, and that agricultural 
scientists today must move beyond this outdated concept. Borlaug believed that wide 
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adaptation implied genetic guarantee of high yields, regardless of environment. He 
strategically leveraged this concept to justify the expansion of his international wheat 
program and intervention in countries like India. In reality, Borlaug’s wide adaptation 
was the result of a fertilizer responsiveness and photoperiod insensitivity, neither of 
which are a guarantee of high yields. These characteristics, like many genetic traits, are 
context-dependent and not universally applicable. Yet Borlaug’s context-free, universal 
phenotype is what wide adaptation came to represent. Further, I add the claim that 
Borlaug’s wide adaptation, which allowed wheat varieties that he bred in Mexico to grow 
in India and many parts of the Middle East, was a lucky historical accident. We saw in 
the case of Turkey that there was no widely adapted winter wheat, due to the particular 
agro-climatic circumstances of the region. We also saw in India that wide adapted wheats 
were not superior to local varieties in central and southern India, and that rainfed farmers 
preferred the tall Indian variety C306 even after Borlaug’s varieties were widespread. 
Both maize and rice varieties, developed under similar institutional structures and 
scientific principles, never displayed the same global spread due to the wider variations in 
maize-growing areas in Mexico and rice-growing areas in south and southeast Asia. 
Unfortunately, wheat breeders today still rely on the rhetoric of wide adaptation to justify 
research programs aimed at favorable conditions. The somewhat recent success of 
CIMMYT’s Veery wheat reinforced the green revolution narratives of a technological 
breakthrough in yield followed by a rapid adoption across wheat-growing regions. But “it 
is impossible to speak of yield without reference to the environment” (Lewontin, 1983, p. 
146). The concept of maximum yield means nothing if actual farmers’ field conditions 
   243 
diverge from carefully managed research station trials. 
The idea of wide adaptation permeated more than just discussions of germplasm 
during the green revolution. In the 1960s, agricultural research transformed from a “site-
specific science” to a broadly applicable set of principles. Scientists and international 
organizations picked up the dogma that not just plant varieties, but also packages of 
technology, could be standardized and widely adopted. This narrative is pervasive, and it 
fails to recognize the variability and location specific needs of agricultural places. These 
range from particular agro-climatic circumstances to sociopolitical regimes. Robert 
Herdt, who worked for the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in India in the 1960s, and 
later for IRRI, has written an exemplary list of lessons:  
First, it is critical not to underestimate the temporal and spatial variability of the 
biological and physical conditions in which agriculture operates; second, it is 
critical not to underestimate the institutional challenges of agricultural 
development; third, ever-renewing agricultural technology is essential and simply 
transferring technology from other parts of the world or from international 
research centers will have limited value without local adaptive research; fourth, 
every country needs its own people with the capacity to conduct adaptive 
agricultural research and to design and implement agricultural policy; and fifth, 
people in assistance agencies, national organizations and in rural areas are the key 
to successful development assistance. (Herdt, 2012, p. 180) 
These lessons directly contradict the philosophy of wide adaptation and the transfer of 
technology model that has been widespread in international agricultural research.  
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 Finally, this dissertation helps illuminate the challenges that Indian and 
international wheat research organizations have faced when adjusting to changing 
paradigms of international aid. When equity became important to aid donors in the 1970s, 
wheat researchers slowly responded by attempting to address rainfed and dryland wheat. 
These programs are still severely marginalized. Agricultural research organizations have 
also struggled to address Sen’s classic finding that increased agricultural production does 
not lead to improved food security (1983).  
I would like to recognize that this dissertation deals with a very small part of the 
food system and the food security equation. I focus on the history of plant breeding and 
testing largely because of its historical importance, and the academic prominence of plant 
breeders (ascending from less prestigious “botanists”) in India in the 1960s and beyond. 
In other realms of wheat research, I have largely ignored pathology, agronomy, soil 
science, hydrology, physiology, extension, and, more recently, biotechnology. I do not 
want to leave the reader with an impression that plant breeding is the most important 
science, but I am recognizing that over the past 50 years, it has been promoted that way. 
This perhaps traces back to the forced distinction of “basic” versus “applied” sciences, 
where basic sciences are viewed as more prestigious. It also has to do with the historical 
focus on the release of new varieties and the prestige tied to developing a popular variety, 
versus the less showy advancements in agronomy and soil conservation. 
  Finally, I rebuke the idea that we should uphold the science policies developed 
during the green revolution because they were successful for wheat. These institutions 
and principles were developed over fifty years ago, in a context of post-colonial 
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development and modernization that no longer applies. In other words, a modern green 
revolution by nature must be different than the previous green revolution: we should not 
constrain possible future innovations to the narrow set of political and scientific ideas 
present in the 1940s through ‘60s. Further, if we do draw from Borlaug’s biography, we 
should remember that Borlaug’s ideas at the time were radical and paradigm-shifting. 
While I challenge both the means and ends of Borlaug’s wheat research program, he has 
rightfully earned his revolutionary reputation by challenging the institutional norms of his 
own education in the agricultural sciences. 
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1: Can you tell me about your professional background?  
 
2: What is your job in this organization?  
 
2.1: From how long are you working with this organization/university? 
 
3: Are you involved in the Wheat Improvement Project? 
 
3.1: From how long are you working with the Wheat Improvement Project? 
 
4: What does your current research focus on? 
 
4.1: What other crops have you worked on?  
 
Thank you, now I’d like to ask you some questions about wheat improvement in northern 
India. Please feel free to give your honest opinion; I am not evaluating anything and your 
responses will be confidential. I will ask some questions about current issues in wheat 
breeding and about your own research goals. 
 
5: What do you think are the most important traits in wheat grown in northern India 
today? 
 
6: Are there challenges to incorporate those traits in the Wheat Improvement Program?  
 
6.1: If yes, for which traits?  
 
6.2: What are the challenges? 
 
7: What are the challenges of getting these new varieties to farmers? 
 
8: What traits or characteristics in wheat grown in northern India will be the most 
important in the next 5 years?  
 
8.1: In the next 10 years? 
 
9: What is the goal of your research?  
 
 9.1: (Follow up question about specifics) 
 
10: Does your research focus on a wide area or specific location?  
 
10.1: Why?  
 
10.2: Do most other scientists at this organization have similar or different goals? 
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11: Do you consider factors like micro-climate and marginal environments in your own 
research?  
 
11.1: If yes, how? 
 
12: Do you consider factors like farm size, and socio-economic status of farmers in your 
own research?  
 
12.1: If yes, how? 
 
13: Do you think that climate change is important for the Wheat Improvement Program? 
 
 13.1: How? 
 
 13.2: What climate factors do you think will be most important? 
 
Thank you, now I’d like to ask you some questions about wheat policies and interactions 
you have with agricultural extension and farmers. 
 
14: Can you tell me whether government policies have affected your research? 
 
15: Do the current policies support the Wheat Improvement Program? 
 
16: What is something policy-makers could do to strengthen your research program? 
 
17: Do you involve or consult farmers or agricultural extension in your research 
program?  
 
17.1: (if yes) How? 
 
17.2: Has this changed since you started your career? 
 
18: Is agricultural extension doing their job to promote new varieties of wheat?  
 
18.1: Why or why not? 
 
19: What is something agricultural extension could do to promote the goals of wheat 
research? 
 
20: Are farmers adopting new varieties of wheat?  
 
20.1: Why or why not? 
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21: What is something farmers could do to promote the goals of wheat research? 
 
22: Who else do you collaborate with or involve in your research program? 
 
That is all of the questions that I have today. Please let me know if you have any 
questions about your participation in my study. 
